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The Suitability Obligations of Brokers:
Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Securities Code
By ARviD E. RoAcH II*
Today, suitability is achieving a place alongside disclosure
and prevention of fraud as a major philosophical theme underlying the federal securities laws.,

Introduction
All registered securities brokers must tailor their investment
recommendations to the situations and goals of their customers under what have come to be known as "suitability" rules2 imposed by
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a corollary to this
basic obligation, the SEC rule, and probably the NASD rule as well,
require brokers to seek out relevant facts about their customers in
order to meet the customers' needs. The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and other securities exchanges are generally thought to impose similar suitability obligations through the vehicle of "know-yourcustomer" rules. 3 In addition, the NASD, the SEC, the exchanges,
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have all proposed or
adopted a number of suitability rules for particular types of securi* B.A., 1972, Yale University; J.D., 1977, Harvard University. Member, New
York Bar. Law Clerk to the Honorable Thomas P. Griesa, United States District Judge,
Southern District of New York. The author wishes to thank Professor Louis Loss for
his inspiration and guidance.
Lipton, The Customer Suitability Doctrine, in PLI FouTan AiiuvA. INstIrE
273, 93 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr. & J. Schupper
eds. 1973) (prepared statement of M. Lipton).
2. See notes 18-55 & accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 56-82 & accompanying text infra.
1.
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ties. 4 A wide variety of state rules also address the matter of suitability.5
Because the language of suitability and know-your-customer rules
differs significantly among these various and often overlapping jurisdictions, ascertaining the scope of suitability obligations with respect
to many transactions is difficult. Several commentators view the
"embryonic requirement"' 6 of suitability as one evolving toward
a
major independent source of brokers' liability which may reach so
far as to impose a duty on brokers to investigate a security's appropriateness for each customer even in arm's length transactions with
fully informed customers. A related development may be the emergence of a duty to refuse to recommend or engage in transactions
that violate some absolute, objective notion of suitability.
Tracing the development of suitability principles is difficult because there are few reported authorities. 7 Of these authorities, the
majority arose in the context of discretionary accounts or other relationships in which reliance on the broker's recommendations is significant. Fraud or misdeeds tantamount to fraud are generally held
to be prerequisite to the imposition of civil liability or disciplinary
sanctions. Most of the reported authorities adopt a subjective view
of suitability: the concept that a suitable transaction is whatever
transaction the particular customer regards as suitable.
4.

See notes 83-237 & accompanying text infra.

5.

See, e.g., 10

CAL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 260.140.1-5 (1973-74); 1 BLUE

SKY

L.

REP.

(CCH) IT8626, at 4553-4 to 4553-5; Colo. Rule L.72 (d)-(f), id. IT 9703, at 5610
(1977); Midwest Sec. Comm'rs Ass'n, Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs § III (Feb. 28, 1973), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ff4812; North Am. Sec.
Adm'ss Ass'n Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Programs § IV, id. IT 4585
(1977); (Sept. 22, 1976, amended Oct. 12, 1977), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) IT
4585; Central Sec. Adm'rs Council, Proposed Guidelines for the Registration of Commodity Pool Programs [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fu-r. L. REP. (CCH) ff
20,244 (1976). A discussion of state suitability rules is beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Van Camp, Living With Tax Shelters in California: A Discussion of the New California Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 403
(1973); Comment, Investor Suitability Standards in Real Estate Syndication: California's Procrustean Bed Approach, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 471 (1975).
6. 1 A. BROMBERC, SECUITIms LAW: FRAUD: SEC RU.E 10B-5 § 5.4, at 99
(1977).
See also 5A A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 211.01[b] at 9-37
(1977); Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers,

57

CORNELL

L.

REV.

869, 897 (1972).

7. SEC cases either directly imposing sanctions or sustaining NASD disciplinary
proceedings, SEC responses to requests for no-action letters, and court decisions constitute the bulk of the reported authorities. See notes 258-334, 335-88, 342-422 &
accompanying text infra.
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Because the sources of suitability principles are so fragmented
and elusive, generalizations about the suitability doctrine are extremely hazardous. A major objective of this Article is simply to catalogue
and place in temporal context the divergent wellsprings of suitability
principles, bringing the suitability doctrine into focus as the summation of many sources not yet integrated. The Article also considers,
though in less depth, the much debated, pivotal question of whether
a private 6ause of action for damages is available under suitability
rules."
A striking combination of recent developments makes this time
especially appropriate for a critical appraisal of the suitability doctrine. Serious abuses have recently been exposed in the selling of
commodity futures and options, and, as a result, a suitability rule to
govern such transactions has been proposed by the CFTC. 9 The
SEC has cited suitability violations as one reason for initiating a major
investigation of options trading on securities exchanges. 10 The SEC
also recently initiated proceedings to disapprove proposals that the
Commission feared would weaken any suitability obligation that exists under the NYSE know-your-customer rule, and in response, the
Exchange withdrew its proposals." The MSRB has added to these
12
recent developments by proposing a significant new suitability rule.
Also, after eight years of debate over the regulation of tax sheltered
investments, the NASD has proposed detailed suitability regulations
for these securities.' 3 In one of the growing number of lawsuits alleging suitability violations, a court recently granted the first reported
4
award of civil damages under a suitability rule.'
Perhaps most important of all, the American Law Institute (ALI)
completed in May 1978 a comprehensive codification of the federal
securities laws,' 5 which will be submitted to Congress. Whether to
codify suitability obligations was one of the few significant issues
8. See notes 496-540 & accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 219-28 & accompanying text infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
12. See text accompanying note 206 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 178-94 infra.
14. See text accompanying note 343 infra.
15. ALI Fa. SEC. CODE, Proposed Official Draft, published in 1978, Tentative
Drafts Nos. 1-6, published annually from 1972 to 1977, and the Reporter's Revision
of Text of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-3, published in 1974. See generally Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code - Its Purpose, Plan and Progress, 30 VArD. L.

1072

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

which was resolved at the very last minute.' 6 The ALl Federal Securities Code, whether or not it is enacted by Congress, is likely to
be the only effort at overall restructuring of the securities laws for
decades to come. This Article concludes with an examination of the
effect that congressional adoption of the present draft of the Code
would have on the existing legal sources of suitability obligations,
and with the author's favorable analysis of the Code draftsmen's
treatment of suitability.
As presently drafted, the Code would neither establish the
boundaries of suitability principles nor settle finally the question of
whether a private cause of action is available under suitability rules.
The Code would, however, provide the SEC with an entirely new,
specific statutory grant of authority to promulgate rules governing
the suitability of brokers' investment recommendations. 17 What restraints this new grant of rulemaking power, as it is specifically
worded, might place on suitability doctrine, and indeed whether the
SEC would exercise this new power, are problematic.
The Code would also preserve all of the present sources of suitability authority without providing any statutory guidelines to help
resolve the ambiguities of suitability doctrine as it has developed
under these rubrics. With respect to NASD and exchange rules
and the special SEC rules, including the general SEC suitability rule,
that apply only to NASD nonmembers, the Code would give the
SEC the option of finally resolving the private cause of action question and would provide the courts with guidelines for its resolution
failing SEC action.
In the opinion of the author, the last-minute decision of the
Code drafters to confer express power on the SEC to promulgate
rules in the area of suitability was a wise one. The Code, however,
should provide clearly that violation of such rules will give rise to
civil liability.

REv. 315 (1977);

Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project,
25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969); Loss, History of SEC Legislative Programs and Suggestions
For a Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 795 (1967).
16. Telephone conversation between the author and Prof. Louis Loss, Reporter for
the Code, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 13, 1977).
17. ALI Fmn. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 915(a) (3).
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Present Law
A. The Present Sources of Suitability Obligations
The NASD Suitability Rule

Of the many rules that require brokers and dealers'

s

to recom-

mend or sell only those securities appropriate to their customers'
needs and to know relevant facts about their customers, the proto-

type is article III, section 2, of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds
for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial
situation and needs. 9
18. This Article does not distinguish between brokers and dealers; both are generally
intended when the term "broker" is used. See § 3(a) (4) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1970), and ALI FED. SEc. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978)
§ 217 (definition of "broker"); § 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(5) (1970), and ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 235 (definition of "dealer"). This Article also does not address the relationship between brokerage firms and their employees, agents, or partners. Some suitability rules are directly
binding on the latter individuals; others are indirectly binding on individuals through
their firms' suitability obligations and duties of supervision. The detailed rules of
the NASD, SEC, NYSE, and other organizations concerning supervision of employees
and accounts are not considered herein except incidentally. See generally SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKErs OF THE SEctmrrns AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 290-323 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as SPECIAL. STUDY]; see also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13402, 11
SEC DOCKET 2102, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) ff 81,102
(1977) (SEC announcement of continuing concern about inadequate supervision of securities salespersons in the area of suitability). Further, this Article will not treat the
complicated question of the full range of firms' liabilities, as "controllng persons," aiders
and abettors, under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, or otherwise, for
their employees' misdeeds. See, e.g., ALI FaD. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft,
1978) § 1724(a)-(b); id. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 1419(a); id. (Revised Tent.
Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) § 1419(a)-(b); id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1418(a)-(b);
3 L. Loss, SEcurrrias REGULATION 1476-77, 1808-11 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Loss (1961)1; 6 id. at 3671-72, 3930-32 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Loss (1969)] Note, Liability of Controlling Persons - Common Law and Statutory
Theories of Secondary Liability, 24 DRAxE L. REv. 621 (1975). Finally, this Article
does not address the suitability obligations of investment advisers or trustees as such.
See Bines, Setting Investment Objectives: The Suitability Doctrine, 4 SEc. REG. L.J.
276 (1976) (pt. 1); id. 418 (1977) (pt. 2) [hereinafter cited as Bines, Investment
Objectives] Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 721 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bines,
Portfolio Theory].
19. [19761 NASD MANUAL (CCH) ff 2152, at 2051.
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This rule was adopted by the NASD in response to the Maloney Act
of 1938,20 which requires the SEC to register a national securities association only if its rules are designed, inter alia, "to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and
equitable principles of trade."2 ' The NASD rule was adopted with
the original Rules of Fair Practice in 1939,22 and was apparently
predicated on a similar rule promulgated a few years earlier by the
investment banking industry 23 under the National Industrial Recovery
Act.

24

In 1963 the SEC published the Special Study of Securities Mar-

kets, 2a a thorough report which noted that the
unsuitable securities was the subject of frequent
tomers who contacted the SEC with reports
abuses. 2 6 The Special Study recommended that
ity rule be better defined and more stringently

recommendation of
complaints by cusof selling practice
the NASD suitabilenforced, especially

20. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938). See generally 2
Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1359-69; 5 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3448-69;
Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C. INDUS. & Co.s. L. REV. 187
(1965); Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 663, 675-77 (1964). The
Maloney Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to empower the SEC to
register national securities associations. Only the NASD has registered. See SEC,
THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ComIiIssIoN

8 (1974).

21. Section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (Sopp. V
1975). The NASD suitability rule was among those approvcd by the Commission in
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 627 (1939).
22. See NASD, CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION AND BY-LAws, RULES OF FAIR
PRACTICE, AND CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING TRADE PRACTICE COMPLAINTS 39

(1939).
23. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3713 (citing Bickel, Selling to Meet the
Customer's Needs, 39 NAT'L Ass'N SEC. ADM'RS PROCEEDINGS 16, 18 (1950)); O'Boyle,
Suitability, in CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 94 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965)
(prepared statement of T. O'Boyle).
24. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). The rule, adopted on March 23, 1934,
read as follows: "Where an investment banker recommends to an investor the purchase or exchange of any security [he or she shall] have reasonable grounds for believing the security to be acquired by the investor is a suitable investment for such
investor upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such investor as to his other
security holdings and as to his investment situation and needs." NATIONAL RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDIMENT TO CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR INVESTMENT BANK-

ERs 9-10 (Approved Code No. 141, Amendment No. 2 (1934)).
Apparently no cases
were processed under the rule. Bickel, supra note 23, at 18.
25. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18. The Special Study was undertaken at the
behest of Congress. See § 19(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1970).
26. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 269.
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in the mutual fund industry, where violations were particularly endemic.2 7 With respect to all suitability violations the Special Study
concluded:
This area would seem to be a particularly appropriate one to be
dealt with through statements of policy ... which can provide
the necessary balance between generality and specificity of standards. Such statements of policy should cover such matters as:
possible guidelines as to categories or amounts of securities
deemed clearly unsuitable in specified circumstances; practices
deemed incompatible with standards of suitability, such as indiscriminate recommending or selling of specific securities to other
than known customers; and approved and disapproved practices
in the handling of discretionary accounts.28

Following publication of the Special Study, the NASD engaged
in negotiations with the SEC which resulted in the issuance of a
policy statement by the NASD Board of Governors entitled FairDealing with Customers.2 9 The NASD's position in negotiating with the
SEC was that suitability "is a difficult concept to delineate."3 0 A
more vocal dissent from the Special Study's call for elaboration of
suitability obligations came from several of the smaller exchanges
31
and from the investment banking industry.
27. SP CAL STuDy, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 144, 146, 206-07, 212. Among the
Special Study's other conclusions regarding mutual funds were that high pressure selling was common, id. at 146, 206-07; that salesmen had considerable influence over investment decisions, id. at 141, 206; that in most cases salesmen failed to inquire into
customers' income, assets, or obligations, even though their "sales pitch" referred to
such matters as taxes and estate planning, id. at 142, 207; that salesmen often failed
to compare various investment options, even though their "sales pitch" claimed a particular fund was suitable, id. at 142; and that "[t]o some extent the industry [was]
reluctant to concede that questions of suitability [could] ever arise in the sale of funds
or plans," id. at 207.
28. Id., pt. 1, at 329. See also id., pt. 4, at 212 (recommendation concerning
mutual fund selling practices).
29. NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964), NASD MAUAL
(CCH) ff 2152, at 2051-53.
30. Investor Protection: Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, and S.1642 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 625 (1963) (statement by the NASD)
[hereinafter cited as Investor Protection].
31. In 1963, at hearings inspired by the Special Study, the President of the Investment Bankers Association presented on behalf of a committee of investment bankers a memorandum that stated: "While we agree that securities salesmen should be
highly qualified to perform their function, we deny that they are or should be responsible for the 'suitability' of the purchases their customers make. Adoption of specific
'suitability' regulations could so restrict the industry as to preclude performance of
its essential function in the American economy." Investor Protection, supra note 30,
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The NASD policy statement covers much broader ground than
does the language of the NASD suitability rule. The statement begins with a general exhortation to "ethical standards" but adds the
caveat that "legitimate sales efforts" must not be dampened by "requirements which do not take into account the variety of circumstances which can enter into the member-customer relationship."
Instead sales practices are to be judged by whether they constitute
fair treatment of a particular customer, rather than by whether that
customer profited from the transaction. The statement lists a number of practices that "have resulted in disciplinary action" and "clearly violate this responsibility for fair dealing. 3 2 Several of these
practices, whether or not they are suitability violations, probably constitute fraud. These practices include churning and short-term trading in mutual fund shares, 33 as well as such clearly fraudulent conduct
as establishing fictitious accounts, violating discretionary account
agreements, engaging in transactions not approved by customers, and
misusing customers' property.3 4 Two proscribed practices that may
not always constitute fraud and that best reflect traditional notions
of what constitutes a suitability violation, are also listed.
[The first is] [riecommending speculative low-priced securities
to customers without knowledge of or attempt to obtain information concerning the customers' other securities holdings, their
financial situation and other necessary data. The principle here
is that this practice, by its very nature, involves a high probability
that the recommendation will not be suitable for at least some of
the persons solicited. This has particular application to high
pressure telephone sales campaigns. . .." [The second is]
(riecommending the purchase of securities or the continuing purchase of securities in amounts which are inconsistent with the
reasonable expectation that the customer has the financial ability
to meet such a commitment."
pt. 2, at 690. The memorandum asserted that the broker "need not and should not
be regarded as a professional who can be expected in every case to administer generally to the financial needs of his customer, as the physician does to his patient." Id.
at 700-01.
32. NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964); NASD MANUAL
(CCH) ff 2152, at 2051.
33. See text accompanying notes 284-94 infra. In prohibiting churning by way of
its general suitability rule, the NASD is unique among the various regulatory authorities. The separate anti-churning rules of, for example, the SECO program, the exchanges options regulatory programs, the MSRB, and the CFTC will not be discussed
in this Article.
34. NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct., 1964), NASD MANUAL

(CCH) If2152.
35.
36.

Id. at 2051.
Id. at 2052.
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The NASD Board of Governors summarized Fair Dealing with
Customers as an effort designed to educate the NASD membership
about various practices which were improper as violations of a suitability principle. The Board expressed its belief that to acquiesce
in the SEC's recommendation that the NASD
impose upon a salesman the duty of determining that securities
sold to a customer are suitable given the customer's situation,
holdings and needs . . . would be unwise and impractical, and
would interject the possibility of hindsight judgment in determining whether there could conceivably have been any reasonable
basis for a sale or purchase.The Board noted its agreement with the general principle that a
reasonable basis should exist for recommendations to customers but
stressed that "no affirmative obligation to ascertain a customer's resources and needs was imposed upon a salesman nor was the extremely difficult test of suitability [in all transactions] imposed upon
the securities business."38
The NASD's position with respect to suitability has remained
basically unchanged since the 1964 policy statement. The Associa37. NASD,

REPo T TO MEMBERS

1964, at 8 (1965).

38. Id. In the wake of the Special Study and the NASD policy statement some
segments of the industry also responded with "voluntary" suitability efforts, combined
with an insistence that the scope of the NASD rule had not been broadened. The
Association of Mutual Plan Sponsors urged its members to undertake "reasonable measures desgned to prevent the rise of [undesirable] sales practice[s]" by making certain
inquiries of contractual plan applicants. A standard form to be filled out by the applicant was suggested:
1. Date of birth.
2. Are you presently employed? If so, give name of employer and position
held.
3. If not employed, specify other sources from which you have an assured
income.
4. Do you have a bank account? Life insurance? Other investments?
5. Are you making monthly installment payments on an automobile or appliances purchased on time, including periodic payments for amortizing
a mortgage on your home or on property you own?
6. UPON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, ARE YOU SATISFIED THAT
AFTER MEETING ALL YOUR OTHER PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED COMMITMENTS YOU WILL HAVE AVAILABLE MONTHLY
THE AMOUNT OF THE PERIODIC PAYMENT TO BE MADE UNDER THIS PLAN, [$]
Roach, Contractual Plans: The Front-End Load; Suitability Requirements and Present
Status, in CONFERENCE oN MuruAL FuNDs 135, 147-49 (Fed. Bar Ass'n, Sec. Law
Comm., ed. 1966). It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Association's voluntary
"suitability" campaign was aimed primarily at protecting its members' pocketbooks.
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tion considered, but did not adopt, an amendment to its suitability
rule that would deal specifically with "hot issues." It recently proposed suitability rules that address the peculiar problems that frequently arise in the area of tax sheltered investments. Both of these
proposals, made with the SEC's urging, are discussed below together
with other SEC initiatives. 39
The SECO Suitability Rule
The Securities Acts Amendments of 196440 empowered the SEC
to issue regulations governing registered brokers who are not members of a national securities association such as the NASD. In particular, the Commission was empowered to adopt rules for such bro41
kers "designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade."
Such nonmember brokers represent a not insignificant portion of
39. See notes 161-94 & accompanying text infra.
The NASD has adopted one additional suitability provision that, while of limited
application, has interesting variations from the basic rule. In 1972 the Association
approved rules governing the offering and sale by NASD members of securities in their
own firms. See NASD News, Sept. 1971, at 3; NASD News, May 1971, at 1 (such
transactions pose "inherent conflict of interest problems, such as . . . the question
whether such securities are suitable for specific accounts"); see generally O'Boyle,
Broker-Dealer Conflict of Interest Problems, in PLI THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEREGULATION 457, 462-70 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972).
The
suitability section reads: "Every member underwriting an issue of its own securities
.. . who recommends to a customer the purchase of a security of such an issue shall
have reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is suitable for such customer on the basis of information furnished by such customer concerning the customer's
investment objectives, financial situation, and needs, and any other information known
by such member. In connection with all such determinations, the member must maintain in its files the basis for and reasons upon which it reached its determination."
NASD By-laws, art. IV, § 2(c), sched. E, § 5, NASD MANUAL (CCH) ff 1402, at 110111 (1977). The absence of the "if any" language of the basic rule, the references
to "investment objectives" and "other information," and the requirement of documentation all indicate greater stringency. The NASD carefully noted: "Such detailed
record-keeping for suitability purposes is not required in connection with transactions
in securities of other offerings and would be required in connection with those offerings only because of the significantly different nature thereof." NASD Notice to Members 4 (May 8, 1971).
40. Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 1, 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
41. Section 15(b)(9) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(9) (Supp. V
1975). On the legislative history of this section, see Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 822-28, who argue:
"Apparently, as long as the NASD does a good job the Commission's rules . . . are
not to go substantially beyond the NASD counterparts." Id. at 824. The Commission has addressed the relationship of NASD and SEC fair practice standards in a release that concludes, with certain qualifications, "the standards of conduct and general
interpretive principles which have been prescribed by the NASD for its members . . .
cTRITIES
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registered brokers, eleven percent in 1962 and seventeen percent in
1974.42 Before 1964, they were not subject to rules of the fair practice variety.
Under the 1964 amendments the Commission has promulgated
its 15b10 series of rules. This regulatory structure is known as the
SECO (SEC-registered Only) program. In 1967, the SEC adopted

Exchange Act rule 15b10-3, the SECO suitability rule, and announced"
that it was intended to implement the recommendation of the Special
Study. 44 The SECO suitability rule provides:
Every nonmember broker . . .who recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have
reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is not
unsuitable for such customer on the basis of information furnished
by such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and
any other information known by such broker . . .45
Although this rule resembles the NASD's suitability rule in some
respects, the references to "reasonable inquiry," "investment objectives," and "other information" are more far-reaching. The most
significant difference between the two rules is the SECO requirement
that a "reasonable inquiry" be made concerning a customer's situation
and needs. The NASD rule, by contrast, refers only to "the facts,
if any" disclosed by the customer. 4 6 Some have argued that the
are relevant guidelines and accepted standards of behavior for nonmember brokerdealers and their associated persons." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9420,
13 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7 25,592, at 18,578 (1972).
42. SPEcrAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 16 (1962 figure); R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEcunrnEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 n.16 (4th ed. 1977)
(1974 figure). But see 34 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 83-84 (1968); ALI Fa. SEC. CODE
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 905(c), Comment (1) (indicating lower figures than
Jennings and Marsh).
43. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7984, at 3 (1966).
44. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1977).
46. Another difference is that the rule refers to "not unsuitable" recommendations,
rather than "suitable" ones. As originally proposed, it required reasonable grounds
to believe a recommendation to be "suitable." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7984, at 6 (1966). The change was not explained by the SEC, and would seem
insignificant. However, one commentator predicted the difference might be seized
upon by a court seeking a basis for a lenient construction of brokers' suitability duties.
Lipton, supra note 1, at 277-78 (prepared statement of'M. Lipton). He was soon
proved correct. See Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex.
1976). Cf. 53 ALI PRoCEDnINcs 648-49 (1976) (colloquy between L. Loss and R.
Demmler on a similar linguistic distinction).
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NASD rule can be read sensibly only as imposing "some responsibility for knowing not only the background of the securities [the broker] sells but also that of his customers." 47 The SECO rule is nevertheless more explicit in imposing such a duty.48 The SEC commentary which accompanied the final promulgation of rule 15b10-3
further defines the broker's duties under this new regulation:
Under the rule the broker . . . , when recommending a transaction to a customer, [is] expected to make reasonable inquiry
concerning the customer's investment objectives, and his financial
situation and needs. Information concerning financial situation
and needs would ordinarily include information concerning the
customer's marital status, the number and age of his dependents,
his earnings, the amount of his savings and life insurance, and his
security holdings and other assets. The broker ... may rely on
the information furnished by the customer.
The nature and extent of the inquiry to be made by the broker-dealer will depend on all the facts and circumstances. Thus,
depending on the length of the interval between recommendations, it might be sufficient simply to ask the customer whether
there has been any material change in his circumstances since
the previous inquiry. However, the broker-dealer is not precluded from making a recommendation because the customer
49
after reasonable inquiry, declines to furnish the information.
Rule 15b10-3 was adopted over strong protests from the NASD,
which argued that Congress had empowered the SEC only to issue
rules comparable to those of the NASD and not to promulgate more
far-reaching rules as an "indirect method of forcing changes in longestablished rules of self-regulatory organizations." 50 The NASD also
argued that rule 15b10-3 would be "generally inhibitory" to business,
imposing a rigid requirement that a broker have a file of financial
information on a customer prior to making any recommendation.
Such a requirement, the Association contended, would effectively
terminate general mailings to potential customers and the opening
of new accounts by telephone. The NASD restated its position that

47. Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD Suitability
Rules, 22 ALA. L. REv. 15, 25 (1969) (emphasis added).
48. See Lipton, supra note 1, at 278 & n.16 (prepared statement of M. Lipton).
49. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135, [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 77,459, at 82,890 (1967) (footnote omitted). This largely repeated the SEC statement accompanying the proposed rule, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7984, at 2-3 (1966), except that the paragraph hedging the
duty to secure information about the customer was added.

50.

NASD News, Mar. 1967, at 4.

See note 41 supra.
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FairDealing with Customers, issued with the Commission's approval
in 1964, was specifically designed to outline unfair practices in making
recommendations without creating a broker's absolute duty of inquiry. 51 The Association hinted, however, that its position that member brokers had no duty to inquire into their customers' circumstances
might not be entirely inflexible: "The Association's present suitability rule recognizes that in certain instances more information might
well be necessary and a broker/dealer member of the NASD might
be called upon to demonstrate that he had made reasonable inquiries
2
to obtain this additional information."5
The difference between the "if any" language of the NASD rule,53
which implies the absence of any general duty to inquire, and rule
15b10-3's more ambiguous "reasonable inquiry" language has precipitated considerable commentary. 54 Remarkably, however, in the decade marking the coexistence of the two rules, only one case has taken
note of their difference in wording.5 5 Not a single decision has rested
squarely on rule 15b10-3.
New York Stock Exchange Rules
In order to be registered, securities exchanges, like national securities associations, must have rules designed, inter alia, "to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just
and equitable principles of trade." 56 Suitability rules might appear
to be required; however, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
does not have an express suitability rule. Some have found 57 an implicit suitability requirement by construing the NYSE's know-your-

51. NASD News, Mar. 1967, at 4.
52. Id. Two years later, Professor Loss wrote that the adoption of rule 15b10-3
indicated that the compromise over the policy statement had not "ended the controversy over whether the [broker] should have an affirmative obligation to seek out the
information relevant to a determination of suitability." 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18,
at 3718 (emphasis in original). Thus, the NASD was correct to fear that the rulc
would reopen the debate. On the instability of the NASD policy statement compromise, see O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 99 (prepared statement of T. O'Boyle).
53. See text accompanynig note 19 supra.
54. See, e.g., 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 100 n.34.2; Fishman, Broker-Dealer
Obligationsto Customers - The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REv. 233, 234-35

(1966).
55. See note 46 supra.
56. Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
57. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1040-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
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customer rule, rule 405, sometimes in conjunction with its general
rule of fair dealing, rule 401, or other provisions. Rule 405 provides
in pertinent part: "Every member organization is required . . . to
...[u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every
customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or
carried by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such organization." 8
Rule 401 reads: "Every member, allied member and member organization shall at all times adhere to the principles of good business
practice in the conduct of his or its business affairs.";"
Commentators have differed over the existence of an implicit
NYSE suitability rule, but the majority agree that rule 405 imposes
at least some suitability obligation.60 The most extreme view is taken
58. 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ff 2405 (1978).
59. Id. If 2401. Article XIV, § 6 of the NYSE Constitution, providing for sanctions against brokers who violate "just and equitable principles of trade," id. If 1656,
has also been read in connection with rule 405 as the source of a suitability obligation.
See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 315. Cf. Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) (allegations in complaint).
60. Compare 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3715-16 (rule 405 "seems more
designed to protect the member firm than the customer"); Gates, The Developing Options Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest, 25 U. FLA. L. R51. 421,
449 (1973) (NYSE has not "clearly recognized" suitability; rule 405 "more designed
to protect member firms"); Rediker, supra note 47, at 66 n.208 (rule 405 serves only
a housekeeping function; contrary court decision "extend[s] the NYSE's rule beyond
the purposes evidently intended by its framers"); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MICH. L. REV. 680, 741 n.319 (1964) (no requirement comparable to that of the NASD); and O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 94 n.1 (prepared statement
of T. O'Boyle) (same; rule 405 "is intended primarily for the protection of members,
not customers"), with E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 156 (1974) (rule
405 establishes "firm's responsibility to its customers who trade in securities 'unsuitable'
for them"); Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 436 (1977) (suitability "may
be derived from" rule 405); Sotos & Bowen, The Proposed Suitability Standards for
the Commodity Industry: "Right Church, Wrong Pew," 53 CHi-KENT L. REv. 289,
302 n.41 (1976) ("Rule 405(1) has now expanded in scope to include the suitability
doctrine."); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 42, at 693 ("Obviously implicit . . .
is the requirement that the broker's recommendations be responsibly related to the
investment objectives and financial situation of the customer discovered by the investigation."); Lipton, supra note 1, at 275-76 (prepared statement of M. Lipton) (rule
405 is a "customer suitability - 'know your customer' - rule"); Fishman, supra note
54, at 239 n.39 (suitability has been "interpreted into" rule 405); Hed-Hofmann, supra
note 20, at 201 (rule 405 is "the same" as NASD suitability rule); Jacobs, supra note
6, at 897 n.124 (rule 405 "was originally designed to protect member firms but has
been developing as a suitability rule as well"); Leavell, Investment Advice and the
Fraud Rules, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1576-77 & n.48 (1967) (rule 405 is a suitability
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by David I. Faust, who has written that the rule imposes "[a]ffirmative obligations to obtain information for the purpose of making
suitability judgments" which are far broader than brokers' obligations

under the NASD and SECO rules, because the NYSE rule neither
distinguishes between orders executed on the basis of broker recom-

mendations and other orders nor between orders and accounts. 6 '
Faust, however, is alone in espousing this view.
It is somewhat incongruous that a suitability requirement has
been inferred from the NYSE know-your-customer and fair dealing

provisions, because both the NASD and the SEC, through the SECO
program, have promulgated know-your-customer rules6 2 and general
rules of fair dealing,63 while also adopting separate suitability canons.

Notwithstanding this incongruity, the Special Study, which had directed its recommendation for the clarification and enforcement of
suitability duties to the NYSE as well as the SEC, 64 reported that,
beginning in 1962, the Exchange was prepared to read suitability

rule). See also SPECIAL STrDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 239 n.10, 301; id. pt. 4, at
669; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9761, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 78,985 (1972) (characterizing rule 405 as a suitability
rule); text accompanying note 73 infra. But see text accompanying notes 146-48 infra.
Among the courts, the content of rule 405 also seems to be in the eye of the beholder.
One court has even taken the view that rule 405 provides for "substantive review"
of brokers' exercise of discretion under all exchange rules respecting customers that
leave brokers with discretion. See Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 111213 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Another court has stated that rule 405 and Amex rule
411, see notes 56-82 & accompanying text infra, "embody standards similar to" the
NASD suitability rule. See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 95,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Wells v. Blythe & Co.,
351 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (rule 405 is "another form of suitability
rule"); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DurE L.J. 445, 451 n.13 (rule 405 "seems to express a suitability concept"), 463 n.54 (citing various NYSE sources expressing suitability principles).
61. Faust, Suitability, 7 REv. SEC. REc. 899, 899-900 (1974).
62. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 15(b), NASD MANUAL (CCH) II 2165
(1976); Exchange Act rule 15b10-6(a) and (c), 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15b10-6(a) and
(c) (1977). See also NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 21(b), NASD MANUAL
(CCH) ff 2171, at 2095 (1967) (record-keeping); id. § 27(c), NASD MANUAL (CCH)
II 1727, at 2109 (1976), (information required for supervision); Comment, The "Know
Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and
Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489, 508 n.65 ("Rule 27 imposes the same
duties on over-the-counter brokers to investigate customers . . . contemplated by rule
405").
63. NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 1, NASD MANUAL (CCH)
2151,
at 2014 (1973); Exchange Act rule 15b10-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15b10-2 (1977).
64.

SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 329.
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into rule 405 even though the rule was originally promulgated "to
protect member firms against irresponsible customers."65
The 1962 NYSE guide to supervision and control of sales practices, which predated the Special Study, contained a detailed specification of the information to be elicited from customers. These
guidelines were apparently designed, however, to protect member
brokerage firms from unscrupulous investors. The word "suitability"
did not appear in the text of the guide, and only two brief allusions
to the concept were discernible. The first reference drew a dichotomy between those customers who do not seek investment advice and
those who do. As to the former, the guide merely observed that
brokers should advise against the purchase of stock where "the risks
of failure appear to him to be far greater than the chances of success."66 Having given such advice, a broker was free to execute the
transaction if the customer still insisted on the purchase. As to
customers seeking investment advice, the guide stated:
To advise an investor properly [the broker] obviously needs to
know his client's investment objective. At the extreme where an
investor wants advice on fitting investments into his personal financial plan, [the broker] will need to help his customer define
his investment objective through consideration of (a) financial
resources and obligations, (b) background and knowledge, (c)
other investments held in his portfolio, (d) cash resources, and
(e) other major assets such as real estate and insurance. On the
other hand, an investor . . . with the objective of buying shares
in a particular industry may want only the [broker's] opinion
on the most promising companies in that industry. Only with
the investment objective clearly understood will a [broker] be
able to give a satisfactory opinion on a security held by a client
or make a proper recommendation for his portfolio. Like a doctor or a lawyer, the [broker] should determine pertinent facts
concerning his client's situation prior to giving advice....
The wholesale recommendation of a single security . . .
without thought to each individual's overall investment situation
is certainly not a proper approach. It is also important that a
[broker] realize that his responsibility is greatest when he recommends the purchase of6 7highly volatile securities or the stock of
a little known company.
The guide also recognizes a potential suitability problem when
"[a] widowed client of limited resources, professing that her objec65. Id. at 315-16, at 320.
66. NYSE, SUPERVISION AND
CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS

67.

MANAGEMENT

7 (1962 ed.).

Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).

OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES AND
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tive is safety of capital and income, expresses keen interest in purchasing a highly volatile, low yielding stock which is the glamour
stock of the moment."68 A broker may recommend against such
a transaction, but the customer may still wish to place the order.
The guide notes that there may be "major difficulties" in proceeding
to execute such an order even though the order was unsolicited. 69
The 1967 and 1973 editions of the same NYSE guide, although
updated in several respects, contained no new material on suitability
despite the Special Study's directive to clarify the area. Except for
the deletion of the phrase, "like a doctor or a lawyer," the abovequoted language from the guide was repeated almost verbatim. 70
The deletion of the analogy to doctors and lawyers suggests, if anything, a retreat from strict suitability principles by the deemphasis
of fiduciary overtones. 7 1
Recently, the NYSE proposed for SEC approval several amendments to rule 405. These proposals include the deletion of the reference to inquiry in the case of "every order," which appears together with references to "every customer" and "every account" in
the present rule; the substitution of the words "reasonable effort" for
"due diligence"; the addition of an exemption from compliance for
up to five $2000 transactions per year per customer; and the exemption of "carrying" brokers, who perform the financial, operational,
and bookkeeping functions for those brokers who actually open and
service a customer account. 72 The Commission responded by initiating a formal disapproval proceeding, expressing its concern that
one effect of the proposal might be to "sanction a less thorough evaluation of . . . the financial condition and investment objectives of
the customer and the suitability of particular transactions."78 After

68. Id. at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5, 9 (1967 ed.); id. at 4, 5,9 (1973 ed.). The 1973 guide adds to
the statement that if a customer insists on a speculative purchase "the decision is his,"
the qualification that "it may be advisable for the manager to document his files with
a written acknowledgement from the customer as to the non-solicitation of the order."
Id. at 4.
71. Recall the investment bankers' rejection of the physician-patient analogy, supra
note 31.
72. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12674, 10 SEC DocK-r 158 (1976);
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13821, 12 SEC DocKEr 1423 (1977).
73. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14143, 13 SEC Doc=z 639, 641
(1977).
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an unsuccessful effort to compromise with the SEC, the NYSE applied
to withdraw its proposed amendments on February 10, 1978.74 The
SEC permitted the withdrawal and discontinued the disapproval pro7

cedure.

1

Rules of the Other Stock Exchanges
76
There are nine registered exchanges in addition to the NYSE.
These exchanges have rules similar to the NYSE rules examined above.
American Stock Exchange (Amex) Rule 411, 77 which has been
termed a suitability rule, 78 phrases the know-your-customer requirement similarly to the NYSE rule: "Every member, member firm or
member corporation shall use due diligence to learn the essential
facts relative to every customer and to every order or account accepted." Amex Rule 411 is reinforced by Amex Rule 16, 79 which
concerns fair dealing and which also closely tracks the NYSE phraseology: "Every member, member firm and member corporation shall
at all times adhere to the principles of good business practice in the
conduct of his business affairs."8 0
The texts of the remaining exchanges' rules demonstrate several
formulations of know-your-customer and fair-dealing duties, none
74. See, e.g., Letter from Agnes M. Gautier, Director, NYSE Member Firm Policy
Development, to Nelson Kibler, Assistant Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation
(Oct. 14, 1977); Letter from James E. Buck, NYSE Secretary, to Secretary of the SEC
(Dec. 7, 1977); Letter from James E. Buck, NYSE Secretary, to George A. Fitzsimmons,
SEC Secretary (Feb. 10, 1978) (Copies on file with the author).
75. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14630, 14 SEC DOCKET 653 (1978).
Only the American Stock
76. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) gr21,310.10 (1977).
Exchange is a national exchange; its volume is about a quarter that of the NYSE.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM.

ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM.

ON SE-

cUurTIEs, 93d Cong., ist Sess., SECtRITIES INDUSTRY STUDY 89 (Comm. Print 1973)
[hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY STUDY]. The other exchanges are regional or specialized. They had only 6.9% of total trading volume in dollars in 1962. SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 18, pt. 2, at 912. But see Liang, Problems Multiply at Midwest Exchange,
But Chief Is Optimistic, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
77. 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GuIDE (CCH) ff 9431 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Faust, supra note 61, at 899 & n.3; Lipton, supra note 1, at 275-76
(prepared statement of M. Lipton); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 897 n.124.
79. [1970] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) If9236.
80. See also Boston Stock Ex. Rules, ch. VII, § 2 BOSTON STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH)
, 2091 (1975) (know your customer); Boston Stock Ex. Rules, ch. II, § 14, id. ff
2027 (1973) (fair dealing). Some exchanges were less circumspect in their reaction to
the Special Study than were the NASD and NYSE, and openly attacked the suitability
recommendation. See Investor Protection, supra note 30, pt. 1, at 394 (Midwest Stock
Exchange), 471 (Amex).
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significantly departing from the NYSE rules. In 1963 the Special
Study reported that no exchange had an express suitability rule,8 1
and with the exception of special suitability rules governing options
transactions,8 2 this remains true.
Exchange Act Rule 15c2-5 and the "Shingle Theory"
The SEC has adopted one special purpose suitability rule, which
seems to impose greater obligations on brokers than does the NASD 8 3
or even the SECO rule. Adopted in 1962,84 Exchange Act rule
15c2-585 was actually the first SEC suitability rule. The rule applies
to customer borrowing other than routine margin borrowing subject
to Regulation T.8 6 It provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall constitute a "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" as used in section 15(c) (2) of the Act for
any broker . . . to offer or sell any security to, or to attempt to
induce the purchase of any security by, any person, in connection
with which such broker . .. directly or indirectly offers to extend any credit to or to arrange any loan for such person, or extends to or participates in arranging any loan for such _person,
unless such broker . . , before any purchase, loan or other related element of the transaction is entered into:
(1) [Makes full advance disclosure of the customer's obligations, of the risks, and of the costs]; and
(2) Obtains from such person information concerning his
financial situation and needs, reasonably determines that the entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, is suitable for
such person, and retains in his files a written statement setting
forth the basis upon which the broker . . . made such determination; Provided, however, That the written statement referred to
in this paragraph must be made available to the customer on
request.87
81. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 321.
82. See text accompanying notes 140-48 infra.
83. But of. NASD MANuAL (CCH) ff 5267 (1973) (NASD guideline stating that
"the arranging of loans or granting of credit appears to result in excessive activity or
churning of accounts of those customers who borrow money to purchase investment
company shares, using such shares as collateral for the loan; and such churning or
other over-activity raises questions under" the suitability rule).
84. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6851, [1961-1964] Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f"76,852 (1962).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1977).
86. 12 C.F.R. §§220.1-.130 (1977). Such transactions are apparently unusual.
See Fishman, supra note 54, at 234 n.3. Apparently the only reported instance of the
enforcement of rule 15c2-5 is the settlement decree in Robert K. Hill, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 11699, 7 SEC DocKET 992 (1975).
87. The requirement that the broker retain a written suitability statement in his
files was adopted in 1975. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11220, 6 SEC
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This suitability requirement applies to all transactions, not just
those accompanied by broker recommendations. The rule seems to
adopt an objective conception of suitability to which the broker must
adhere even when a highly sophisticated investor is entirely satisfied
that the transaction is suitable. 88 According to the SEC, rule 15c25 was promulgated in response to abuses arising out of the proliferation of so-called "equity funding" programs, "in which securities
sold to a customer by a broker or dealer are used as collateral for
a loan whose proceeds are in turn used for payment of premiums
on a life insurance policy sold to the customer as an integral part
of the program."8 9 The abuses included programs that were being
offered indiscriminately to many persons for whom they were not
suitable.90 The application of rule 15c2-5 is not limited to "equity
funding" programs, however, and it applies to arrangements which
involve borrowing of funds by customers from brokers in any form
except conventional margin securities transactions.
Unlike the SECO suitability rule, 91 rule 15c2-5 is a direct interpretation of the antifraud language of section 15(c) (2) .92 Despite its authority to recommend rules designed "to insure fair dealing in securities . . . or to insure fair administration of [a national

securities] exchange,"93 the SEC imposed the rule, a very stringent
suitability requirement, under the antifraud rubric of section 15(c)
DOCKET 342, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

ff 80,096 (1975).
Before 1975, the rule required the statement to be delivered to the customer. No
explanation was offered for the change.
88. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 54, at 234.
89. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11876, 8 SEC DOCKET 541, 545,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f1 80,333, at 85,837 (1975).
See notes 370-73 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of Anderson v. Knox, 297
F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962), which inspired rule
15c2-5. See also 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3725; Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer
Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their
Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 691, 700 (1964).
90. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11876, 8 SEC DOCKET 541, 559
n.22, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SFc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,333, at 85,855 n.22

(1975).
91. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
At the time of the SECO rule's promulgation, the Commission noted that it was
not adopted under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
§ 77,459, at 82,890 (1967).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1) (1970) (national securities associations). These sections were superseded by 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
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94 As yet, however, no commentator has recognized
(2).
clearly the
doctrinal difficulties posed by subsuming suitability under "fraud"
through rule 15c2-5. 95

Section 15(c) (2) does give the Commission broad authority to
adopt rules that "define and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices [by brokers] as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative."96 By requiring both full disclosure of
risk and an independent determination by the broker that the transaction is suitable for the customer, rule 15c2-5 apparently rejects
the idea that a suitability requirement should be directed at allowing a customer to determine for himself the appropriateness of the
transaction after full disclosure of the risks involved by the broker.9 7
94.

The SEC can impose fair practice rules on the exchanges and the NASD under

§ 19(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (Supp. V 1975) (formerly § 19(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970)). Until 1975,, the SEC had the power to override exchange
rules concerning twelve enumerated subjects, as well as other "similar matters." Although at least one commentator assumed this power did not reach suitability, see
Rediker, supra note 47, at 52, the question was certainly debatable. See Gordon v.
New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 667, 687 (1975); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 129-31, 134-36 (1973). Since 1975, the
SEC has had undisputed power to impose suitability rules on the NASD and the exchanges.
95. See 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3681, 3725; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 903;
Mundheim, supra note 60, at 454-55, 460 n.39; Rediker, supra note 47, at 53 & nn.17071. But see Fishman, supra note 54, at 234-35, 247; Mundheim, supra note 60, at
472 n.81.
96. See generally 2 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1192-200, 1361-62; 3 id. at
1425-26; 5 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3202-05; 6 id. at 3680-81.
97. This may be as appropriate a point as any to record the author's view on the
relationship between disclosure requirements and true suitability rules. This view is
best illustrated by his conclusion that Securities Act rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1977), the "safe harbor" rule recently adopted under the private offering exemption,
is not, although embodying certain suitability principles, properly conceived of as a
suitability rule.
Rule 146, adopted in 1974, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5407, 4 SEC
DocKEr 154, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 2710 (1974); see also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5913, 14 SEC Doc=E 310, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 81,532 (1978) (proposed amendments), is a nonexclusive interpretation of the
exemption from registration of securities provided by § 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). In addition to imposing restrictions on the number of purchasers, on resale, and on the access to issuer data by or the furnishing of data to
offerees, the rule requires offerees and purchasers to satisfy certain criteria. The issuer
(or anyone acting on its behalf) must have reasonable grounds to believe, and shall believe, one of two things about offerees and purchasers. Immediately prior to the offer,
he must believe either that "the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of valuating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," rule 146(d)(1)(i), or that "the offeree is a person who is able
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In view of the traditional principle that fraud is a kind of decepto bear the economic risk of the investment," rule 146(d)(1)(ii). Immediately
prior to sale, he must also believe, "after making reasonable inquiry," rule 146(d) (2),
one of the same two things about the purchaser. If the second alternative (ability to
bear the risk) is taken, however, he must also believe that the "offeree and his offeree
representative(s) together" satisfy the first alternative (ability to evaluate the risk).
The ALI Code's "limited offering" exemption would not impose any such criteria on
offerees or purchasers, although the imposition of such criteria was initially considered.
See ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 242(b); 49 ALI PROCEEDINGS 376-77 (1972)
(remarks of L. Loss). Indeed subsection (b) (3) suggests
the Commission would have the power to do so if the Code were adopted.
Some commentators have seen rule 146 as a suitability rule. See Cook & Levenson,
SEC Staff Views on Continental Tobacco and the Need for Regulatory Guidelines in
the Private Offering Area, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION 49, 55 & n.17 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr. & J.Schupper eds. 1973); Lipton,
supra note 1, at 273, 287, 289 & n.35 (prepared statement of M. Lipton); id. at 289 &
n.35 (address by SEC Chairman M. Cohen); Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note
18, at 279 n.8, 284, 419 n.2, 424 n.11, 428 & n.27, 431, 455-56 (1976 & 1977); Borton
& Rifkind, Private Placement and Proposed Rule 146, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 304-05
(1974); Faust, supra note 61, at 901; Flint, SEC and FRB Treatment of Options: An
Experiment in Market Regulation, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1243, 1261, 1263 (1975). However,
this view fails to distinguish the underlying purposes of rule 146 and suitability rules.
Ultimately, all of the securities laws aimed at ensuring disclosure could be thought
of as suitability laws, because their goal is to facilitate informed judgments by purchasers and sellers as to the desirability, or suitability, to them of transactions - the
suitability in their eyes, which is referred to in this Article as subjective suitability.
So could the states' blue sky laws, which, by interposing the judgment of the state between issuers and investors as to the fairness of investments, assure the suitability
of transactions for customers in the state's eyes. That concept of suitability which
involves its being decided for the investor by someone else is referred to in this Artice
as objective suitability.
Suitability rules can also be divided along these subjective-objective lines. As
we shall see at text accompanyng notes 260-62 & 342-388 infra, the SEC initially interpreted the suitability obligation, and the courts have also tended to interpret it.
as a requirement that the broker not frustrate the process of informed investor judgment that the disclosure philosophy was meant to promote by recommending a security
he knew the customer would not find appropriate, at least if the customer were fully
sophisticated and autonomous. They thus took a clearly subjective view of suitability,
See also Ceerlings, Suitability Requirements for Non-Member Broker-Dealers Under
Proposed Rule 15b10-3, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FuNDs J3, 14-15 (P. Geerlings
ed. 1967) (arguing that the suitability rules should be faithful to the concern with
disclosure of the SPECIAL STUDY and the securities acts). On the other hand, some
suitability rules, rule 15c2-5 for example, embody a clearly objective view. They cannot be reconciled with the disclosure philosophy because they make it the broker's duty
to determine himself the suitability of a transaction rather than to facilitate the customer's determination of suitability. In some cases they also impose specific guidelines
as to the characteristics of customers for whom given transactions are presumed suitable
or unsuitable.
But what all suitability rules have in common is that they are specifically and exclusively directed at ensuring a desired matching between investments and customers'
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tion,98 the rule's imposition of a dual obligation under the doctrinal
heading of fraud must rest on the fiction that brokers, by "hanging
out their shingles," implicitly represent that they will independently
determine the "objective" suitability of all transactions for their customers. 99 This assumption seems entirely implausible, except in the
circular sense that Rule 15c2-5 itself now makes such an implicit
representation a part of doing business as a broker.
The fiction of brokers' implicit representations to their customers
is the cornerstone of the "shingle theory," which emerged as a means
of justifying rules and proceedings under the fraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933100 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.101
The shingle theory was employed in cases in which acts of actual
investment goals, finances, and needs. Rule 146 is not a suitability rule because while,
like objective suitability rules, it imposes guidelines as to the characteristics of investors,
it does so not directly to the end of objective suitability, but as an instrumental step
in the larger regulatory scheme of general disclosure. The alternative to compliance
with rule 146 is disclosure, whereas there is no alternative provided to compliance
with true suitability rules. Rule 146 limits private offerings to certain purchasers
neither because private-offering securities are objectively suitable only for such purchasers, nor because only such purchasers can make the informed, autonomous judgments underpinning the subjective view of suitability: at least as far as the Securities
Act is concerned, if the securities were registered, they could be sold to anyone. The
basic reason that rule 146 requires offerees and purchasers to meet sophistication or
risk-bearing criteria is that only by so limiting the universe of purchasers can the
protections afforded by the general disclosure mechanism (and the effect it has through
the interpretation of public information in the marketplace) be approximated. As
the SEC said on adopting the rule: "Such a rule should deter reliance on [the section
4(2)] exemption for offerings of securities to persons who are unable to fend for
themselves in terms of obtaining and evaluating information about the issuer and in
certain situations of, assuming the risk of investment. These persons need the protections afforded by the registration process." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487, 4
SEC DoC=sr 154, 156, 1 FFa. SEC. L. RsP. (CCH) ff 2710, at p. 2907-3 (1974).
See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953); SEC v. Continental
Tobacco'Co., 463 F.2d 137, 15M-61 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Intl
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687-91 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. This principle was most recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977).
99. Of course, there is no question that a false express representation, made with
scienter, that a transaction is suitable for a customer is fraudulent. See John J. Colmer,
Jr., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10925, 4 SEC Doc=ET 826 (1974);
McGivney & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10641, 3 SEC DOCKET
544 (1974).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The relevant antifraud provision is § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1970).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The relevant antifraud provisions are § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
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deception could not be specified but which involved the calculated
enrichment of brokers at the expense of their customers. 10 2 The
theory was first applied to dealers who profited by consummating
transactions at prices not reasonably related to the market.10 3 More
recently the theory has been applied to hold brokers liable for conduct not in keeping with, for example, these implied representations
or "implied warrant[ies]":104 that the broker will execute only authorized orders, 10 5 that orders will be executed promptly,106 that customer securities purchased for cash will not be pledged without authority, 1° 7 that the broker is solventI°8 that the broker has no interest
such as a substantial long or short position which could cloud his
recommendation' 0 and that there is a reasonable basis in fact for a
1 10
favorable recommendation of a security.
102. Lipton, supra note 1, at 275 (prepared statement of M. Lipton). See generally 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1474-75, 1482-500; 6 Loss (1969), supra note
18, at 3682-702; ,Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116, 118-19 (1962), aff'd sub nor
Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939);
Loss The SEC and the Broker-Dealer,1 VAN7D. L. REV. 516 (1948); Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers in Securities, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1237
(1946); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MiCH. L. REV. 680.
734-39 (1964).
On the continued vitality of the shingle theory following the Supreme
Court's curtailment of certain fictionalized concepts of fraud in Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), see Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptiong
Against Corporate Mismanagement, 6 SEC. REC. L.J. 3, 12-13, 29-30 (1978).
103. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). See also SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., Inc., 386
F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1482-88,
1490-500; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3682-83, 3685-702.
104. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969).
105. E.g., First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952).
See 3 Loss (1961),
supra note 18, at 1488 & n.45; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3683.
106. E.g., Ned J. Bowman Co., 39 S.E.C. 879 (1960).
See 3 Loss (1961), supra
note 18, at 1488-89 & n.46; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3683-84.
107. E.g., Richard A. Sebastian, 38 S.E.C. 865 (1959).
See 3 Loss (1961), supra
note 18, at 1489.
108. E.g., SEC v. Scott, Gorman Municipals, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1387
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See 3 Loss, (1961), supra note 18, at 1489, 1508-14 & n.105;
6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3727-34.
109. E.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
See 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1503-04 & n.95; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18,
at 3704-05.
110. E.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1608 (1978); University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879,
898 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 14149, 13 SEC DOCKET 646, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,365 (1977); Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960).

May 1978]

SUITABILITY OBLIGATIONS OF BROKERS

One significant feature of the shingle theory is that, because it relies on a warranty concept, proof of reliance or of a lack of sophisticaffon on the part of an investor apparently are not necessary elements in establishing a violation."' On the other hand, there is
considerable authority that in the case of other suitability rules reliance
must be shown,"12 and that experienced or sophisticated investors
have a greater burden in directly proving a violation."13
Although the shingle theory has been said to hold "the seed"
of the suitability doctrine, 1 4 the foregoing applications of the shingle
theory fail to support an extension of the theory to suitability for two
reasons. 115 First, the representations that have been inferred in most
See S.JAFFE, BRoER-DEALERs AND SEcurrims MaRXn'rs: A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY PROCESS § 7.02 (1977); 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1489-90 & n.51, 1504-05
n.96; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3705.
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1974); Berko v. SEC,
316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963); S. JAFFE, supra note 110, § 7.03; 5A A. JACOBS,
supra note 6, § 211.01[b], at p. 9-39; Brudney, Origins and Applicability of the "Reasonable Basis" or "Know Your Merchandise" Doctrine, in PLI FotRT ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURrTms REG ULA
O
239, 249 & n.34 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr.
& J. Schupper eds. 1973) (prepared statement of V. Brudney); William Harrison
Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 906 (1959). Reliance and lack of sophistication may, however, be required in private civil actions, as distinguished from SEC enforcement actions. See SEC v. North American Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84-85 (2d
Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 & nn. 9 & 13 (2d Cir. 1969); see also
A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 211.04, at p. 9-83 & n.15. Recently, however, this qualification to the strict warranty approach may have been abandoned. See Franklin Say.
Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 530 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting in
part); see also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 312 (1977).
112. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 293-94, 380-88 & 444-46 infra.
113. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 363-69 infra. See also note 369 infra. But
see Lipton, supra note 1, at 280 (prepared statement of M. Lipton) (treats as open
question).
114. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3685. See also Lipton, supra note 1, at 275
(prepared statement of M. Lipton) ("suitability can be traced to the Commission's
shingle theory"); Loss, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 238, 239 (1965) (suitability
requirement has "been emerging out of the old 'shingle' theory").
115. See Bickel, supra note 23, at 17 (denying "that the recommendation of an
unsuitable security in itself is tantamount to fraud or deceit"). One court has expressed misgivings about the wisdom of treating suitability under the shingle theory.
See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430-31 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). But see E. WEIsS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATIoN OF Baoicans AND DEALERS 184 (1965) ("representation as to suiting the client's
needs . . . appears to be implicit in the recommendations made by a broker-dealer
to his customer"); note 295 infra. The NASD policy statement, Fair Dealing with
Customers, concludes with a cryptic reference to the shingle theory which appears to
signal no view as to its relevance to suitability. See NASD, Special Report to NASD
Members (Oct. 9, 1964), NASD MANUAL (CCH) 7 2152, at 2053.
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of the shingle theory cases have some basis in common sense; they
are aspects of "trade custom" 116 to which the average customer would
probably expect a broker to adhere. On the other hand, it is considerably less likely that the average customer expects a broker to
make an extensive effort, before recommending a security, to assure
himself that the customer would find it appropriate to his investment
objectives, portfolio, and financial needs. It is even less plausible
that the average customer expects the broker to make an independent,
objective calculation of appropriateness, satisfying himself that the
security is suitable for the customer according to certain absolute
criteria, notwithstanding the customer's own opinions, before making
any recommendation. Because the shingle theory has developed
from the application of fraud principles to the broker-customer relationship, a cause of action under the theory must ultimately be
based on some type of misrepresentation, which may be implied.
There can be no misrepresentation, even impliedly, as to the suitability of a security, however, if the customer does not expect the
broker to satisfy himself of the security's appropriateness. Thus, to
include suitability doctrine, particularly an objective version of suitability, within the shingle theory stretches the theory farther than it
will reach.
Second, most of the practices to which the shingle theory has
been applied involve substantial conflicts of interest; they are practices which would constitute a breach of a broker's fiduciary duty if
he had entered into a fiduciary relationship with his customer. The
usefulness of the shingle theory is that it allows brokers to be disciplined for these practices without a case-by-case finding that a fiduciary relationship existed with the customer. 1 7 It is less evident
whether a broker's recommendation of an unsuitable security, absent
misrepresentations or other clearly fraudulent acts, I' " may be reason116. 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1488.
117. See id. at 1500-08; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3702-08. But see Rice.
Recommendations by a Broker-Dealer: The Requirement for a Reasonable Basis, 25
MERcEn L. REV. 537, 553-54 (1974).
118. Churning is also an exception. "Even a broker, who acts solely as an agent
for his customers, is compensated on a commission basis and thus has an interest in
generating transactions. His interest in this respect obviously may conflict with those
of his customer. And when this conflict is resolved in the broker's favor, trouble
may ensue in the form of, for example, a 'suitability' or 'churning' case." O'Boyle.
supra note 39, at 459. See text accompanying notes 284-94 infra; see also V. BRUDNEY
& M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1064 n.o (1972)
("unloading" excess inventory).
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ably viewed as conduct constituting a conflict of interest and a breach
of fiduciary principles. A broker in this situation at most secures
business he might otherwise lose, and may simply save the time and
expense of a thorough investigation of security and customer. The
substantial unjust enrichment or self-dealing present in most shingle
theory violations is absent from "pure" suitability violations.
Of course, the SEC and the courts may choose simply to abandon
the doctrinal underpinnings of the shingle theory' 19 in favor of a
formula that makes it fraudulent to act "unfairly" or inconsistently
with "standards of the profession." But such a formula would be
20
almost infinitely elastic.

Options Trading: SEC Proposals and Exchange Rules
During the past five years, there has been a rapid emergence of
exchange trading in options, which previously had been traded over
the counter in much lower volume. 121 The SEC has permitted this
trading, the first trading of options on the exchanges since the years
before 1934, on an experimental basis on the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE), the Amex, and the Philadelphia, Pacific, and
Midwest Exchanges. 2 2- The Commission has repeatedly expressed
119. See, e.g., Leavell, supra note 60, at 1581-83.
120. See Loss (1969), supra note 114, at 240 (danger that inferring representations
is "question-begging"); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 880. See also Hearing on Municipal
Securities Regulation before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1975)
(testimony of SEC Commissioner J. Evans that use of a fraud theory "would be a
much more difficult approach to upgrading standards" than fair practice rulemaking).
121. Options are contracts in which the seller ("writer") conveys to the buyer the
right to buy ("calls") or sell ("puts") an underlying security at a specified price within a specified period. In exchange trading, the Options Clearing Corporation intervenes between seller and buyer, becoming the party with which each contracts. On
the mechanics of options trading, see S. JAFFE, supra note 110, § 10.11; Poser & Brodsky, Amex Options Regulation, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 959, 959-60 (1975); Flint, supra note
97, at 1244-47; Gates, supra note 60, at 421-37.
122. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10552, 3 SEC DocKET 224,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Ir79,604 (1973) (approving
CBOE plan); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11144, 5 SEC DocKET 734
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT80,034 (1974) (approving
Amex plan); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11423, 6 SEC DocKET 394
(1975) (approving Philadelphia Exchange plan); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12283, 9 SEC Docr 317 (1976) (approving Pacific Exchange plan);
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13045, 11 SEC DOCKET 1120 (1976) (approving Midwest Exchange plan). See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
13401, 11 SEC DocKET 2100, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 81,030 (1977) (approving limited trading in puts on certain exchanges).
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concern, however, not only with the potential impact of such trading
on capital markets but also with the higher risks and greater complexity of trading in options rather than in the underlying securities. 123 Accordingly, the Commission adopted Exchange Act rule
9b-1,1 24 requiring SEC approval of exchange options trading plans.
26
This rule was later superseded 25 by Exchange Act rule 19b-4,1
which governs all rule changes by self-regulatory organizations.
On October 17, 1977, the SEC announced the initiation of a
formal investigation of all options trading and the initiation of formal
disapproval proceedings directed at plans to expand options trading.12'
Among the abuses that precipitated this major policy shift were suitability violations. 2 Thus, the suitability performance of options brokers may have an important impact on the future of options trading.
The Commission's proposed Exchange Act rule 9b-2, outstanding
since early 1973,129 would impose stringent disclosure requirements
and a three-part suitability requirement on all brokers dealing in
options. 180
The first part of the rule's suitability scheme is a general options
suitability provision that tracks the language of rule 15b10-3, but also
123. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10490, 3 SEC DOCKET 39,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 79,550 (1973); SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 10552, 3 SEC DOCKET 224, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT79,604, at 83,623 (1973).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1975).
125. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11604, 7 SEC DOCKET 652, [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT80,267 (1975).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1977).
127. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14056, 13 SEC DOCKET 366, [19771978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT 81,346 (1977) (investigative proceeding); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14057, 13 SEC DOCKET 375,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fT 81,347 (1977) (disapproval
proceedings).
See also Barron, Recent SEC Developments, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 59
(1978); Rissman, Options Moratorium, Investigation Throw Markets into Confusion,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 29, col. 1. The Commission had imposed an informal suspension of further expansions in options trading the preceding summer. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13760, 12 SEC DOCKET 1275 (1977).
128. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14056, 13 SEC DOCKET 366,
371, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 81,346 (1977).
129. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10550, 3 SEC DOCKET 213, [19731974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT 79,601 (1973); SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9994, SEC DOCKET, Feb. 8, 1973, at 6, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT79,221 (1973).
130. The rule is to be issued under the fraud and options sections of the Exchange
Act, sections 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975), and 9(b)-(c), 15
U.S.C. § 78i(b)-(c) (1970).

May 1978]

SUITABILITY OBLIGATIONS OF BROKERS

requires a broker to have reasonable grounds to believe that "the
entire recommended transaction is not unsuitable." 3 1 The second
suitability requirement in rule 9b-2 would apply to "limited price"
options, also known as "down-and-out" and "up-and-out" options. The
Commission has been considering since 1973 whether to prohibit these
options. 13 2 Limited price options expire if the market price of the
underlying securities falls below, in the case of calls, or rises above,
in the case of puts, a given price. Under the proposed rule, no transaction in a limited price option could be recommended unless the
broker also obtained "from the customer such information in addition
to any other information known by such broker . . . , as to have

reasonable grounds to believe, at the time of making the recommendation, that the customer understands the special characteristics of such
option." 33 According to the Commission, this additional suitability
requirement is necessary because "limited price options are fraught
with special hazards which require a customer to have a high degree
of sophistication and understanding in order for such options to be
recommended as a suitable investment.'

34

The third part of rule 9b-2 would apply to "uncovered" or "naked" calls and "offsetting" puts. These are calls whose writer neither
owns nor is long in the underlying security, and puts whose writer
is short in the underlying security. They are not subject to the same
risk limits as other options because the writer faces unbounded losses
on the call or the short position. 133 A broker could effect such
transactions only if
on the basis of information obtained

....

after reasonable in-

quiry, and in addition to any other information known by such

131. Proposed rule 9b-2(b)(1), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT22,623 (1977).
132. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10550, 3 SEC DocKET 213, [19731974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT79,601 (1973).
133. Proposed rule 9b-2(b)(2), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT22,623 (1977).
One commentator has observed that it is unclear whether this provision would bar
executing a transaction with a customer who refused to provide information, but takes
the view that it probably would. Frankhouser, Options Regulation, 7 REv. SEC. REc.
903, 908 (1974).
134. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10550, 3 SEC DocKET 213, 214,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 79,601, at 83,613 (1973)
(footnote omitted). See also SEC Securities Exchange Act No-Action Letter, § 10(b),
rule 10b-5, Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) IT78,159 (1971); Lipton, supra note 1, at 291-92 (prepared statement of M.
Lipton).
135. See Bryant, Proposed SEC Option Rules, 6 REv. SEC. RG. 883, 887 (1973).
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broker . . . .he has a reasonable basis for believing that the
customer, at the time of the transaction, is capable of evaluating
the additional risks in such transactions, and has the financial
capability to meet reasonably foreseeable margin calls .... "I

This suitability provision would apply to all transactions conducted
by the broker, whether or not he recommended them. The SEC explained that the broad scope of the provision was necessary "in view
of the dangers to customers and endorsing brokers inherent in this
137
more complex form of option writing."'
The Commission noted with respect to both the second and third
parts of the suitability scheme of rule 9b-2 that the information the
broker should obtain would generally "include the nature and extent
of the customer's knowledge and experience in financial matters."' s
The Commission added that, unlike the general suitability requirement, these parts do "not call merely for a reasonable inquiry of the
customer," but "would require the broker . . . to obtain the infor-

mation relative to the customer's sophistication that is needed in order
for . . . the broker . . . to make a reasonable judgment." 1'

Exchange trading of options began on the CBOE in 1973 and
on the Amex in 1975140 and is presently underway on three smaller
exchanges, as already noted. The rules14 1 adopted by these exchanges
136. Proposed rule 9b-2(c) 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 22,623 (1977).
137. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10550, 3 SEC DOCKET 213, 214,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,601, at 83,613 (1973).
138. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9994, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f1 79,221, at 82,689 (1973).
139. Id.
140. Poser & Brodsky, supra note 121, at 959; Brodsky, Rules of tile CBOE, 6 REv.
SEC. REG. 897 (1973).
141. See, e.g., CBOE rule 9.9, CBOE GUIDE (CCH) * 2309 (1977), Amex rule
923, 2 Axi. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) fT9723 (1977); Philadelphia Stock Ex. rule 1026,
PHILADELPHIA STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) ' 3026 (1977); Pacific Stock Ex. rule X, §
]8(c), PACFIC STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) fT4993 (1977); Midwest Stock Ex. rules art.
XLVIII, Rule 5, MIDWEST STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) I 2115 (1977).
See aLso Proposed rule Change by Nat'l Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., SEC File No. SR-NASD-77-2,
Exhibit 1, at 25-27 (Jan. 24, 1977); id., amendment no. 5, at 29-30 (June 13, 1977):
proposed NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 33(b), app. E, § 19, submitted as part
of NASD plan for over-the-counter listing of standardized options); Proposed Rule
Change of Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., SEC File No. SR-NASD-77-23, at 30-32
(Dec. 23, 1977); id., amendment no. 4, at 16-17 (Apr. 13, 1978) (same, [19771 NASD
MANUAL (CCH) IT2183); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14307, 13 SEC
DIGEST 1246 (1977) (request for comments on NASD options suitability rule, as modified to apply only to trading of exchange-listed options by NASD members who are not
exchange members); Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange, Inc., SEC
File No. SR-NYSE-77-17, Exhibit C, at 29 (June 20, 1977) (proposed NYSE rule 723).
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as part of their statutorily-required options trading plans142 include

suitability rules very similar to those of proposed rule 9b-2, except
that limited price options, which are not now traded, are not addressed

and the more stringent requirements of the third part of proposed
rule 9b-2 are applied to all puts rather than to offsetting puts only.
The exchanges also require periodic review of options accounts from
1 43
the standpoint of suitability.
A number of brokerage firms have established minimum require-

ments in terms of net worth or account equity for "covered" and "uncovered" transactions.14 4 The Amex has established as a guideline
the requirement that except for recommendations limited to the particular series of options where the customer himself has determined

the amount of the investment to be made, "recommendations should
not be made for the investment of more than 15% to 20% of a customer's investment assets in the purchase of options." 145
One important side effect of the establishment of this new realm
of suitability regulation by the exchanges is that it substantially undercuts the already uncertain argument that exchange know-your-

customer rules are de facto suitability rules.146 For, in their options
regulation schemes, the exchanges have included separate know-

your-customer rules side by side with options suitability rules. These
options know-your-customer rules not only repeat the language of
the basic know-your-customer rules as to learning "the essential facts

relative to the customer," but go on to require that the broker learn
the customer's "financial situation and investment objectives."14 - The
142. See note 122 supra.
143. See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 140, at 897 (CBOE); Poser & Brodsky, supra
note 121, at 963 (Amex).
144. Poser & Brodsky, supra note 121, at 963; AmEx, REGULATORY GUIDELINEs Fon
CoNDUcT Ne A PUBLIC BUsiNEss IN AMEx LIsTED OPTIONS (PUTs AN CALLS) 4 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as AM Gur ELNES].
145.

AmEx GUIDELn;ES, supra note 144, at 10.

146. See, e.g., note 60 supra.
147. CBOE rule 9.7(b), CBOE GUrE (CCH) ff 2307 (1976), (also refers to
"needs"); Amex rule 921(b), 2 Am. STOCK Ex. GuE (CCH) f1 9721 (1977); Philadelphia Stock Ex. rule 1024 (b) (ii), PHLADELPMHA STOCK Ex. Gutm (CCH)
3024
(1977), Pacific Stock Ex. rule X, § 18(b)(1), PACIFIC STOCK Ex. GtrmE (CCH) ff
4993 (1977); Midwest Stock Ex. rules art. XLVIII, rule 3(b), MIDWEST STOCK Ex.
GUImE (CCH) II 2113 (1977).
The Amex commentary on the rule states: "In connection with approving the

ir

account of a customer for options trading, members and member organizations should
seek information in particular as to whether the customer has had prior experience in

trading options, whether he is aware of the nature and extent of the obligations as
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NYSE proposal for options rules follows the other exchanges in this
regard. 148 The adoption or proposed adoption of these rules creates
a powerful negative inference as to the suitability content of the basic
know-your-customer rules.
Other SEC Proposals and Statements Concerning Suitability

In the past several years, the SEC has made several interesting
proposals and statements concerning suitability. 4 "
Unsecured Short-Term Debt Securities
On April 12, 1971, the Commission released a statement expressing
its concern over proposals to offer unsecured short-term debt securities
in the guise of substitutes for savings accounts or certificates of deposit. The SEC drew attention to the risk factors associated with
these securities and reminded those "engaged in the offer and sale"
of such investments of their obligation under the SECO suitability
rule, as well as under various fraud sections and rules "to consider as
to each prospective investor all adverse risk factors, taking into account, among other relevant considerations, his investment needs and
objectives in light of his personal and financial situation."' 1 Apparently this instance is the only one in which the Commission has
issued a warning under the general SECO suitability rule as to a
particular category of investments."'
well as the risks attendant to options trading, whether he has account with other brokerage firms and the extent of any positions or commitments therein, and whether the
customer has financial resources adequate to cover option positions he may intend
to establish in such account." 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUDE (CCH) 1 9721.02 (1977).
For similar comments, see PHILADELPHIA STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) ff 3024.02 (1977):
PACIFIC STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH)
4993.02; MIDWEST STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) I
2113.02 (1977).
148. Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange, Inc., File No. SRNYSE-77-17, Exhibit C, at 25 (June 20, 1977) (proposed NYSE rule 721).
149. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11220, 6 SEC DOCKET 342,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,096 (1975); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 10845, 4 SEC DOCKET 384, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 79,809 (1974)
(SEC consideration of, and ultimate decision against, adopting suitability rule governing certain real property investments).
See also notes 258-341 & accompanying text infra (SEC enforcement decisions and noaction letters).
150. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9143, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 78,C24, at 80,247 (1971).
151. But cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14273, 13 SEC DOCKET 1127,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,387 (1977) (warning
to the public concerning coal mining tax shelters, citing question of their suitability).
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Future Structure of Securities Markets
On February 2, 1972, the Commission issued to Congress its

Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets.152 The
statement addressed the possibility that competitive brokerage commission rates would deprive the small investor of the benefit of research financed by the minimum commission scheme in effect at that
time. A broker's adequate knowledge concerning the securities he
recommends has not only been required independently under fraud
principles, 1 3 but is a logical prerequisite to his discharging his suitability obligations. In the SEC's statement to Congress, it observed
that a competitive rate structure would not relieve brokers of their
obligations under the NASD and SECO suitability rules and continued
with this interesting comment:
It should be noted that the suitability rules are cast in terms
of the needs of the customer based on information he furnishes
to the broker. Unarticulated but implicit in such rules is also
the broker's obligation to obtain current basic information regarding the security and then to make an evaluation as to the
suitability of a recommendation for a particular customer in view
of both the information concerning the security and the customer's needs.
The Commission recognizes that some customers will independently determine to purchase or sell specific securities and will
not request or desire the advice of a broker and that in these
circumstances it is impractical to require rigid adherence to the
suitability rules. Even in such cases, however, the broker would
appear to be obliged to reveal to the customer information known
to him about the security which might reasonably be expected
to affect the customer's decision, apart from his other duties
under applicable provisions of the securities laws.154
The second paragraph seems to indicate that even in arm's length
order clerk situations, the broker must make full disclosure of potential unsuitability. Such disclosure, by definition, would require some
knowledge of the customer's situation. Apparently, the broker is free
to effect the transaction if the customer so desires, once such disclosure is made.'55
152. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 71A, [Special Studies 1963-1972
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) fT74,811 (1972).
153. See note 110 supra.
154.

SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 71A, [Special Studies 1963-1972

Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 74,811, at 65,620 (1972).
155. Accord, Faust, supra note 61, at 9C0. See also Bines, Investment Objectives,
supra note 18, at 432 (Future Structure statement raises "the question of how intensely
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The Future Structure statement also identified the creation of a
composite network of securities price quotations as an important step
toward the ultimate goal of an integrated, national securities market. 15'
After considerable analysis and debate of alternative means to pursue
a composite quotation system, 157 the Commission finally adopted Exchange Act rule 11Ac-1. 15 8 This rule requires the exchanges and
the NASD to make available to electronic quotation vendors their
members' current bids, offers, and quotations sizes about every security
for which trading data are regularly reported. These quotations are
to be firm"; that is, each member broker will be required, with certain
exceptions, to execute transactions at terms at least as favorable as
his latest published quotations, with any other broker "or any other
person belonging to a category of persons with whom [he] customarily
deals." 59 The SEC was careful to stress that the new rule does not
abrogate brokers' suitability obligations: a broker still "should not
engage in a transaction with a customer when the broker's fiduciary
responsibility, including principles of suitability . . . , would otherwise prohibit such a transaction."'1 60

a manager must review a client's financial position and even suggests that a manager
may act only on the basis of his own independent suitability evaluation regardless
of the client's stated preference").
156. On the development of the national market system concept, see generally SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14416, 14 SEC DOCKET 31, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) f[ 81,502 (1978).
157. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9529, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 78,599 (1972); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 10969, 5 SEC DOCKET 735, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
79,931 (1974); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11288, 6 SEC DOCKEl
425, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,136 (1975); SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12670, 10 SEC DOCKET 109, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f[ 80,658 (1976); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13626, 12 SEC DOCKET 835, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,199 (1977).
158. This rule is to be codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-1. See SEC Securities
Exchange Act 'Release No. 14415, 14 SEC DOCKET 14, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
81,501 (1978).
159. Rule llAcl-l(c)(2).
160. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14415, 14 SEC DOCKET 14, 25,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 81,501 (1978). In its release explaining the
proposed rule, the Commission had expressed uncertainty as to the wisdom of conferring on retail customers the right to compel a broker to execute a transaction at his
quoted terms, in light of the NASD suitability rule. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 13626, 12 SEC DOCKET 835, 838-39 n.16, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fT81,199, at 88,172 n.16 (1977).
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Hot Issues
On July 26, 1972, during hearings on "hot issues," which "result
where the price of a new offering of securities rises to a substantial
premium over the initial offering price immediately or very soon after
the securities are first distributed to the public," the SEC issued statements in which it noted a greater need for "due diligence" by the
underwriters of such securities. The Commission also found a "definite need for specific suitability standards" as to these high-risk securities. It noted that there was precedent for the "tailoring of
suitability standards for a specific problem," citing rule 15c2-5, and
requested the NASD and the exchanges to "consider developing suitability standards for the guidance of their members in selling" such
securities. These standards should take into account both the customer's "investment objectives, financial situation and needs" and his
"experience and sophistication in securities transactions." The Commission stated that, if "an appropriate response" were not forthcoming,
it would "consider rule making to accomplish the necessary results for
6
the protection of investors and in the public interest."1 1
The NASD circulated its proposed "hot issue" rules in early
1973.102 The suitability section provided:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security which is part of the initial public offering of a
company in the promotional, exploratory or developmental stage,
a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of
information furnished by the customer concerning the customer's
investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other
information known by the member. In connection with all such
determinations, the member must maintain in its files the basis
16 3
for and the reasons upon which it reached its determination.
The "hlot issue" proposal was withdrawn to redraft the "due diligence" sections and to add other provisions.16 4 It was resubmitted
to the membership in April 1975,16 " but has not been pursued. Un161. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9671, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
F 4506B, at 4059 (1972).
162. NASD, Notice to Members No. 73-17 (Mar. 14, 1973).
163. Id. at 13-14. Notice the similarity of this proposed rule to the NASD rule
governing members' recommendations of securities in their own firms, set forth in note
39 supra.
164. NASD, REPORT TO MmERS 1973, at 7 (1974).
165. See NASD, REPoRT To MEMBFRS 1975, at 7 (1976). But see Phalon, New
Issues: A Re-emergence, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1978, at 26, col. 1; Ella, Federal Ex-
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doubtedly other matters were regarded as more pressing in the context of a bear market from which "hot issues" had all but disappeared.
Tax-Sheltered Programs
On July 2, 1973, the Commission requested public comment on
proposed NASD rules for comprehensive regulation of the distribution by NASD members of securities of tax-sheltered programs. These
programs frequently involve exceptional levels of risk.166 At the same
time the NASD circulated these proposals, which had already been
revised following a year's consideration within the Association, to its
1 67
own members for the second time.
The proposed suitability provision would have governed all sales,
not merely recommendations. It was summarized by the SEC as
follows:
[A tax sheltered] program would be required to establish and
disclose in the prospectus its suitability standards for program participants. In order to determine the suitability of a program for
a particular investor, the rules would establish certain minimum
guidelines, among which are that the customer should be reasonably anticipated to be in at least a 50%tax bracket in certain high
risk situations, and that the customer have a net worth sufficient
to sustain the risk inherent in the program, including the loss of
his investment. 16 8
Departures from presumptive suitability standards would have been
permitted, but the burden would have been on the broker to prove
that such aberrations were appropriate. 169 Full disclosure to the customer would not fulfill the suitability obligation. The provision also
press Corp., Hot New Issue Excites Buyers, Delights Traders and Rewards Lenders,
Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1978, at 45, col. 3.
166. See, e.g., Murdock, Tax Sheltered Securities: Is There a Broker-Dealer in
the Woodwork? 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 518, 527-30 (1974); Hazard, Regulation of Real
Estate Syndications: An Overview, 49 WASH. L. REv. 137 (1973); Mosburg, Regulation of Tax Shelter Investments, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 207 (1972); Note, Tax Sheltered
Equities, 5 REv. SEc. REG. 896 (1972).
167. See NASD, Notice to Members No. 73-50 (July 13, 1973). See also NASD,
Tax Sheltered Programs: Proposed Article III, Section 33 of Rules of Fair Practice
and Proposed Regulations to be Adopted Pursuant Thereto (May 9, 1972). The proposals grew out of a 1970-1972 NASD study of tax sheltered investments, see NASD
News, May 1971, at 5, "the bulk of which are distributed through NASD members"
NASD News, Aug. 1972, at 6.
168. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10260, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) fr79,417, at 33,196.
169. See NASD, Press Release No. NSD 1672, at 2 (June 4, 1972) (proposal would
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included a requirement that the broker "maintain in the files the
basis for and reasons upon which the determination of suitability was
reached as to that customer."17 °
The SEC, noting that several states had regulated such investments and that proposed California rules, now in effect,'1 would
govern their suitability,17 2 stated it was "inclined to the view that the
implementation [of the suitability provisions and certain of the other
provisions of the proposed rules] should proceed."' 7 3

The Commis-

sion expressed misgivings, however, as to the breadth of the overall
NASD proposals; it was concerned that some of the provisions, such
as those governing issuer net worth, investor assessments, liquidation
of program interests, and sponsor compensation, might entail regulation of issuers which would be more appropriate for legislative
action. 1 74

Several months later, the Commission also released for

comment a proposed guideline requiring that specific suitability
7standards be prominently displayed in real estate prospectuses.1
In a May 1974 letter to the NASD, the SEC expressed continued
misgivings over the breadth of the NASD's proposed regulation of
tax-sheltered offerings. The SEC concluded that, although it "would
welcome the prompt submission" of proposed NASD suitability rules
for tax-sheltered investments insofar as suitability was within "the
traditional areas of [NASD] regulation," the NASD should not, "at
this time," undertake to regulate "the operation, structure and management" of tax-sheltered programs.
The Commission then suggested that the NASD could salvage
"much of the thought behind" the disapproved rules in the form of
"impose the burden of providing justification for the determination of suitability on the
broker/dealer").
170. NASD, Notice to Members, 73-50, at 32 (July 13, 1973).
171. See note 5 supra.
172. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10260, 2 SEC DocicEr 82, 83, 85
& n.9, 86, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f[79,417, at 83,194,
83,198 & n.9, 83,202.
173. Id., 2 SEC Doc=or at 85-86, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
at 83,202.
174. Id., 2 SEC DocxET at 85-86, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
at 83,198-200. See also NASD News, Aug. 1973, at 3; NASD, REPORT TO MEMBERS
1973, at 7 (1974); Murdock, supra note 166, at 532 n.57.
175. Proposed Guide 60, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10663 (March
1, 1974), 3 SEC DocKET 606, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
gt 79,683 (1974). See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12224, 9 SEC
DocK r 181, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) ff 80,405 (1976)
(adoption of Guide 60).
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"general guidelines in the area of suitability."176 In suggesting how
such guidelines might be developed, the letter continued with a
fascinating and illuminating effort by the Commission to mark out a
line between acceptable suitability regulation and illegitimate issuer
regulation. As an example of the use of issuer-oriented criteria in
developing suitability guidelines, the SEC cited the NASD's proposed
experience and net worth criteria for sponsors of tax shelter programs.
Under the Commission's approach, such criteria would not be mandatory. Since these criteria are risk indicators, programs whose
sponsors failed to satisfy them would be suitable for fewer customers.
The Commission took the following position with respect to such
a program:
While suitability guidelines would not absolutely preclude a
member from deciding (and, if necessary, subsequently demonstrating) that offsetting factors made a program sufficiently attractive to justify recommending it to selected customers, a member so deciding will obviously wish to document that the selected
customers had, for example, an ability to comprehend fully the
extra risk involved and greater capital or income than the average customer to whom it recommended tax shelter programs
generally.177
On July 7, 1977, three years after the SEC letter, the NASD
renewed its efforts in this area by submitting for SEC approval an
enabling provision that delegates to the Association's Board of Governors broad power to set the conditions under which NASD members may distribute, sponsor, or underwrite investments in "direct
participation programs."' 7
The Board's powers would include authority to set "the standards of suitability for investment in such
programs by investors."' 7 A direct participation program is defined,
in essence, as an investment vehicle "which provides for flow-through
tax consequences."'1 80 The enabling provision responded to the SEC's
176. Letter from SEC Division of Market Regulation to NASD (May 6, 1974),
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) rj 79,810, at 84,193 (1974).
177. Id. at 84,194. As to the events of 1972 to 1974, see Comment, supra note 5,
at 486-88.
178. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13753, 12 SEC DOCKET 1273
(1977) (request for comments).
179. Proposed art. III, § 35(b)(3) of the Rules of Fair Practice. See NASD,
Notice to Members No. 77-3, at 33 (Jan. 21, 1977). This provision had been approved by the NASD membership in January and February 1977, after it was circulated together with a first draft of detailed Board rules to govern such programs.
180. Proposed art. III, § 35(d)(2) of the Rules of Fair Practice. Id. at 34.
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earlier concerns by limiting the Board's power to establish substantive standards concerning issuers to those cases in which an NASD
member actually sponsored the program.18
On March 10, 1978, while the enabling provision remained pending with the SEC, the Board of Governors circulated a second draft
of detailed rules for direct participation programs,'18 2 including, as

had the first draft, a suggested suitability rule. The SEC may well
be awaiting a final draft of these rules before passing on the enabling
provision. In both the 1977 and 1978 drafts, the suitability rule is
identical. 8 3 The rule substantially repeats the 1973 suitability proposal. It requires suitability standards to appear in program prospectuses. 8

4

A broker may neither recommend nor sell units in such

programs unless he satisfies a three-part suitability requirement. 85
This obligation is separate and apart from the broker's duty to "inform the customer of all pertinent facts relating to the liquidity and
marketability of the program, or lack thereof, the tax aspects of the
program during the term of the investment and the tax consequences
18
upon dissolution of the program." 6

The first facet of the suitability requirement is an obligation to
make a general suitability determination. The broker must "have
reasonable grounds for believing that the purchase of the program
is suitable for the customer on the basis of information furnished
by him concerning his investment objectives, financial situation and
needs and any other information known" to the broker. 8 7 Unlike
the general NASD suitability rule, this part of the proposal leaves no
doubt that the broker must obtain detailed information from the customer about the customer's finances and investment goals.' 88
181. Proposed art. III, § 35(b) (2) of the Rules of Fair Practice. Id. at 32-33.
182. NASD, Notice to Members No. 78-12 (Mar. 10, 1978).
183. See NASD Notice to Members No. 77-3, at 54-56 (Jan. 21, 1977 (proposed
NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 35, app. F, § 5); NASD, Notice to Members
No. 78-12, at 53-55 (Mar. 10, 1978) (proposed NASD Rules of Fair Practice art.
III, § 35, app. F, § 7).
184. Id. at 53 (subsection (a)).
185. Id. (subsection (b)).
186. NASD, Notice to Members No. 77-3, at 55 (Jan. 21, 1977) (proposed subsection (b)(3)). Some of the language of this subsection was omitted from the 1978
version by a typographical error. See NASD, Notice to Members No. 78-12, at 53
(Mar. 10, 1978).
187. Id. at 54 (subsection (b)(4)).
188. See also note 39 supra (NASD rule governing self-underwriting); text accompanying note 163 supra (NASD hot issue proposal); note 141 supra (NASD options
proposal.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

The second part of the suitability requirement mandates a specific determination that the investment is appropriate for the customer's tax situation. The broker must
be assured on the basis of information obtained that the customer, after giving effect to all of his direct participation investments, is reasonably anticipated to be in a tax bracket appropriate
to enable him to obtain the tax benefit described in the prospectus; provided, however, that in the case of an oil and gas program, other than a program formed to acquire producing properties, the customer shall be reasonably anticipated to be in at
least a 50 percent tax bracket prior to giving effect to all of his
direct participation investments .... 189
Thus, a mechanical presumptive suitability standard - that the customer be in at least the fifty percent tax bracket - is adopted for
certain high-risk ventures in oil and gas.
The third part requires a specific determination that the investment is appropriate in light of the customer's net worth. The duty
imposed by this third part has at least three aspects. The broker
must conclude that the customer's net worth is high enough that (a)
he can bear the risk of losing the investment, (b) he can bear the
risk of loss of liquidity posed by the investment, and (c) his overall
investment in such programs is a "reasonable" proportion (whatever
that may mean) of net worth. 190
A broker must keep on file "the basis for and reasons upon which
the determination of suitability was reached."'19 The broker is also
forbidden from underwriting or distributing investments in any direct participation program which does not apply the rule's suitability
standards to all its purchasers.
The stringency of the specific suitability standards outlined above
is diluted, however, by the availability of an alternative means of
compliance. In the event the requirements are not "entirely satisfied,"'19 2 (a) "the burden of proving justification for the determination" of suitability shall be on the broker, and (b) the broker "shall
document in writing the basis therefor with particular references to
its departure from the standards." 93 The Board of Governors ex189. NASD, Notice to Members No. 78-12, at 53-54 (Mar. 10, 1978) (subsection
(b)(2)).
190. Id.at 54 (subsection (b) (3)).
191. Id.(subsection (b)(5)).
192. Id.(subsection (c)).
193. Id.(subsection (c)(1) and (c)(2)).
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plained that while suitability standards for such investments "should
be higher than those for investment in general securities, it does not
believe they should be so rigid that exceptions could not be made
in appropriate circumstances or that discretion to make a suitability
determination should be taken completely"' 94 from the broker.
The Proposed MSRB Suitability Rule

Municipal securities brokers, including bank departments, were
required to register by section 15B (a) (1) of the Exchange Act, 195
effective December 1, 1975. To facilitate extending the scheme of
the securities acts to municipal securities professionals, Congress created the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). The
MSRB is something of a hybrid between an administrative agency
and a self-regulatory association. 19 6 It received the familiar command to adopt rules designed, inter alia, "to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable
principles of trade." 19 7 Among the reasons cited in congressional

hearings for conferring fair-practice rulemaking power on the MSRB
was the existence of suitability abuses in the marketing of municipal
securities. 198 Recent evidence indicates that these abuses continue.' 99 Pending MSRB action, transactions in municipal securities
were exempted by Congress from NASD rules 200 and by the SEC
201
from SECO rules and rule 15c2-5.
194. Id. at 18.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). This statute was enacted as part
of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L.No. 94-29, § 1, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
196. See generally Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board: A New Concept in Self-Regulation, 29 V."D. L. REv. 903 (1976); MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ff 101
(1977).
197. Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C)
(Supp. V 1975).
198. See, e.g., Hearing on Municipal Securities Regulation before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (remarks of Rep. W. Stuckey), 43 (testimony of
SEC Commissioner J. Evans), 73 (prepared statement of Public Finance Council)
(1975).
199. See, e.g., Lawson, Investors Lose Millions On a California Swamp Called
Quimby Island, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
200. Sections 3(a)(12) and 15A(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(12)
and 78o-3(f) (Supp. V 1975).
201. Exchange Act rules 15b10-12 (exemption from SECO suitability rule) and
15c2-5(c) (exemption from rule 15c2-5), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b10-12, 240.15c2-5(c)
(1977). The initial SEC proposal for the exemption of municipal securities from rule
15c2-5 was accompanied by a comment implying that such a suitability rule was re-
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In April 1977, after considerable study, the MSRB proposed its
own set of fair practice rules, including a suitability rule, rule G-19.
Following a period of public comment, these rules were submitted
to the SEC for approval in September 1977,202 as required by sections
3(a) (26) and 19(b) of the Exchange Act. 20 3 The suitability rule
was substantially revised between the time of submission of the exposure draft and the SEC filing.
The MSRB explained that in formulating its fair practice rules,
it "carefully reviewed comparable NASD and SECO rules, and proposals from industry representatives and others.."20 4 Although proposed rule G-19 does draw on the language of other suitability rules,
it also contains new material which would make it among the least
20 5
ambiguous and most sophisticated of all suitability provisions.
The proposed rule reads:
(a) Customer Information. No broker . . . shall recom-

mend the purchase, sale, or exchange of a municipal security to
a customer unless such broker . . . , after reasonable inquiry,

(i) has reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation
is suitable for such customer on the basis of information furnished
by such customer concerning the customer's financial background,
tax status, and investment objectives and any other similar information concerning the customer known by such broker . . . or
(ii) has no reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is unsuitable for such customer if all of such information is
not furnished or known. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a
broker .. .determines that a transaction in specific municipal

securities would not be suitable for a customer and so informs
such customer, such broker . ..may thereafter respond to the

customer's requests for advice concerning such securities and
may execute transactions in such securities at the direction of
the customer.

garded as unnecessary in the municipal securities area. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 11876, 8 SEC DOCKET 541, 545, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
But the language finally adopted
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,333, at 85,837 (1975).
was explained in terms which did not give rise to such an inference. SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12468, 9 SEC DOCKET 681, 685, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,544, at 86,384 (1976).
202. MSRB, Notice of Filing of Fair Practice Rules (Sept. 20, 1977), MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ff 10,030.
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(26) and 78s(b) (Supp. V 1975). See also MSRB
Rule A-8, MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ff 3036 (1977).
204. MSRB, Exposure Draft: Fair Practice Rules (Apr. 7, 1977), [1977J MSRB
[ 10,003, at 10,319.
MANUAL (CCH)
205. Unfortunately, the Board's commentary does not explain the reasons for the
various adoptions of, and departures from, other suitability rules.
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(c) DiscretionaryTransactions. No broker . . . shall effect
a transaction in a municipal security or cause such transaction to
be effected with or for a discretionary account, unless the broker
. . . first determines that the transaction is suitable for the custhe
tomer as set forth in paragraph (a) (i) of this rule or unless
20 6
transaction is specifically authorized by the customer.
Rule G-19 resolves several ambiguities in the NASD and SECO
rules. Like the SECO rule, it would impose a duty of reasonable
inquiry into the customer's finances and investment objectives, but
it would also require inquiry into "tax status," while omitting the
reference to the customer's "needs" which appears in both the NASD
and SECO rules. The rule also narrows the SECO rule's reference
to "other information known" by the broker by specifying "other
similar information." Rule G-19 would allow a broker, under certain conditions, to make a recommendation to a customer who refused to provide relevant information 20 7 but would not allow him
to engage in discretionary transactions for such a customer unless
each transaction was specifically authorized.
Rule G-19 demonstrates that the MSRB sees a significant difference between the requirement in the NASD rule that a broker believe a recommendation is "suitable" and the SECO rule's requirement that he believe it "not unsuitable." The Board's rule would
apply the latter language only to the special case of the reticent
customer.
Because the "not unsuitable" phraseology applies to the reticent
customer, it becomes crucial to know when the broker's lack of information about a customer itself compels the broker to conclude
that an investment would be unsuitable for that customer. The
MSRB exposure draft offered the following example of a situation
206. MSRB, Notice of Filing of Fair Practice Rules (Sept. 20, 1977), MRSB MAN(CCH) i 10,030, at 10,369.
207. "Although the proposal would not prohibit making recommendations to customers who, after reasonable inquiry by the broker, do not disclose relevant personal
and financial information other than the customer account information required by the
Board's rule G-8(a)(xi), the [broker] would not be permitted to make a recommendation unless the [broker] had no reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation would be unsuitable for the customer." MSRB, Exposure Draft: Fair Practice Rules (Apr. 7, 1977), MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ff 10,003, at 10,321. Only this
comment makes it clear that the provision is aimed at a refusal or failure on the part
of the customer to provide information. The language in subsection (a)(ii) itself"if all of such information is not furnished or known" - might suggest that a mere delay
or other problem in communication between broker and customer could be sufficient to
permit a "not unsuitable" recommendation to be made.
UAL
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in which a broker could not reasonably believe a recommendation
"not unsuitable":
[A] municipal securities professional could not recommend the
purchase of tax-exempt securities to a retired person who indicates to the professional that the proceeds of a savings account
no
are to be used to make the purchase, if the professional has
20 8
knowledge that the customer has any other liquid assets.
This statement suggests that the absence of information about the
customer's other assets would preclude a reasonable broker from determining that tax-exempt securities would be "not unsuitable" for the
customer. After the comment period, however, the Board greatly
diluted this statement by adding the following qualification:
If, after further inquiry, the customer is unwilling to reveal any
further information to the professional, the Board believes that
the provisions of paragraph (a) (ii), as redrafted, would permit
recommendations to be made, provided the professional had no
that the recommendations were
reasonable grounds to believe
200
unsuitable for such customer.
The only interpretation of this addition that does not render the analysis circular is that an absence of crucial data about a customer does
not, in itself, require a broker to conclude that any particular recommendation is unsuitable, if the customer is responsible for withholding
the data.
Perhaps the most important feature of the proposed rule is its
authorization for brokers to give advice upon request to customers
who have first been warned that the securities they desire are unsuitable. By this language of authorization, the MSRB rule embraces
a conception of suitability as a matter determined not by the customer but by someone else applying objective standards to the customer's situation. Under the proposed rule, the customer's persistence in desiring a transaction after he has been informed it is unsuitable frees the broker from any further suitability obligations. It
does not, however, render the transaction suitable. The customer's
preferences, therefore, are apparently irrelevant to suitability under
the MSRB rule.

208.
MANUAL

Id.

(CCH) fJ 10,003, at 10,321.

209. MSRB, Notice of Filing of Fair Practice Rules (Sept. 20, 1977), MSRB
UAL (CCH) 1 10,030, at 10,374.

MAN-
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Commodity Futures and Commodity Options

The trading of commodity futures, contracts for the future delivery of commodities, and commodity options, rights to buy or sell
such contracts at a specified price at a future time, has generally
been excluded from the regulatory scheme administered by the
SEC. 210 For a long period, such trading was instead subject to relatively minimal controls under the Commodity Exchange Act.21 ' Although such transactions can be used by actual buyers and sellers of
commodities, such as meat processors and ranchers, to minimize risks
of loss from adverse price movements in the future ("hedging"), they
can also be a vehicle for speculation on price movements by investors
who never participate in actual commodity transactions. Depending
on the overall structure of the investor's transactions, such specula212
tion may involve exceptionally high risks.

In response to serious abuses and regulatory inadequacies, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974.21 3 This statute established the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) as a single, central regulatory agency for this
214
field and greatly expanded the regulation of commodities trading.

The commodities trading markets are rapidly growing in importance. 2 15 Although the intricacies of commodity futures and com-

210. See Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law - Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CoRP. L. 217 (1976); Long, Commodity Options - Revisited, 25 DRAKE L.
REV. 75 (1975); Hewitt, Commodities and Securities, in PLI SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTrrVE o SEOCtRTms REGULAMTON 281 (A. Fleischer, Jr. & R. Mundheim, eds. 1975).
211. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
212. See generally Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Regulatory Independence, 33 Bus. LAw. 163, 164-77 (1977).
213. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
214. See, e.g., Symposium on Commodity Futures Regulation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1 (1977); Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Selected Challenges to Agriculture, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 509; Purcell & Valdez, The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974: Regulatory Legislation for Commodity Futures
Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S.D.L. REv. 555 (1976). Congress is
presently considering whether to extend the life of the CFTC beyond September 30,
1978. Martin, Futures Commission Winning Fight to Survive Congressional Review,
Wall St. J., May 10, 1978, at 36, col. 1; Martin, GAO's Urging Cut in Jurisdiction of
Futures Unit Worries Industry, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1978, at 36, col. 2; Mullaney,
The Battle Over Regulation of New Futures Contracts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1978,
at D1, col 2.
215. Greer & Kandel, Brokers Eye Greener Pastures in Futures Trading, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 23, 1978, at 26, col. 1; Maidenberg, Commodity Commission Fights to Extend
Its Life, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1978, at Dl, col. 1.
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modity options 216 regulation are beyond the scope of this Article,217
it is important to examine the recent proposal by the CFTC of a
highly sophisticated, and in several respects novel, suitability rule to
govern commodity trading brokers.
The proposed rule, which was established for comment in September 1977,218 reads as follows:
216. Under section 4c(a)(3)(B) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c
(Supp. V 1975), only certain commodities may legally be the subject of options.
Gross suitability abuses in commodity options trading have recently been reported.
See, e.g., Kelley v. Carr, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) gf 20,517, at 22,139 (1977)
(commodity options brokerage firm preliminarily enjoined from any sale unless customer is first told both orally and in writing that "because of the volatile nature of
the commodities markets, the purchase of commodities options is not suitable for many
members of the public"); British Am. Commodity Options Corp., Nos. 76-15 & 77-3
(CFTC Dec. 2, 1977) (summarized in COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) If20,526); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F.
Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Field, Cadden & Koblenz, Summary of the Division of
Enforcement's Experience to Date in Regulating Options Transactions (CFTC Staff
Memorandum, Mar. 11, 1978); Lynch, How a Flim-Flam Man Causes a Big Shake-Up
in Commodity Options, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Mysterious James A.
Carr - Options, Alias and Wealth, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, at Dl, col. 2; Kwitny,
Commodity Options Sold By Phone Often Fail To Ring True, Wall St. J., Nov. 18,
1977, at 1, col. 4; Maidenberg, When the Commodity Pitchman Calls, Hang Up, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1977, § 3, at 3, col. 1; COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH), Report No.
68, at 5 (Mar. 13, 1978); Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Option
Trading - Is the Customer Protected? 9 ST. MARaY's L.J. 53 (1977). In response,
the CFTC has imposed a suspension as of June 1, 1978 of all commodity options
trading. See Suspension of the Offer and Sale of Commodity Options, 43 FED. REG.
16,153, COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) If20,588 (1978); Buxbaum, Proposed Suspension
of Trading in London Commodity Options, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1978, at 1, col. 1. This
decision was reached because the Commission's comprehensive program to regulate
options trading failed to halt customer abuses. For the development of this regulatory
program, see 41 FED. REc. 44560 (1976); id. at 51808; 42 id. at 18246 (1977); id. at
23614; id. at 55538; id. at 61831; CFTC Advisory Comm. on the Definition and Regulation of Market Instruments, Recommended Policies on Commodity Options Transactions, reprinted in COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH), Report No. 26 (July 15, 1976).
The CFTC still expects to implement by the end of 1978 its plans for pilot programs
of commodity options trading on registered exchanges. CFTC, Release No. 385-78,
at 3 (Apr. 5, 1978).
217. For example, this Article does not consider the rules of the various commodity
exchanges. On the regulation of commodity trading generally, see Comm. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) If 100-911 (1977-1978); CFTC, ANNUAL REPORT 1976 (1977).
218. Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Commodity
Trading Professionals, 42 FED. REc. 44750, COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) If20,474 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rulemaking]. See generally Buxbaum, CFTC's Proposed
Rules to Protect Customers, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Hudson, Customer
Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1978). In May
1978, the CFTC announced it would adopt certain of the proposed customer protection
rules, but apparently deferred decision on the suitability rule. CFTC Release No.
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(a) No [broker] . . . may, directly or indirectly make any
recommendation to any customer concerning the purchase, sale
or continued holding of any commodity interest, or may effect,
directly or indirectly, any transaction in a commodity interest for
a customer pursuant to discretionary power . . . , unless the
[broker] ..e.
(1) Within a reasonable period of time before the recommendation or transaction,
(i) Obtained from the customer the essential facts about the
customer's financial condition and trading objectives, and
(ii) Verified with the customer the accuracy of that information if previously obtained and
(2) At the time of the recommendation or transaction, had
reason to believe that the recommendation or transaction was
suitable for the customer in light of
(i) The information obtained from the customer and otherwise known about the customer . . . , and
(ii) The risk of loss involved therein.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "recommendation" means any advice, suggestion or other statement that is
intended, or can reasonably be expected, to influence a customer
to purchase, sell or hold a commodity interest, but does not include any statement that merely describes in an objective fashion
the commodity interest, the manner in which it is traded or the
services of the [broker] ....
(c) This section does not apply to recommendations furnished solely through(1) Uniform publications distributed to subscribers thereto,

(2) Books,
(3) Television or radio communications,
or
2 9
(4) Seminar or lecture presentations. 1

The need for, and appropriate contours of, a suitability rule for
commodities trading were hotly debated before the release of the
CFTC proposal. 220 The Commission justified its proposal by citing
398-78 (May 2, 1978). However, the Commission did decide that brokers "should be
required to disclose to prospective customers - by way of the risk disclosure statement that the customers should consider whether futures trading is suitable for them in light
of their financial condition and needs." Id. at 3.
219. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 218, 42 FED. REG. at 44750, COMM. Fn-r.
L. REP. (CCH) at 21,940 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 166.2).

For an excellent critical

analysis of the rule, see Hudson, supra note 218, at 13-18. A separate rule would ban
churning. See id., 42 FED. R57. at 44750, Comms. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,940
(proposed 17 C.F.R. § 166.3).
220. See, e.g., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) ff 20,266
(1977). This is a summary of a workshop of an American Bar Association subcom-

mittee, at which concern was expressed over the "potential for litigation" threatened
by any CFTC suitability rule, and opinions were expressed such as the following:
"[P]ersons who trade commodity htures contracts are not investors, but speculators,
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the high risk that commodity trading can involve and noting that
"customers are often unaware of, or inattentive to,"221 this risk. The
Commission declared that it
is considering the adoption of a suitability rule precisely because
disclosure alone does not sufficiently protect some customers from
high-pressure sales tactics. For example, commodity option
salesmen have been able to induce customers on small fixed incomes to make clearly unsuitable purchases of speculative options notwithstanding the salesman's disclosure in some instances
of all material facts.222
Indeed, a separate proposed rule would require that every customer
be furnished with a detailed, written statement disclosing the possible
2 23
risk of loss from commodities trading.
The proposed suitability rule has several distinctive features.
First, as in the NASD tax shelter proposal, 2 -4 the concept of suitability
is expressed not only in the familiar general terms of the consistency
of a recommendation with the customer's investment objectives and
financial situation but also in an additional, particularized requirement concerning the appropriateness for the customer of the risk of
loss from the transaction. The accompanying commentary makes
clear that the assessment of suitability, in both senses, is to be made
by the broker, not the customer. This adoption of an objective noand are not entitled to the same kind of regulatory protections afforded securities investors. Furthermore, if a person is aware of certain risks, how can the government
prohibit or require brokers to prevent such a person from losing his money futures
trading?" Id. at 21,453. The argument that commodities and securities markets cannot be compared is also made in Hudson, supra note 218, at 14, and Sotos & Bowen,
supra note 60, at 294-96. Sotos and Bowen advocate a suitability rule requiring only
that the broker determine whether the customer has sufficient liquid assets to bear the
loss of his position. Id. at 305-06. Their proposal is based on the questionable premise
that there is no material difference in risk levels among all the various commodity
transactions a broker might recommend. In contrast, see Hudson, supra note 218, at
14 n.97, 18. See also CFTC Advisory Comm. on Commodity Futures Trading Professionals, Report, reprinted in Commzt. Fu'T. L. REP. (CCH), Report No. 29, pt. II
(Aug. 20, 1976) (recommending that the CFTC adopt a suitability rule). After proposing its customer protection rules, the CFTC undertook a highly publicized series
of nationwide hearings on the riles. See Comx. FUT. L. REP. (CCH), Report No.
58, at 2 (Oct. 11, 1977); CFTC, Release No. 347-77 (Oct. 17, 1977); Co.mtm. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH), Report No. 61, at 2 (Nov. 21, 1977).
221. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 218, 42 FED. REG. at 44743, CoMm. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) at 21,928.
222. Id., 42 FED. REc. at 44744, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,929.
223. See id., 42 FED. REG. at 44749, Comm,. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) at 21,939 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 1.55). See note 218 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 182-90 supra.
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tion of suitability is made clear with comments that it would be
"inconsistent with the purpose of the rule to permit the professional
to shift completely to the customer the responsibility for assessing
the risks of a trade" and that the broker would be held to the suitability requirement "regardless of the degree to which the customer
22 5
relied" on him.

Second, this strongly paternalistic quality of the rule is reinforced
by a Commission request for comments on the possibility of imposing
presumptive suitability standards, "such as a requirement that commodity customers have a minimum net worth (e.g., $50,000), annual
gross income (e.g., $25,000), account equity (e.g., $10,000) or some
combination of those factors."22 6 The Commission's skepticism about
imposing such standards resulted not from basic doubts about the
imposition of external, objective suitability criteria on the customer
but rather from concern regarding the imperfections of any presumptive standards as measures of "true" ability to bear risk. 227 The
CFTC expressed its confidence that once the broker had complied
with his obligations to inquire into the customer's situation2 28 and
had obtained information as to such matters as the customer's net
worth, income, dependents, financial obligations, and other investments 229 he would "be able to determine whether commodity trading
225. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 218, 42 FED. REG. at 44744, Comm. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) at 21,930.
226. Id. Some brokers, and many "commodity pools" (which are akin to mutual
funds in the securities markets) already impose income and net worth standards on
investors. Hudson, supra note 218, at 16 n.104, 17 n.110.
227. Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 218, 42 FED. REc. at 44744, COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) at 21,929, 21,930.
228. The proposed rule contains no specific requirement for regular updating of
customer information, and no requirement of the verification by other sources of information supplied by the customer. However, the Commission requested comments
on the possibility of including such express requirements. Id., 42 FED. REc. at 44749,
Comrm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,937. Proposed 17 C.F.R. § 1.37 would require
the broker to "keep a record in permanent form which shall show for each person
for whom a commodity futures or commodity option account is carried all information
concerning the person's financial condition and trading objectives . . . considered in
recommending any transaction for the account or in effecting any transaction for the
account pursuant to discretionary power." Id., 42 FED. REc. at 44749, Comm. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) at 21,939.
229. Id., 42 FED. BEG. at 44744, Comrm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,928-29. The
Commission announced that it would recognize a special exception for information
concerning a customer's commodity trading activities with other brokerage firms. If
a broker made a "good faith attempt" to secure such information, he would not be
barred from making recommendations to, or discretionary trades for, a customer who
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is suitable for the customer and, if so, the amount of risk-taking that
230
will be appropriate.."
Third, the CFTC's endorsement of an objective theory of suitability is completed by the rule's prohibition of any recommendations
to, or discretionary trading for, customers who decline to provide all
information necessary to a suitability determination by the broker.
The Commission explained that order clerk transactions were excluded from this prohibition because "the application of the rule in
this area might unduly restrict the activities of financially responsible
customers who do not receive trading advice . . . and who decline
to furnish suitability information." Basic financial information about
such customers would have to be obtained in any event, in the Commission's view, to satisfy the know-your-customer component of the
rule.2 3 1 The Commission requested comments on the wisdom of
its proposed prohibition of recommendations to, and discretionary
trading for, reticent customers and suggested that a broker might
instead be permitted to deal with a customer who refuses to provide
information when the broker makes a "good faith attempt" to obtain
it.

2 32

The CFTC proposal supplies a detailed, and very broad, definition of "recommendation." In this connection, the Commission requested comments on the advisability of "requiring wide-spread communications that contain commodity recommendations to include a
conspicuous warning that commodities trading is not suitable for many
individuals.."23 3 The CFTC also requested comments on whether the
various commodities exchanges, and any NASD-type commodities
association which may become registered, should be required to
adopt self-regulatory suitability rules equivalent to or stricter than
the CFTC rule, which would be a departure from the SEC approach
2 34
to suitability regulation.
Even before the CFTC proposed its suitability rule, another source
of suitability doctrine had emerged in the field of commodities. In
sharp contrast to the approach of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44744 n.16, COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
at 21,929 n.16.
230. Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44744, CoM-M. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,929.
231. Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44743 n.15, Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,928 n.15.
232. Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44749, CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,937. See
also id., 42 FED. REG. at 44743 n.14, Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,928 n.14.
233. Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44743, Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,928.
234. Id., 42 FED. REG. at 44742, 44743, Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,925,
declined to provide it.

21,927.

This proposal may be abandoned.

See CFTC, Release No. 398-78, at 3.
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to conventional securities, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 created an administrative mechanism through which
an aggrieved customer can recover money damages from a broker for
the broker's misdeeds. This "reparations" procedure is authorized by
section 14 of the 1974 Act. 2- 3 On the complaint of a customer, the
CFTC may proceed against a broker. When more than $2500 is
claimed, a hearing must be held before an administrative law judge.
In several reported decisions, administrative judges have imported
suitability principles from legal sources outside the area of commodities regulation in order to dispose of customers' claims that unsuitable
recommendations were violations of the antifraud section and rules
governing commodities. 2-3', Generally, these decisions have denied
the customers' suitability claims because the administrative judges
have taken the position that even highly risky commodities transactions are suitable for any customer who has some investment experi2
ence and even the most modest of liquid assets.. 7
B. The Present Sources Applied
8

23
Routes to Enforcement

The suitability obligations of brokers and dealers may be enforced
by regulatory action of the NASD, an exchange, or the SEC or by
judicial decision invoked by an individual complaint. The following
235. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. V 1975). Rules for these proceedings are codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 12 (1977). See Hudson, supra note 218, at 12 n.89, 37-39.
236. See section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (Supp. V
1975); 17 C.F.R. §§ 30.02, 30.03, 32.9 (1977). The CFTC proposal of customer protection rules, including the suitability rule, cautioned that "it should be clearly understood that the inclusion of a standard in the proposed rules does not mean that a
commodity professional's failure to adhere to that standard would not presently be
actionable." Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 218, 42 FEn. REG. at 44743, Comm.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 21,927.
237. See Jones v. Rosenthal & Co., Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 7 20,532 (1977);
Tucker v. Economic Systems, Inc., CoM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 7f20,480 (1977);
Tomasian v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 7f
20,433 (1977); Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., COMm. Fur, L. REP. (CCH)
1 20,427 (1977). One decision simply held that the antifraud provisions impose no
suitability duty on brokers. Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., Comm. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 7 20,539 (1977). But see Dwyer v. Murlas Bros. Commodities, Inc., COMM.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) f 20,517 (1977) (recommendation of futures trading to widow
of limited financial resources unsuitable); Russo v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc.,
Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 7f20,513, at 22,115 (1977) (dictum) (meaningful inquiry into needs and objectives of customer is required).
238. For a discussion of the separate scheme for the regulation of commodity
futures and commodity options, see notes 235-37 & accompanying text supra.

1120

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

discussion will analyze various aspects of each of these methods of
23 9
enforcement.
NASD disciplinary decisions are not reported in any detail.240
The Special Study found that from 1959 to 1961, only 35 of 1,506 NASD
rule violations involved suitability but noted that "charges of violations
of net capital or of keeping improper books and records are frequently
brought when the NASD believes that improper selling practices are
being carried on [because] cases on that ground would be more difficult to develop and prove."2 4 ' Individual complainants have rarely
initiated NASD discipline because the disciplinary mechanism has not
been publicized and does not yield rescission or damages to the
customer.

242

239. For surveys (in some respects outdated) of the range of possible sanctions
against brokers for selling practice abuses, including some not discussed here such as
injunctive and criminal proceedings, see S. JAFFE, supra note 110, at chs. 4-5; SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 302-22; Comment, supra note 60, at 743-47. For
discussions of possible state common law liability, see Mundheim, supra note 60, at
469 n.77; Rediker, supra note 47, at 39-40; see also Jackson, Stock Broker's Liability
Under Customs, Usages, and Rules, 12 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 111 (1963).
For an excellent analysis and critique of self-regulation in relation to SEC authority, see INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 76, at 135-221.
240. Fishman, supra note 54, at 238 & n.35. But see SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 13726, 12 SEC DOCKET 1107, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ff 81,225 (1977) (adopting rules requiring notices to the SEC by
self-regulatory organizations of disciplinary sanctions and providing for public availability of certain information).
Brief summaries of recent NASD disciplinary actions and of pending suspensions
appear at NASD MANUAL (CCH) 316 ff., 701 ff. As of April 20, 1978, none of the
thirty-one reports concerned violations of the NASD suitability rule. See also NASD
Press Release No. NSD, 1172, at 5 (Jan. 5, 1972) (report of discipline for suitability
violation); NASD News, June 1963, at 8 (same); notes 261, 285 & 319 infra.
241. SPECLL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 165, 314; see also Rediker, supra note
47, at 25-26.
242. Fishman, supra note 54, at 237-38. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 13726, 12 SEC DOcKET 1107, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ff 81,225 (1977), may produce some increase in public awareness. See note
240 supra.
At SEC urging, the NASD has filed a plan for the arbitration of customer's disputes with brokers involving less than $2500. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 14671, 14 SEC DOCKET 816 (1978).
Similar plans of the NYSE and Amex were
approved in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14737, 14 SEC DocK-- 985
(1978).
See also SEC Clears Way for Plan to Settle Investor Disputes, Wall. St. J.,
May 5, 1978, at 20, col. 1. It is too early to assess whether these new arbitration procedures will be an effective means of resolving customer complaints about selling practices.
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The Special Study found that exchange actions, which are also
not reported, 24 3 had led to discipline for violation of a suitability
standard in only one of ninety-two disciplinary proceedings against
members and registered representatives involving "selling abuses"
from 1957 to 1962. Other NYSE Rule 405 cases "involved the possibility of financial loss to the firm rather than the customer."244 These
data, collected during a bull market characterized by high-pressure
selling, may be similar to present figures, which would be based on
a higher volume but bearish market. Because damages are not available to customers through exchange disciplinary proceedings, there
is little incentive for customers to lodge complaints.
Reported cases involving suitability rules originate from both
SEC proceedings and federal court actions. 245 Reported SEC decisions may arise in two ways: (a) on appeal from NASD proceedings against members or their associates 246 and (b) directly as Commission proceedings to discipline brokers either in their capacity as
NASD members 247 or in their capacity as registrants.2 48 The NASD
may act against member brokers for violations of the Exchange Act
2 and SEC rules thereunder as well as for violations of its own rules 4
and rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. The SEC's
243. SPECIAL STuDy, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 540-42. See also Fischer v. New York
Stock Exchange, 408 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cohen & Rabin, supra note
89, at 698 n.50. But see note 240 supra.
244.

SPECIAL

STyY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 320-21; see also id. at 319, as to the

single instance of a suitability violation in which the salesman was merely censured,
and was later hired by another member firm.
245.

Recently, a few suitability decisions have also been published by administra-

tive law judges administering the separate regulatory scheme for commodity futures
and commodity options. See notes 235-37 & accompanying text supra.
judges administering the separate regulatory scheme for commodity futures and commodity options. See notes 235-37 & accompanying text supra.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)-(f) (Supp. V 1975). See generally S. JAFFE, supra note
110, § 11.20; 2 Loss (1961); supra note 18, at 1374-80; 5 Loss (1969); supra note

18, at 3477-97.
247. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(h)(2)(B), (h)(3)(B)

(Supp. V 1975).

See generally

2 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1387-89; 5 Loss (1969); supra note 18, at 3506.

The SEC may initiate such direct proceedings even ifthe NASD - or both the
NASD and an exchange - have already acted against the same respondents. See, e.g.,
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811, 852 n.88 (1965); Investor Protection, supra
note 30, pt. 1, at 263 (remarks of SEC Chairman W. Cary).

248. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) and (6) (Supp. V 1975).
249. See § 15A(b)(3) and (h)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(3)
and (h)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See generally S. JAFFE, supra note 110, §§ 11.1711.19; 2 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1371; 5 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 347077.
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power to initiate actions, on the other hand, does not extend to NASD
rule violations. 250 In 1974, the SEC's authority to hear appeals and
initiate its own proceedings was extended beyond NASD members to
reach members of registered securities exchanges, 251 but this greater
authority does not seem to have produced any reported cases concerning suitability.
Federal court decisions may arise through circuit court review
of an SEC decision 25 2 or via a federal district court proceeding instituted by a plaintiff who alleges a direct federal civil cause of action
under a particular suitability rule. In several recent suits claiming
an implied cause of action for suitability violations, plaintiffs have
alleged violations of both the NASD suitability rule and NYSE Rule
405.25 3 Thus, the commentators' argument that NYSE Rule 405 car250. See note 247 supra.
251. As to appeals, see § 19(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)-(f)
(Supp. V 1975). As to SEC actions, see § 19(h)(2)(A) and (3)(A), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(h)(2)(A) and (3)(A) (Supp. V 1975); however, this authority over exchange
members does not extend to the enforcement of MSRB rules, as does SEC authority
over securities association members. Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of
the NYSE, supra note 62, at 502 n.48. This scheme is consonant with the fact that
exchanges, unlike the NASD, are not required to enforce MSRB rules. For example,
compare § 6(d)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V
1975) (exchanges), with § 15A(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(1)(B)
(Supp. V 1975) (associations).
252. Under what was § 25 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970), and is
now reformulated and recodified in pertinent part as § 25(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)
(1) (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Todd & Co., v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977);
S. JAFFE, supra note 110, § 11.20; INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 76, at 205-18. Review
may also be available under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704
See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 690 n.15
(1970).
(1975).
253. See, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1281 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp.
1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Carroll v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); McMillan v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp.
1153 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp.
678 (D. Wyo. 1975); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f[ 95,021 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F.
Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Utah v. duPont Walston, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f1 94,812 (D. Utah 1974), aff'd sub nom. Utah State
Univ. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
264 (1977); Mahony v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) j[ 94,354 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pearl v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
Civil No. 9187 (W.D. Wash. May 1, 1972) (unpublished opinion; copy on file with
the author); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399
F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (counterclaim).
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ries implicit suitability content 254 seems to be growing increasingly
popular with litigants.
The scope of suitability rules in practice is very difficult to determine, as they have rarely been relied upon to dispose of reported
cases. There have been very few SEC decisions in which a suitability issue was even arguably dispositive. It has been suggested
that "[m]ost NASD proceedings are not reviewed because no appeal
is taken and those cases that are appealed rarely involve the question
of the suitability doctrine." 2 55 In some thirty federal court cases 25 6
suitability claims under the various rules have been reported. Generally, the courts have avoided deciding whether a cause of action
under the rules was available, and only a few have addressed the issue
of what elements are necessary to establish a suitability cause of action
or have specified defenses that would be available if the cause of
2 57
action did exist.
SEC Decisions
The Commission has upheld the NASD suitability rule against the
claim that it is unconstitutionally vague. In Boren & Co. 2 58 the Commission found the rule "sufficiently specific" to "provide an adequate
standard of compliance," characterizing it as an obligation "to consider the financial situation and security holdings of the customer" 259
when making a recommendation. A review of the SEC decisions in
which suitability violations have been found or suitability principles
have been discussed, however, reveals several fundamental ambiguities
in the doctrine.
Knowing Sale of an Unsuitable Security:
"Objectively" Unsuitable?

From the "Subjectively" to the

A first major category of SEC suitability decisions is comprised
of those cases in which a broker, handling a discretionary account or
254. See note 60 supra.
255. Fishman, supra note 54, at 239 (footnote omitted).
256. See notes 342-422 & accompanying text infra.
257. This is not to deny that unreported suitability claims, perhaps many of them,
have been settled. Instances are reported in O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 101-02 (prepared statement of T. O'Boyle), Comment, supra note 5, at 530-32 (two SEC settlements in federal court of suitability claims involving real estate syndications, one involving $2.5 million), and Mundheim, supra note 60, at 465.
258. 40 S.E.C. 217 (1960).
259. Id. at 227-28.
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executing transactions with the customer's complete reliance, either
purchases speculative securities for a customer whom the broker knows
cannot bear the risk of loss or else recommends securities directly
counter to the customer's expressed needs. Characteristic suitability
statements from decisions spanning the past thirty years place emphasis on the totally inappropriate nature of the offending broker's
recommendations in view of the known investment objectives of the
client:
Additional violations of the anti-fraud provisions were committed
. . . in conjunction with . . . sales to certain customers of . . .
unseasoned and highly speculative stocks . . . [The] companies
. . had operating losses, and information concerning such losses
was supplied to registrant's sales staff. The customers in question disclosed their financial situations and needs and investment
objectives to the salesmen who falsely represented, expressly or
impliedly, that the securities they recommended met those needs
and objectives.
*

It was incumbent on the salesmen in these circumstances, as a part of their basic obligation to deal fairly with the
investing public, to make only such recommendations as they
had reasonable grounds to believe met the customers' expressed
needs and objectives.260
[I]n many instances, (the broker) recommended and sold the
stock to uninformed customers whose trust and confidence he
cultivated and who indicated to him their need for non-speculative investments which would produce a reasonable income.
Instead, by fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, [he]
induced them to purchase a highly speculative security of doubtful value, which had little prospect of any income and which
he knew was not adapted to their needs.261
The suitability principle has been viewed, by those focusing their
attention on decisions in this category of "knowingly unsuitable" recommendations as essentially aimed at discouraging the merchandising
of speculative securities to customers for whom they are plainly in-

260. Richard N. Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 16, 18 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
261. Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814, 824 (1948). See also Century Sec. Co..
43 S.E.C. 371, 377 (1967), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1969); Irving Friedman, 43 S.E.C. 314, 316 (1967); J. Logan & Co.,
41 S.E.C. 88, 99 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); Ramey Kelly Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 759 (1960);
Hammill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634, 637 (1948); NASD News, May 1971, at 8 (NASD
disciplinary report).
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appropriate by brokers aware of the inappropriateness. 262 The concept of suitability reflected in these decisions is a subjective one suitability to the customer in the customer's own eyes. The gravamen of this type of violation is that the broker knowingly misleads the
customer as to subjective suitability. More recent decisions in this
first category of knowing suitability violations have contained overtones of an objective concept-suitability to the customer in the eyes
of a third party, usually an administrative authority who is implementing some absolute notion of suitability.
Perhaps the most interesting of the cases is Philips & Co.,263 the
only case in the first category to review a specific finding that the
NASD suitability rule had been violated rather than articulating suitability principles in the context of a fraud finding. 264 Three customers
of the brokerage firm-a head porter, a garment factory foreman, and
a cab driver-had complained to the NASD that the firm's salesperson,
"knowing their limited financial circumstances," had strongly urged
the purchase of a highly speculative oil stock, accompanying his solicitations with "extravagant representations and glowing promises" of
profit.26 5 The salesperson thus allegedly knew the purchases by
these customers were "not suitable on the basis of their financial
situations." 266 The NASD had found violations of the suitability rule
and the general rule of fair dealing, holding that "the statements made
led the customers beyond their means and induced them to make
purchases, perhaps through their own greed, which good judgment
267
would not otherwise have led them to do."
The Commission affirmed with an opinion that suggested that the
voluntariness of the customers' decisions to purchase was of no importance. The SEC acknowledged that the customers were "mature
and intelligent persons," that they made additional speculative purchases from "their own independent judgment and desire," and, indeed, that they had recommended speculative purchases to others.
The Commission reasoned, however, that the broker was aware of
262. See, e.g., O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 104 (remarks of P. Loomis, Jr., SEC
General Counsel). Cf. Lipton, supra note 1 at 284 (remarks of T. O'Boyle) (suggestion that suitability doctrine is aimed at brokers who have "induced and encouraged"
shift from long-term investment to short-term trading as goal of customers).
263. 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
264. See notes 298-312 & accompanying text infra.
265. 37 S.E.C. 66, 67 (1956).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 68.
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the modest financial situations of the three customers, as well as their
earlier acquisitions of shares in the questionable venture, and yet he
"engaged in a persistent and aggressive sales campaign" designed to
convince his customers that the recommended transaction was financially safe. The Commission went on to announce the correct test of
a suitability violation:
Whether or not customers Z and E considered a purchase of the
stock . . . a suitable investment is not the test for determining

the propriety of applicants' conduct in the situation before us.
The test is whether [the broker] fulfilled the obligation he assumed when he undertook to counsel the customers, of making
only such recommendations as would be consistent with the customer's financial situation and needs. The record shows that [he]
knew all the facts necessary to enable him to realize that
268 reasonable grounds for his recommendations did not exist.

Both the NASD and the Commission here suggest that suitability
is an objective concept which the broker is obliged to observe regardless of a customer's wishes, 269 a view that the NASD, at least, had
previously rejected. 270 The NASD's statement that the customers'
"own greed" may well have been their motivation reinforces the idea
2 71
that the customer is not sovereign for suitability purposes..
268. Id. at 70.
269. Accord, Fishman, supra note 54, at 243 n.61; Mundheim, supra note 60, at
453-54.
270. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 23, at 27-28 (NASD rejection of charge of suitibility violation where the board of the aggrieved charity had made an informed choice
to adopt a policy of aggressive trading).
271. Accord, Mundheim, supra note 60, at 449-50 & n..
Actually, the roots of
the notion that a customer's genuine desire to speculate is somehow illegitimate, and
that securities bought for this reason are necessarily unsuitable, can be found in the
Special Study, with its pejorative use of the terms "speculative impulses" and "gambling
instincts" in its characterization of the appeals of certain securities advertisements. See
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 248, 322.
There are other hints in the cases that the customer's choice to speculate, however
free and genuine, cannot ipso facto confer suitability on the sale of a high-risk security.
See, e.g., Century Sec. Co., 43 S.E.C. 371, 373 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Nees v. SEC,
414 F.2d 211, 219 (9th Cir. 1969) (one suitability "victim" wanted to double her
money in nine months); J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88, 98 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964) (broker
played on "speculative instincts").
The implication, of course, is that insofar as the customer's judgment is not sovereign, no amount of disclosure can discharge the broker's suitability obligation. Among
the commentators, at least, this has increasingly been seen as a basic tenet of suitability doctrine. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 273 (remarks of R. Mundheim)
(growth of suitability doctrine "reflects a judgment that disclosure has not been a successful regulatory technique and that, at least in some areas, it is necessary to shift
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It is possible that this holding cannot be read separately from the
fraud aspects of the case, although the Commission makes no reference to fraud in its opinion. Perhaps a customer who was accurately
appraised of the risks of a speculative security and whose dependence
on the salesperson's recommendation was not so great as to interfere

with his independent judgment could make an informed judgment
that he did not feel the security was unsuitable. The salesperson
would then be absolved from liability on any objective theory of

unsuitability.

272

In at least one later case, however, in which a highly speculative
investment was recommended, the SEC held explicitly that no amount
of disclosure to the customer could have cured the violation. In
Powell & McGowan, Inc., 27 3 the broker had recommended that a customer, seventy-nine years of age, "retired and living alone," whose

physical condition "had deteriorated to such an extent that at times
it was doubtful whether he was capable of understanding or making
274
'
decisions with respect to his investments or financial matters,"
enter into a subordination agreement to supply the broker with capital.
The broker knew of the customer's poor health and did not fully disclose the risks of the transaction. In holding that the broker had

violated several antifraud sections and rules, the Commission went
beyond the failure to disclose and held: "In the context of the
the responsibility for making the ultimate investment judgment from the customer to
the broker"); id. at 273-74 (prepared statement of M. Lipton) ("There has been a
growing awareness that full disclosure and the anti-fraud provisions are not sufficient
for the protection of investors in today's securities markets. It is now quite clear that
a new doctrine - customer suitability - is evolving to fit the need."); Fishman, supra
note 54, at 239 ("[One reason] why a suitability rule is needed in the securities business [is that] disclosure requirements and practices have not protected the investor
completely. In fact, there can be situations where disclosure is not enough to protect
the investor even from his own greed."); Faust; supra note 61, at 900 ("Must the
broker tell the investor on a fixed income with limited assets that speculative securities
are off limits? Can such an individual be welcomed at a racetrack betting window
but be banned from the Chicago Board Options Exchange?" Faust concludes disclosure
to such a customer may not suffice).
272. This was, for example, the idea expressed by a spokesman for the mutual fund
industry in 1966. See Roach, supra note 38, at 147-48. See also Investor Protection,
supra note 28, pt. 2, at 471 (statement of the Amex) ("The final judgment as to suitability is properly lodged with the customer himself."); Comment, supra note 5, at 494,
495 nn.128-29 (noting support by analogy in guardianship and contract law for proposition that "[t]he investor who fully understands what he or she is doing will make only
suitable investments") (emphasis omitted).
273. 41 S.E.C. 933 (1964).
274. Id. at 934.
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circumstances here and the facts concerning this customer known to
it and the special risks involved, registrant had an obligation not to
recommend a course of action clearly contrary to the best interests of
'
the customer, whether or not there was full disclosure."275
This holding clashes sharply with the SEC's initial purely disclosure-oriented
expression of suitability principles.2 76 Although the emphasis on the
customer's condition might suggest that disclosure to a fully competent
customer would have been adequate,2 77 there are two indications to
275.

Id. at 935.

The Special Study came to a similar conclusion as to contractual

mutual fund plans with heavy "front-end load," that is, in which sales commissions
made up a major part of the early periodic payments by the customer: "[T]he
combined factors of the incentive to high-pressure selling which the front-end load
provides to salesmen, the essentially unsupervised nature of home selling of plans, the
complexity of the security sold and the lack of financial sophistication of so many
of the purchasers of plans create a problem of a fundamental nature which cannot be
solved through the mere application of the doctrines of disclosure." SPEcIAL STUDY,
supra note 18, pt. 4, at 211.
276. See, e.g., Standard Bond & Share Co., 34 S.E.C. 208, 211 (1952).
277. This seems to be the view of Faust, supra note 61, at 900, who doubts, however, that disclosure is ever a "sure defense." In Lipton, supra note 1, at 281-83,
Thomas A. O'Boyle put a similar case (an eighty-year-old widow who wishes to open
a clearly improvident trading account) to test the issue of competence. Martin Lipton
responded by pointing to Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), in which the court, although refusing to hold the defendant liable for excessive trading where the rate of trading was clearly desired by the plaintiff and the
trading was ultimately stopped on the broker's initiative, expressed the following concerns: "The question brought to mind by the evidence in this case is, should the
broker permit a compulsive investor to continue to trade through its facilities when
it has become clear that his speculative activity has crossed the line between intelligent risk taking and irrational gambling? We are reminded of the established body
of law which limits the bartender's discretion in selling to an obviously inebriated alcoholic. . . . This is a clear example of a case in which governmental scrutiny and
control are necessary to prevent the unfortunate waste of financial resources such as
plaintiffs have brought upon themselves here." Id. at 433; see also Bines, Investment
Objectives, supra note 18, at 279-80 & n.10, 419 n.1, 451.
But if the Powers court were seeking guidance in state common law or statutory
law on the question of competence, one would have thought the more likely analogy
would be the law of contractual or testamentary capacity. Both involve a determination of the threshold competence to be required before permitting an individual
to dispose of his property - and both plainly set a lower threshold than is required
by those who would have the suitability doctrine effectively protect customers against
themselves. See 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTS §§ 222-272
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959 & Supp. 1977); 1 W. PAGE, LAW OF WILLS §§ 12.1-.48 (rev.
ed. W. Bowe & D. Parker 1960 & Supp. 1977-1978).
The sale of alcoholic beverages to inebriates obviously involves factors of physical
danger to the user and to others that make for a considerably different resolution of
the competing values of personal freedom, on the one hand, and protection of the self
and third parties, on the other, than is appropriate with regard to the sale of securities.
Indeed, even given these more compelling factors, the dominant rule at common law
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First, the Commission carefully avoided actually

finding that the customer's competency was impaired, 279 and second,

a later Commission decision cited Powell & McGowan as support for
an assertion that even with disclosure, a sale of subordinated notes
"might well have been fraudulent," even though the "elderly widow"
who made the purchase in the latter case was inquisitive, knowledge20
able, and apparently healthy.
A recent decision that also suggests an objective view of suitability is Harold R. Fenocchio.28 1

Again, the extent of the customer's

reliance on the salesperson's recommendations or the degree to which
the customer may have been affirmatively misled is not clear, but the
Commission's language in affirming a holding that the NASD suitability rule was violated strongly suggests a duty to refuse transactions that are objectively unsuitable, as well as an affirmative duty to
investigate the customer's finances and needs. The customer in
Fenocchio was in his eighties, resided at a rest home, and had an
investment history indicating an emphasis on growth rather than income. The broker admitted having detailed knowledge of the customer's experience, financial needs, and objectives and asserted that
the customer was "a sophisticated investor who had been engaging in
securities transactions for over 50 years, and that all transactions were
made with the customer's full knowledge and approval." 2 2 The Commission replied:
Even if we were to accept without qualification applicant's
contentions, we believe the instant circumstances, particularly the
customer's advanced age and the fact that he resided in a rest

home, placed a duty on Fenocchio . . . to make a serious inquiry
continues to retain a proximate cause barrier to proving damages from the sale of
liquor. See, e.g., Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976). And of
course, Congress made a fundamental choice in favor of customer free choice, albeit
fully informed free choice, in 1933 and 1934. See I Loss (1961), supra note 18, at
121-28.
278. Rice, supra note 117, at 577 & n.213, reads Powell & McGowan as making
disclosure "no defense" to a suitability charge, at least in administrative proceedings.
See also Lipton, supra note 1, at 283 (remarks of M. Lipton) (broker "cannot satisfy
the obligation by disclosure alone"); Fishman, supra note 54, at 240.
279. Fishman, supra note 54, at 243, and Mundheim, supra note 60, at 453, simply
assume that the customer was "senile" and that the decision established a duty to determine whether the customer can utilize any information disclosed.
280. Whitman & Stirling Co., 43 S.E.C. 181, 182-83 (1966).
281. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12194, 9 SEC DocxET 146 (1976).
282. Id. at 148.
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into the suitability of the customer's investments and to prevent
the dissipation of the customer's capital by successive turnovers.283
One Variant on the Objectively Unsuitable:
tions Such as Churning

"Per Se Unsuitable" Transac-

The second major category of suitability decisions concerns transactions that might be called "per se unsuitable." These transactions,
2 4
which are specifically singled out in the NASD policy statement,
are almost surely fraudulent, aside from the invocation of suitability

by the NASD or SEC.

These practices include churning, short-term

trading in mutual funds, and executing transactions near dividend
dates, thereby creating for the unsophisticated a false impression of

gain. 2 85 Another example, discussed in the Special Study, is the sale
to elderly persons of long-term contracts to purchase mutual fund
shares. 286 In line with the NASD's generally restrictive reading of
the suitability obligation, the NASD continues to treat such per se
unsuitable transactions as the paradigmatic violations of the NASD
287
suitability rule.

283. Id. at 148. Note that excessive turnover was viewed as a separate violation
from the unsuitability of individual investments.
284. See notes 29-36 & accompanying text supra.
285. For cases containing express findings that the NASD suitability rule was violated, see Winston H. Kinderdick, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12818,
10 SEC DOCKET 519 (1976) (trading in mutual funds); Harold R. Fenocchio, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12194, 9 SEC DOCKET 146, 146-48 (1976) (same); Charles
E. Marland & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11065, 5 SEC DOCKET
313, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,008 (1974) (same);
Russell L. Irish, 42 S.E.C. 735 (1965), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Irish v. S.E.C.,
367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967) (same); Samuel B.
Franklin & Co., 42 S.E.C. 325, 327-31 (1964) (churning); First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C.
589 (1961) (same); Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 222 (1960) (transaction akin to mutual
fund "'switching"); R. H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180, 182-87, aff'd on other grounds
sub nom. R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
855 (1952) (churning and dividend dates); Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196,
207-08 (1945) (dividend dates). See also NASD Press Release No. NSD 3573, at
2 (May 28, 1973) (NASD decision on churning); NASD Press Release No. NSD 1173,
at 7 (Jan. 2, 1973) (same); NASD News, July 1955, at 4 (same); NASD Press Release No. NSD 3273, at 4 (NASD decision on mutual fund "switching"); NASD News,
Apr. 1963, at 3 (same); Bickel, supra note 23, at 26-27.
286. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4. at 151 ("might in many cases violate"
the NASD suitability rule).
287. For example, a recent compilation of reports from District Committees on violations began with this general introduction to the suitability rule: "Unsuitable recommendations, when discovered, include sales to elderly clients of long-term growth funds
with sales loads, excessive transactions in discretionary accounts, switching of mutual
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"Churning" is excessive trading in a customer's account, which
has the effect of increasing commissions to the broker without any
valid goal of economic gain to the customer. Short-term trading in
mutual funds might be thought of as a special case of churning, 288
because mutual fund shares are generally held for longer terms and
are "not proper trading vehicles."289 Thus, any short-term trading in
mutual funds constitutes excessive trading because it cannot lead to
economic gain and such transactions often involve substantial sales
commissions and tax disadvantages. The inherent unsuitability of
shifting a customer's assets from one security into another that will
soon yield a dividend lies in the fact that the "ex-dividend" price
mechanism of which the customer is presumably ignorant offsets the
dividend and forecloses the possibility of real economic gain. In
addition, there may be significant tax disadvantages. Analysis of
these abuses is not a simple problem. When does aggressive trading
become excessive trading? What about trading in reaction to news
developments between growth-oriented mutual funds specializing
in particular industries? When does a transaction near a dividend
date demonstrably have no purpose other than to create a false
impression of gain? These questions, however, are ones of definition
and proof rather than fundamental concept. 29 0 All would agree that,
funds shares in customer accounts, the execution of unauthorized transactions in customer accounts, and unauthorized sharing in customer accounts by registered representatives." NASD Newsletter, Sept. 1976, at 4.
288.

See SPEcIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 151.

289. NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964), NASD MANUAL
(CCH) iT2152, at 2052 (1976).
290. Even if churning, mutual fund "switching," or selling near dividend dates
are clearly identified, whether they are necessarily suitability violations also turns on a
question equally relevant to other transactions: What place do the customer's wishes
have in determining suitability? Is the customer's choice to conduct the transactions
irrelevant, even if he is "fully informed" as to its implications? Because the NASD
has not recognized any general duty of inquiry, its view as to transactions in general
seems to be that customer choice, even if not fully forewarned and tutored, automatically
confers suitability on a transaction. As to mutual fund transactions, however, the NASD
has vacillated on whether signed customer ratifications alone can create suitability. After
a series of pronouncements indicating that written suitability statements had value but
were not conclusive and did not free the broker of a further obligation to assure himself
that a mutual fund switch was appropriate, see SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4, at
152; NASD News, April 1968, at 5-6; NASD News, Nov. 1969, at 4, the Association
reported the discipline of a member for transactions the customers had apparently desired: "[A]Ithough the customers cheerfully and willingly paid unnecessary sales commisions and also signed statements signifying their intention to do so, this did not in
any way excuse the conduct of the principal." NASD News, Jan. 1970, at 6. Shortly
thereafter, the NASD unceremoniously retreated from this position, and explained that
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291
in unambiguous cases, such transactions are suitable for no one..

The SEC tends to buttress its position in per se unsuitability cases
with evidence that customers were unsophisticated and relied on their
brokers. Furthermore, in churning cases the broker's control of account transactions has become an invariable prerequisite to a violation. 292 At the same time, the decisions generally suggest that
sophistication, reliance, and even the customer's opinion that the
transaction is suitable 29 3 are not defenses to such per se suitability
violations. While the SEC may discuss the needs of the particular
client, his lack of investment knowledge, and his reliance on the
other factors were present in the reported disciplinary action, and no clear-cut rule as
to the relevance of signed customer ratifications was appropriate. NASD News, Mar.
1970, at 3-4.
291. See Rice, supra note 117, at 537-38 n.3 ("a transaction in some situations may
be so inherently bad that a broker-dealer could not recommend it as 'suitable' for anyone").
292. For cases under the NASD rule, see Harold R. Fenocchio, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12194, 9 SEC DOCKET 146, 147-48 (1976); Charles E. Marland
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11065, 5 SEC DOCKET 313, 314, [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,002, at 84,606-07 (1974); Russell
L. Irish, 42 S.E.C. 735, 737 & n.4 (1965), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Irish v.
SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967); Samuel B.
Franklin & Co., 42 S.E.C. 325, 330 (1964); First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 590-92
(1961); Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196, 208 n.11 (1945).
For cases under fraud provisions, see Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258-59 (4th
Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045, 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1974);
Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373-74 (1st Cir. 1973); Booth v. Peavey
Co., 430 F.2d 132, 135 (8th Cir. 1970); Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455, 461-64 (6th
Cir. 1970); Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 96,251, at 92,675-76 (D. Ore. 1977); Faturik v.
Woodmore See., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 894, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Home v. Francis I. duPont
& Co., 428 F. Supp. 1271, 1274-75 (D.D.C. 1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,
424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Gleit v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) r
95,799, at 90,889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,649, at 90,216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on
churning holding, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
769 (1978); Greenfield v. D. H. Blair & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
I 95,239, at 98,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jenny v. Shearson.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IT95,021, at
97,581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432-33
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 837, 846-47 (E.D.
Va. 1968); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432-33 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v. Watson, 285 F. Supp. 724, 731
(E.D. Pa. 1966); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner Co., 137 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Mass. 1955);
Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 614-15 (D. Mass. 1955).
293. See Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196, 208 n.12 (1945) (dividend dates).
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broker, the conclusion that a suitability violation occurred does not
flow from these facts in a direct way. Instead, the underlying con2 "4
cept of intrinsic, objective unsuitability appears to be the key. 1
The Difficulty of Isolating the Suitability Rationale
The very fact that the cases in these two major categories of
suitability decisions are those closest to the realm of fraud, if indeed
not within it, 29 3 makes them uncertain guides to the scope of the
suitability rules. The knowing recommendation of an unsuitable
transaction involves just the sort of intentional deception which is
easily viewed as fraud within the meaning of federal securities
law-a material misrepresentation made with scienter.- 0 It has already been noted that per se unsuitability violations, such as churning,
probably violate fraud provisions, either because of the broker's knowing failure to disclose the absence of any economic benefit to the
customer or because, under the shingle theory, there is an implied
representation that the broker will not enter into transactions which
297
are undesirable for customers.
Furthermore, most of the decisions in both categories of casesthose involving recommendations that were clearly inconsistent with
the customer's expressed investment objectives and those involving
per se unsuitable transactions-also found independent violations of
several antifraud sections and rules. For example, in Century Securities Co., 298 which falls into the first category, violations of section
17(a) of the Securities Act, 299 sections 10(b) 300 and 15(c)(1) 301 of
294. See, e.g., First Sec. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589 (1961).
295. One observer has written that the recommendation of a "hot issue" with knowledge that such an investment is inconsistent with the customer's investment goals "could
easily be considered a 'scheme to defraud,' a 'misleading statement,' or be otherwise
encompassed as a fraudulent activity." Comment, Securities Regulation: Legislative
and Administrative Treatment of the "Hot Issue" Phenomenon, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1137,
1151 (footnote omitted).
296. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materiality);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter).
297. See, e.g., sources cited in note 290 supra. Churning may also violate various
specific fraud rules, see, e.g., Exchange Act rules 15ci-2, 15ci-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15cl-2,
and 240.15cl-7 (1977). See also note 34 supra.
298. 43 S.E.C. 371 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1969).
299. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
300. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (Supp.V 1975).
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the Exchange Act, and Exchange Act rules 10b-53 02 and 15cl-230 were
found, including the sale of unregistered securities, market manipulation, the charging of excessive prices, and the making of overt misrepresentations. Indeed, one commentator observed in 1965 that "[i]n
every case in which suitability concepts have been articulated there
30 4
have also been fraud grounds for disposing of the case.."
Often in cases on appeal from the NASD, the reviewing Commission discusses suitability concepts even though no express finding
of violation of suitability rules was made by the NASD. In the SEC's
own fraud proceedings, the Commission has carefully avoided clear
explanation of whether the suitability comments are intended as integral to the fraud holding or whether they are merely dicta.30 5 These
opinions thus give no indication of the outer reaches of the suitability
obligation. If the suitability discussions are intended as part and
parcel of the fraud findings, 3 06 perhaps they are conservative relative
to the ultimate scope of the suitability obligation. On the other hand,
if the discussions are simply dicta, perhaps they articulate general
ethical principles broader than the suitability duty that the Commission would be willing to enforce in proceedings under even the
SECO suitability rule. One SEC decision implies that the latter interpretation may be the correct one. In Haight & Co., 30 7 after a
detailed description of the eight respondent salesmens' failures to
observe the investment objectives of their customers and of their
302. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
303. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1977).
304. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 470; see also Bickel.
supra note 23, at 25; Rediker, supra note 47, at 25.
305. For example, in Richard N. Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8 (1969), "where numerous instances of unsuitable recommendations were found to have occurred, the Commission
almost pointedly avoided referring to either its own or the NASD's suitability rule."
Rediker, supra note 62, at 38 n.103.
306. This is the unsupported assumption of most commentators, premature in the
author's view, for at no point, despite ample opportunity, does the SEC make clear the
significance of its discussion of suitability principles. See, e.g., 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note
6, § 211.01[b], at 9-43, 9-44 & nn.25-26; Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18.
at 426; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 899 n.134, 901-02 n.139, 903 & nn.14 7 -48; Rediker,
supra note 47, at 53 n.171; Comment, supra note 60, at 741; Leavell, supra note 60,
at 1583 n.98 (Leavell does, however, express uncertainty as to the coverage of suitability
by rule 10b-5); Rice, supra note 117, at 539 n.10 (senble); Comment, supra note 5,
at 530 & n.270, 538-39 n.312. See also note 334 infra. Only Mundheim, supra note
60, at 466-67, takes a more cautious view of the Commission's articulations of suitability
principles in cases arising under the fraud provisions. But see id. at 471-72 n.81.
307. 44 S.E.C. 481, 496-98 (1971), aff'd mere. sub noma.Haight v. SEC, No. 711136 (D.C. Cir.) (unreported opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
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encouragement of the purchase of speculative securities, the Commission nevertheless expressly disclaimed reliance on suitability violations
in arriving at its fraud holding. The SEC has noted that "in many
situations, violations of the suitability rules may involve fact patterns
which also would constitute violations of [the] securities acts." 30 8
However, it also has taken the position that "[f]ailure to adhere to
these rules may fall short of actual violation of the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities acts and the rules thereunder."8 00
The Commission usually initiates actions only against flagrant
violators, when an antifraud violation may be in question, leaving other
matters to the NASD. 3 10 One commentator has characterized the
SEC's approach as follows:
The SEC has been at great pains in its language and approach to keep "legal" (antifraud) considerations out of cases
reviewing the application of NASD rules and, similarly, to exclude explicit reference to NASD "ethical" standards from its
own proceedings under the antifraud provisions. This course
is followed even though it seems clear that a violation of the antifraud provisions usually would also constitute a violation of
a NASD rule. In rare instances, even the SEC acknowledges
the congruency by its language in a particular case.311

308. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9671, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff
4506B, at 4059 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 99
n.11 (prepared statement of T. O'Boyle) ("major portions of [NASD policy statement],
such as the churning concept, have their origin in the antifraud provisions"); Address
by SEC Commissioner M. Cohen, Seminar on the Management Function in the Investment Banking Industry, Oct. 25, 1962, at 5. In fact, some of the SEC cases cited in
one SEC release as violations of the NASD suitability rule do not even refer to the rule.
See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9420, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff
25,592, at 18,580-81 nn. 6-8 (1972). The following cases cited in the release involved
the fraud sections and rules thereunder exclusively: Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
43 S.E.C. 1042 (1969); Linder, Bilotti & Co., 42 S.E.C. 407 (1964); Looper & Co., 38
S.E.C. 294 (1958); R. H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), aff'd sub nom. R. H.
Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 251 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
309. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9671, 1 FEi. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 4506B, at 4059 (1972). See also Jacobs, supra note 6, at 897 n.126 ("The ethicallyoriented NASD and SECO [suitability] rules may impose more stringent standards than
the fraud-oriented Rule 10b-5.").
310. SPEcrAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 304-05.
311. Rediker, supra note 47, at 32 (footnote omitted). For such a "rare instance"
of the Commission's expressly charging that "effecting unsuitable transactions" violate.
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, see Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 14722, 14 SEC Doc=ar 976, 977 (1978); Bache Is Accused
By SEC of Illegal Options Trading, Wall St. J., May 10, 1978, at 4, col. 1.
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In short, both the SEC's practices in bringing cases and the
studied ambiguity of its opinions have worked against the potential
that "development of the suitability concept" could have had to clarify
"the relation generally between the self-regulatory agencies' ethical
312
strictures and the SEC's fraud concepts.."
Expansion of the Idea of Knowing Sale of an Unsuitable Security:

The

"Boiler Room" and Beyond
A number of additional SEC decisions that articulate suitability
concepts involved neither a recommendation that the broker knew
was unsuitable for the particular customer nor a per se unsuitable
transaction. 313 In several opinions in which brokers were sanctioned
for aggressively selling securities that were more speculative than
called for by their customers' circumstances or investment preferences,
the SEC made statements suggesting that such behavior violated suit312. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3727.
313. See, e.g., Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 10565, 3 SEC DOCKET 255, 255 (1973) (salesmen "failed to obtain adequate information as to the financial resources of the shareholders contacted"); John P. Fleming,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8129, at 1 (1967) ("respondent ... induced
customers to purchase such speculative securities without regard for their financial needs,
circumstances or objectives"); Amsbary, Allen & Morton, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8111, at 2 (1967) (same fact situation); M.J. Merritt & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7878, at 3 (1966) ("Prospects were induced to
make hasty decisions to effect purchases or additional purchases of the stock and to
sell securities they owned in order to pay for such purchases, and the salesmen did not
inquire into the purchasers' financial position or investment needs and objectives.");
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811, 834 (1965) ("Kaye, without inquiring into
a 70-year-old widow's finances or investment objectives, induced her to invest $1,250
in USAMCO stock although she had limited financial means, earned a weekly salary
of $65, and wanted safety of principal and some dividend income."); J. A. Winston &
Co., 42 S.E.C. 62, 64 (1964) ("Customers were not questioned about their financiai
status or their particular investment objectives or needs."); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321,
324 (1963) ("Applicant was an active participant in this fraudulent, high-pressure operation for an extended period of time, selling only this admittedly promotional and
speculative security . . . to persons whose financial condition he did not know or apparently consider relevant."); N. Pinsker & Co., 40 S.E.C. 285, 292 (1960) ("Registrant's technique of using numerous salesmen to sell a large block of securities of one
issuer by wholesale and persistent telephone solicitations, in the course of which highly
optimistic representations were made without disclosure of known or easily ascertainable
adverse facts and customers were urged to sell other securities they owned and to use
the proceeds to acquire Tyrex shares without knowledge of their individual investment
needs and situations, violated the basic standards of fair and honest dealing."); Boren
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 222 (1960) ("Boren also admitted that if investment company
shares were being sold, no inquiries were made concerning the customer and his needs
because he 'assumed' that such shares are 'good for everyone.' ").
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ability principles even if the broker was unaware of the customers'
financial status and investment goals. All of these cases, however,

involved indiscriminate sales efforts. They must therefore be considered in light of Gerald M. Greenberg,8 14 a decision which has been
described as repealing the "if any" language3 15 in the NASD suitability rule31 6 but which in fact is probably more limited in its holding.
Greenberg involved a "boiler room," a high pressure sales technique that is designed to sell speculative securities, usually through
large-scale telephone solicitations.3 17 The appellant contended that

a broker "is not guilty of any misconduct under the language of the
[NASD suitability] Rule in making a recommendation unless facts

concerning the customers' financial condition and holdings making
the recommendation unsuitable are volunteered by the customer or
are already known" by the broker.3 18

The Commission disagreed.

It held that the purpose of the rule, to restrain "the making of recommendations to customers under circumstances where there is no

reasonable basis for considering the recommendation suitable to the
customer," would be defeated if a broker could "engage in a practice

of recommending low price speculative securities to unknown customers." This language, broad as it is, goes no further than proscribing indiscriminate recommendations when there is "a high probability that the recommendation will not be suitable to at least some
of the persons solicited."319 One commentator has articulated this
314. 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960).
315. That is, the requirement that the broker believe the security is suitable "upon
the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by" the customer. See text accompanying note
19 supra.
316. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3714; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 899 n.132;
O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 96-97 (prepared statement by T. O'Boyle).
317. See generally SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 76,862 (1962); Mac Robbins & Co., 40 S.E.C.
497, 504, remanded sub nom. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, and sub nom. Berko v. SEC,
297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961), on remand, 41 S.E.C. 116 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Berko
v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); 5A. JAcoBs, supra note 6, § 211.04; 6 Loss
(1969), supra note 18, at 3708-13; SPECIAL So-my, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 265-68, 324;
Heller, The Boiler-Shop Cases and the Reasonable Basis Rule, in CONFERENCE ON SEcuriT-Es REGULATON 68 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965); Comment, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud: The SEC's Proposed Rule 15c2-6 and the Boiler Room,
72 YALE L.J. 1411, 1411-16 (1963).
318. 40 S.E.C. 133, 137 (1960).
319. Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted). See also, e.g., William Glanzman & Co.,
43 S.E.C. 261, 262 (1967) ("Registrant and its salesmen made no reasonable inquiries
to learn . . . the financial circumstances or investment needs of their customers.");
William Glanzman & Co., 42 S.E.C. 365, 369 (1964) ("It must have been clear to all

1138

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

standard as existing in those cases in which the broker (a) neither
gives the customer an "opportunity to tell him the facts" about him32
self nor inquires after them and (b) "is forcing a decision." 1
Such a reading of Greenberg is consistent with the rationale of
the first major category of decisions involving knowing sale of an
unsuitable security. The only expansion is in the concept of knowlthe participants that the [speculative] Gaslite stock was being recommended without
any consideration to its investment merit or its suitability to the large number of persons
being solicited."); Schmidt, Sharp, McCabe & Co., 42 S.E.C. 745, 747 (1965) (boiler
rooms are characterized by "indifference to or lack of concern for . . .investors circumstances"); Norman Joseph Adams, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7072, at
3 (1963) ("Registrant used 'boiler-room' sales techniques involving high-pressure telephone solicitation of unknown persons by untrained salesmen without adequate supervision, reflecting a disregard of the basic standards of conduct of a broker-dealer toward
his customers."); Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116, 119-20 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) ("[Boiler rooms] involve a concerted, highpressure effort - typically by telephone - to sell a large volume of one or several promotional or speculative low-priced securities to unknown persons without any concern
for the suitability of such securities in light of the customers' investment needs or objectives and by the use of false and deceptive means. The sales techniques used are
by their very nature not conducive to an unhurried, informed and careful consideration
of the investment factors applicable to the securities involved."); Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C.
1, 4 n.7 (1960) (citing Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 933 (1960)) ("Its wholesale solicitation of distant customers by telephone was by its very nature not conducive
to an unhurried and careful presentation and disclosure of the facts and investment
factors applicable to the security recommended and to a determination of its suitability
for purchase by the customer in the light of his particular financial situation and investment objectives."); SPECIAL STr~iy, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 311 (NASD decision holding
in case of a recommendation of speculative securities that firm and salesmen had responsibility to know "(1) what they are recommending, and (2) to whom they are recommending it"); NASD News, Apr. 1958, at 1, 4; SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assoc., Inc.,
386 F. Supp. 866, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (boiler rooms involve intensive selling "without
regard to the suitability to the needs of the customer, in such a manner as to induce a
hasty decision"); Kelley v. Carr, COMM.

Fur. L. REP. (CCH)

20,517, at 22,128

(W.D. Mich. 1977) (defendants preliminarily enjoined under Commodity Exchange
Act from offering commodity options without regard to suitability, citing R. J. Allen):
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434
F. Supp. 911, 915 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); Cohen, Broker-Dealer Regulation at
the Federal Level, in CONFERENCE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION 3, 8 (R. Mundheim ed.
1965) (statement of SEC Chairman M. Cohen). But cf. Alfred Bryant Tallman, Jr.,
44 S.E.C. 230, 231 (1970) (discussed in Jacobs, supra note 6, at 903 n.148) (where

even though there is no evidence cited of boiler room or high-pressure selling, nor of
the broker's knowingly making unsuitable recommendations,
have "offered, recommended the purchase of, and sold the
securities . . . to customers for whom such securities were
investment needs and objectives").
320. O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 97 (prepared statement

the respondent is found to
speculative and unseasoned
unsuitable in light of their
by T. O'Boyle); see Cohen

& Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative
Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 691, 707 n.120 (1964).
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edge 32 1 - from actual knowledge to must-have-known or should-haveknown forms of constructive knowledge. Thus, should the broker
fail to make a reasonable inquiry of his customer's finances and objectives, he would nevertheless be held to have constructive knowledge of what an inquiry directed to the type of customer with whom
he dealt would have been very likely to disclose. Except for the
fact that boiler room tactics represent perhaps the most egregious
violations of the duty to deal fairly, 322 there is no logical reason to
restrict this expanded concept of knowledge to the boiler room
context.3 23
A broader reading of the boiler room cases would see them as
standing for the proposition that a broker has an absolute duty to
inquire into the customer's finances and objectives to determine the
suitability of a proposed investment, regardless of whether the broker
can be said to have constructive knowledge of unsuitability. Some
commentators have adopted this broader view but would limit it to
the boiler room context,3 2 4 observing that boiler room practice con-

stitutes a "segment of the industry" that "by [its] very nature [does]
not conform to the requirement to deal fairly.

325

If, however, Green-

berg and its progeny are read as imposing a duty of inquiry independ321. See ALl FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 287 (knowledge);
id. § 299.50 (scienter); id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 251A (knowledge); id. (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1974) § 251A and Comment; id. § 296AA (scienter); id. (Revised Tent.
Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) § 251A; id. § 296AA and Note (2); 50 ALI PROCEEDINGs 470-71,
473-76 (1973); 51 id. 471-82 (1974 discussions of definition of knowledge); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToaTs, § 12(1) (reason to know) and (2) (should know) (1965).
See also Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, at 426 ("not a difficult step" from
"know" to "ought to know").
322. See, e.g., O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 103 (remarks of SEC General Counsel P.
Loomis, Jr.) ("The only instances where the Commission has carried [the concept of
suitability] over into a rule of law is the context of a boiler room. In the boiler-room
context suitability can be reduced to its lowest common denominator .... ").
323. Note that the language of paragraph 1 of the NASD policy statement (broker
may not recommend "speculative low-priced securities" without inquiry because of "high
probability" of unsuitability) is not restricted to boiler rooms. See Bines, Portfolio
Theory, supra note 18, at 725 n.20.
Application of an objective or per se unsuitability theory to boiler rooms might
also be conceived of as a surrogate for disclosure. See Lipton, supra note 1, at 283
(remarks of A. Fleischer, Jr.); but see id. (remarks of M. Lipton).
324. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 54, at 244-45; Mundheim, supra note 60, at 457;
Wilson, Interpretationof NASD's Suitability Requirements in Sales of Mutual Fund Shares
in CONFERENCE ON MurTuA. FuNDs 21, 26 (P. Geerlings ed. 1967); cf. Comment, A
Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud, supra note 317, at 1429.
325. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 268.
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ent of any constructive knowledge of unsuitability which may be
imputed to a broker, there is no reasoned basis for limiting the duty
to boiler rooms. Boiler rooms are special precisely because, unless
the high-pressure salesperson assumes an affirmative duty to inquire
and assure suitability, unsuitable transactions are inevitable, and this
truth should be obvious to the salesperson. Because the SEC boiler
room decisions failed to express clearly this constructive knowledge
analysis, no rationale appeared for limiting their holding that there is
an independent duty to inquire in the boiler room context. Thus, in
a 1966 address, the SEC Chairman characterized Greenberg as standing for the general principle, embodied in the then proposed Rule
15b10-3, that "a broker-dealer could not avoid the impact of [the
NASD] suitability rule by not making inquiry into the financial situation and needs of his customer." 32 " The Special Study saw Greenberg as a rejection by "[b]oth the NASD and the Commission" of "the
contention that under the language of the [NASD] rule, when a customer does not volunteer his financial condition and holdings, the
broker-dealer and his salesmen have no duty to obtain such infor3 27
mation."
The observation previously made 3 -S about the first two categories
of cases is true of the boiler room cases as well: the principal attack
by the NASD and SEC has been on fraud grounds. 32 ' The main count
in NASD and SEC proceedings is typically a non-suitability fraud
count, occasionally accompanied by a count for selling unregistered
securities. 330 At one time the Commission proposed an "anti-boiler
room" rule under antifraud section 15(c) (2) of the Exchange Act to
restrict selling of low priced, speculative securities. 33 1 Indeed, in
326.
3 (Oct.
327.
328.
329.

Address by M. Cohen to 18th Annual Int'l Mutual Fund Dealers' Conference
25, 1966) (quoted in Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3719).
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 239 (footnote omitted).
See notes 295-312 & accompanying text supra.
Kroll, Fraud Problems in Connection with Broker-Dealer Selling, in SECURITIES

LAWS AND REcULATIONS INSTITUTE

23, 36 (H. Sowards ed. 1967).

330. Boiler room cases "typically involved outright misrepresentation or material
nondisclosure." Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, at 283 (footnote omitted).
Of the many cases cited in notes 313, 314, and 319 supra, only three, Boren & Co., supra
note 313, Gerald M. Greenberg, supra note 314, and C. Gilman Johnston, supra note 319,
involved the NASD suitability rule at all. The others only incidentally articulated suitability principles. Even in Boren and Greenberg there were substantial nonsuitability
fraud grounds for discipline (such as the sale of securities at unfair mark-ups), and in
Boren the violation was in the nature of per se unsuitability.
331. Proposed Exchange Act rule 15c2-6, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6885, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) if 76,862 (1962).
See
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most of the boiler room cases, brokers were disciplined for clearly
fraudulent conduct: misrepresentations about the companies whose
securities were being sold, unfounded predictions of price increases,
failure to conduct adequate investigation of the securities or to disclose known facts that undermined the attractiveness of the securities,
or classical shingle theory violations, such as excessive markups. Many
boiler room decisions did not offer even brief dicta as to suitability
principles.3 32 Professor Alan Bromberg sees this primary reliance on
fraud counts in the boiler room cases not as another sign of the elusiveness of pure suitability principles 333 but rather as an indication of the
expansion of fraud principles to cover suitability. He briefly notes
in his text:
Except for "boiler-shop" cases, [the suitability requirement] presently lies outside 10b-5 and other fraud rules. However, ithas
already become a requirement for broker-dealers who are SECregistered without being members of the NASD, and it takes no
great prophet to foresee
a closer connection between suitability
4
and the fraud rules.33
No-Action Letters
An indication from the SEC that suitability duties may not be
limited to express recommendations is the response to a 1971 request
for a no-action letter.335 On March 27, 1972, the SEC responded to
a request from New York Securities Co. and three coparticipant firms,
seeking the Commission's imprimatur for a payroll deduction scheme,
Comment, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud, supra note 317.

The pro-

posed rule was later withdrawn as unnecessary. See SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7517, [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ir 77,193
(1965).
332. See, e.g., Hamilton Waters & Co., 42 S.E.C. 784 (1965); W. E. Leonard

& Co., 41 S.E.C. 505 (1963); B.Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210 (1962); Midland Sec.,
Inc., 40 S.E.C. 635 (1961); W. T. Anderson Co., 39 S.E.C. 630 (1960); see also Fishman, supra note 54, at 239-40; Comment, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud,
supra note 317, at 1416-17.
333. See notes 306-09 & accompanying text supra.
334. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 100 (footnotes omitted). The same assumption that any suitability principles articulated in boiler room cases were intended to be

incorporated in the theory of the fraud violation is made in 6 Loss (1969), supra note
18, at 3708; Kroll, supra note 329, at 39, Jacobs, supra note 5, at 898 n.131, and Mundhelm, supra note 60, at 460 n.39. See also note 306 supra.
335. On no-action letters, see generally Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REv. 303 (1973);
Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: Informal Advice as a Discretionary Administrative
Clearance, 37 LAw & CoNirEMP. PRoB. 95 (1972).
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which they would manage and which was to be offered to the employees of client companies. Existing schemes managed by one of
the firms provided companies' employees the option of purchasing
insurance, mutual fund shares, or both through payroll deductions.
The firms proposed to add an additional element, the shares of client
companies. Employees would be given the option of investing onefourth of each payroll deduction in their employer's stock. No recommendations would have been made, except whatever recommendation could be read into the very availability of the stock under the
deduction plan. Nevertheless, the firms had affirmatively represented
that
New York Securities would make sufficient investigation of each
proposed company to make certain that the stock of the corporation would be a suitable investment for employees prior to any
presentation being made....
•...
[N]o sale of funds or stock would be permitted to any
individual for whom such an investment would be unsuitable, talcing into consideration the wage level of the employee and the
amounts of money withheld for investment.336
The SEC responded that a guarantee of suitability precautions would
337
have to be substantiated by submission of a detailed procedure.
Clearly, the SEC staff either found the absence of recommendations
irrelevant under rule 15b10-3 or found the scheme carried enough
of an implicit recommendation to trigger the rule.
The idea persisted that suitability rules are inappropriate when
no overt recommendation is made..33 8 In a 1974 request for a no-action letter concerning another employee-investment scheme in which
about thirty stocks would have been available, attorneys for Standard
& Poor's took the position that rule 15b10-3, the SECO suitability rule,
was inapplicable to the proposed plan because the securities would be
recommended on the basis of investment merit, so that the employee
would be allowed to decide personally whether the security would

336. SEC Securities Exchange Act No-Action Letter, § 10(b), rule lOb-6, New
York Securities Co., April 25, 1972, Letter from Francis P. King to SEC, August 18,
1971, at 6 (available on LEXIS; copy on file with the author).
337. Id., Letter from Albert D. Sturtevant to Francis P. King, March 27, 1972 (available on LEXIS; copy on file with author).
338. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act No-Action Letter, § 10(b), rule 10b-5,
Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, May 21, 1973, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.

(CCH) ff 79,412.
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"meet his needs." 33 9 The response advised that suitability questions
should be taken up with a different division of the SEC but also included the following remarks regarding the degree of discretion to
be retained by investors under the plan:
A fundamental problem, in our view, is that in providing a list
limited to approximately 30 securities eligible for investment, the
Service greatly restricts an investor's ability to exercise a significant degree of discretion in purchasing securities. Although participants in the Service would be able to exercise some choice in
selecting securities, that choice would be quite limited in relation
to the broad range of available investments which might otherwise
be suitable. 34 0
Why the SEC staff focused on the breadth of choice among securities
to be offered by the plan, rather than on the discretion that every
employee would of course retain to buy securities elsewhere, or not
to buy them at all, is unclear.
These no-action responses suggest a retreat from the position that
an overt recommendation is required before suitability obligations
attach or, alternatively, an expansion of the definition of recommendation to include statements that carry implicit recommendations. In
adopting this new attitude, the SEC is ignoring the evidence in favor
of the "order clerk" exemption to the suitability rules provided by
"recommendation" language in the rules themselves. Additionally,
the Commission is forgetting that the Special Study's seminal analysis
of the suitability problem revolved exclusively, aside from the special
34 1
problem of churning, around inappropriate recommendations.
Court Decisions
The Elements of a Violation
Reported federal and state court cases do little to clarify the
many ambiguities and inconsistencies that emerge from the materials
discussed above. No SEC decision on suitability has been reviewed
on the merits in a circuit court. Most court decisions deal with
339. SEC Securities Act No-Action Letter, § 2(1), Investment Advisers Act NoAction Letter, § 206, Standard & Poor's Corp., Nov. 23, 1975, Letter from Booth & Baron
to SEC, Dec. 5, 1974, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 80,337,
at 85,880 (full text available on LEXIS; copy on file with author).
340. Id., Letter from Alan Rosenblatt to Booth & Baron, Nov. 23, 1975, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 80,337, at 85,874.
341. See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 269-70, 278, 308.
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whether a federal cause of action will lie under the exchange and
NASD rules. 34 2 Three recent cases, however, address in detail the
merits of suitability claims. One case construes the doctrine liberally,
while the other two take restrictive views. Two older cases, though
less clear, also seem to embrace a restrictive view.
In Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,343 the plaintiff Rolf
brought suit alleging fraud and violations of the NASD suitability rule
and NYSE Rule 405 as a result of trading that reduced the worth of
his stock portfolio from $1,423,000 in May of 1969 to $225,000 by January of 1971. The court found that plaintiff was a sophisticated investor with long experience in growth-oriented trading. He had actively managed his own account from 1950 to 1962 when he switched
to a discretionary account because he did not have enough time to
devote to his portfolio. In 1963, he engaged defendant BEDCO, a
brokerage house, seeking to double his equity as quickly as possible.
In 1969, plaintiff's account manager left BEDCO, and the account was
reassigned to defendant Stott, who recommended that plaintiff turn
his account over to an independent investment adviser, defendant
Yamada. Stott was unaware of plaintiff's investment objectives when
he recommended Yamada to the plaintiff, and he remained ignorant
of those objectives throughout the ensuing period while he participated in managing the account.
Plaintiff met with Yamada, whom he found to be a bright, aggressive young adviser known for his great success with highly speculative securities. He advised Yamada that he was interested in rapidly
increasing his equity but that he also sought to preserve his capital,
which would largely finance his retirement. Plaintiff executed a
blanket trading authorization to Yamada but requested he trade
through BEDCO and Stott in order "to balance Yamada's youth and
34 4
zeal with BEDCO and Stott's reliability and supervision."
Yamada took over plaintiff's account and began trading in low
quality securities that greatly reduced the value of the account. A
number of the investments were being used by Yamada as part of
fraudulent manipulation schemes or were the subject of fraudulent
misrepresentations. The court held that Stott knew these securities
were highly speculative but not that they were fraudulent.
342.
343.
344.

See notes 496-540 & accompanying text infra.
424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1028.
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Both Stott and BEDCO contended that a brokerage firm has no
obligation to prevent unsuitability "if an investment adviser [is] in
the picture" 34 ; and that the firm was therefore justified in dispensing

with its normal policy of special approvals for transactions involving
stocks with low ratings. The court began by rejecting this theory.
In what was technically dictum because of a finding that Stott actually had engaged in managing the account, the court held that an
intervening agency does not relieve the broker of his obligations under NYSE and NASD rules to the customer. It cited as persuasive
authority two SEC decisions which held that a broker may not remain
passive while knowing that an investment adviser was defrauding
customers.3 46

The court's holding went well beyond these SEC de-

cisions, however, because Stott was ignorant of any actual fraud by
Yamada and because the court required Stott not merely to act on
known unsuitability but also to investigate the suitability of transactions.
The court began its discussion of the law by referring to brokers'
duties both as fiduciaries and under the shingle theory, clearly implying that suitability violations are within the realm of the fraud
sections and rules. 347

It determined that Stott, and BEDCO on a

theory of respondeat superior, were liable for violations of the rules
by Stott that were "tantamount to fraud" and committed with scienter.
First, the court held, without any discussion of Rolf's speculative investment goals, his investment sophistication, or the fact that he was
fully aware of the nature and value of his holdings throughout, that
Yamada's acquisitions of manipulated securities were unsuitable for
Rolf and that the total management of Rolf's account was tantamount
to fraud. Second, the court found that Stott's recommendation of
Yamada as an investment adviser, without knowing or investigating
Roll's investment objectives or "every essential fact relative to
Yamada," violated the rules because Stott "did not learn whether
Yamada would be a suitable adviser."3 48

This holding stretches

enormously the language of the suitability rules, which say nothing
345. Id. at 1035. This was regarded as an open question in Lipton, supra note
1, at 280 (prepared statement by M. Lipton).
346. Id. at 1037-39. The SEC decisions are Moore & Co., 32 S.E.C. 191 (1951),
and William I. Hay, 19 S.E.C. 397 (1945).
347. 424 F. Supp. at 1036-37. The court's reference to liability under NYSE and
NASD rules for violations "tantamount to fraud" creates some doubt as to the holding.
id.
348. Id. at 1042.
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about recommending investment advisers. Third, the court held that
Stott's reassurances to Rolf as to Yamada's competence and failures
to suggest that Rolf "reconsider any transaction," to recommend
against any investment, or to suggest "that perhaps Yamada was too
speculative for the plaintiff's investment needs" were tantamount to
fraud. The court then concluded:
Even had Stott never assured the plaintiff with respect to Yamada,

Stott's total failure to speak out nevertheless would suffice to
render him liable for violations of the rules. Stott not only failed
to learn about Rolf, but he totally failed to investigate the stocks
in the account or to tell Rolf what he now claims - that he really
didn't know anything about those stocks. If a broker acts only
as an order-taker, he must not offer advice. If he begins to offer
advice, he must not fail to make full disclosure ...
A broker must not allow his silence to be taken as a recommendation. If he cannot or will not investigate the security
being purchased, he must disclose the fact to the customer and
warn the customer of the risks of making investments without
full knowledge of the issuer. He must satisfy himself that not
only the security but also the type of transaction is suitable for
the customer. 4 9
Finally, the court held that the appropriate measure of damages
was determined by the amount of commissions that the defendants
had earned from plaintiff's account, plus interest. Rolf thus recovered
only $55,790 of his $1,198,000 loss.
On appeal, the Second Circuit sustained the finding of liability,
but on fraud grounds only. The court put off for another day whether
a cause of action is available under the NASD and NYSE rules.3')
The court reversed on the question of damages, holding that in addition to the amount awarded above, Rolf was entitled to his gross losses
during the period of the fraud, reduced to reflect the decline that
had been occurring in the market as a whole. 3 "
349. Id. at 1042-43 (citations omitted).
350. 570 F.2d 38, 41, 48 n.19 (2d Cir. 1978).
351. Id. at 48-50. The court was rather inscrutable as to the mechanics of the required market-factor correction. However, it seemed to hold that the decline in value
of Rolf's portfolio during the relevant period, his gross losses, should be reduced by
the percentage decline of the market as a whole (as measured by some recognized
index or a composite of such indices) in order to arrive at net losses. It would appear more logical to reduce Rolf's portfolio at the beginning of the relevant period
by such a market-decline percentage, and then to arrive at net losses by subtracting
from the result Rolf's portfolio at the end of the period. This would of course yield
a lower damage measure than the court's suggested approach.
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Clearly, the district court's suitability ruling in Rolf is extremely

broad. As the circuit court recognized, the trial court went out of its
way to expand liabilities where narrower holdings were available.
Rolf is the only decision allowing a knowledgeable, sophisticated investor to recover for unsuitable investments despite his speculative
investment goals. There is also a troubling air of ex post facto judgment as to the unsuitable nature of the entire portfolio, and indeed
the court does not analyze all of Rolf's assets. 352 The logic of applying

suitability rules to the recommendation of an investment adviser is
also highly questionable. Despite the equivocal evidence concerning
the plaintiff's reliance on the broker for reassurance, and the almost
total lack of evidence that the broker's security recommendations were
unsuitable, a strict affirmative suitability. duty is imposed. Finally,
the need for any evidence of express advice is cast in question by the
admonition that the "broker must not allow silence to be taken as a
recommendation."
After Rolf, Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.Y3 seems cruelly
narrow in its rejection of plaintiffs' suitability claims. Mr. and Mrs.
Gleit, having returned a postcard inviting them to request further
information as to Shearson's investment services, met in April 1972
with Loeser, a Shearson account solicitor. They discussed with
Loeser, their finances and investment goals. The Gleits earned
$25,000 per year, had an unspecified amount of life insurance, owned
a mortgaged home, and wanted to invest half of their $20,000 savings
in order to realize "sufficient capital appreciation to assist in meeting
college costs for their three children."

14

The defendants have petitioned for rehearing or rehearing en banc, with the support of amici curiae which include the NYSE and several major brokerage firms. While
the petition remains pending, the Second Circuit took the unusual step of issuing an
amendment to its original opinion. The court added a footnote to make clear that
rule 10b-5, at least, was not being construed to "impose liability on a broker-dealer
who merely executes orders for 'unsuitable' securities made by an investment advisor
vested with sole discretionary authority to control the account." The court noted that
Stott, "although charged wth supervisory authority over the advisor and aware that
the advisor was purchasing 'junk,' actively lulled the investor by expressing confidence
in the advisor without bothering to investigate whether these assurances were wellfounded." Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Nos. 77-7104 & 77-7124 (2d Cir. June
22, 1978). See Rustin, Court Amends Ruling on Broker Duties to Client, Wall St. J.,
June 23, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
352. See 570 F.2d at 55 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
353. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) g 95,799 (S.D.N.Y.

1976).
354. Id. at 90,887.
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Loeser told the Gleits that he would depend on Shearson research
and receive the firm's approval for transactions. The Gleits explained
they were ignorant in securities matters and would rely entirely on
Loeser and Shearson. A margin account was opened for them the
next day.
By March 1973, the Gleits had realized $624.06 in gains and
$16,475.77 in losses on purchases and sales of nine securities. Two
of the biggest losers, accounting for 56%of total portfolio losses, were
new issues. The Gleits alleged that unsuitable purchases were made
in violation of NYSE Rule 405, "and that such violation constitutes a
manipulative or deceptive practice within the meaning of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. ' 3"
The court held that, even assuming arguendo that a violation of
Rule 405 gives rise to a civil cause of action, the plaintiffs had not
proven the securities purchased were poorly suited to their objectives.
The evidence summarized in the opinion, however, had little or nothing to do with the risk levels of the securities purchased or the appropriate risk levels of the plaintiff's portfolio. Rather, the court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that (a) the securities were
generally regarded by brokers as "good" investments (for whom not
being specified), and (b) plaintiffs would have fared even worse if
defendants had not sold when they did. The only clear reference
to risk levels was in connection with a purchase of warrants, and that
discussion begs the question of appropriateness at the time of purchase:
Because warrants are by their nature speculative, they might
be considered inconsistent with the Gleits' investment objectives.
However, they were the only securities in plaintiffs' portfolio
sold at a profit. This Court therefore finds it difficult to fault defendants for having made this particular recommendation. Nor
can the Court criticize their sale shortly after their purchase even
though so fast a turnover indicates a non-investment objective.
Had the warrants been held longer, they too would have been
sold at a loss . . .
In sum, Gleit is very unclear concerning the requisite elements
in finding a suitability violation. Generally, the opinion applies a
very lenient "malpractice" standard which differentiates little, if at
all, among the appropriate risk levels of different investors.
355.
356.

Id. at 90,888.
Id. at 90,890.
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In Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes,3 57 the
court was similarly conservative but much clearer about its reasons.
After first holding that no private right of action existed under the
NASD suitability rule, the court went on in dicta to construe the rule
very restrictively in two important respects. The court stated that
the rule imposes no duty to investigate the customer's finances and
also held, squarely contradicting the Rolf court, that the rule applies
only to express recommendations. The court easily concluded that
even if a cause of action were available, the rule had not been violated.
Had the rule been given a broader reading, the facts might well
have supported a finding of violation. The plaintiff was a wealthy
woman whose husband, Smith, had traded her account on her behalf.
She prayed for the recovery of $1,983,125, a 100% loss on the purchase
of 50,000 shares of the common stock of Cartridge Television, Inc.,
which had developed and was promoting a home video tape system.
After selling an initial acquisition of 13,000 shares of the stock
at a profit, the dealer, Ward, telephoned Smith and reported that he
had "information which had not been available to him" when he had
counselled sale two days earlier. Based on the information conveyed
by Ward, Smith decided to purchase 50,000 shares of the stock. At
that time plaintiff was having cash flow difficulties resulting from the
failure of a speculative real estate venture. This fact, however, was
not disclosed to Ward. Eighteen months later the company was
bankrupt and the shares were suitable only for framing.
Apparently Ward sought to induce the purchase, even though he
may not have made a formal recommendation. In the context of
plaintiff's very recent, large profit in the stock, his phone call certainly
could be construed as the recommendation of a renewed purchase. 858
He also seems to have assumed that the plaintiff's account remained
the rather free trading account it had been before plaintiff became
pressed for cash. If he had been under an obligation to make the
most minimal inquiry-for example, to ask, "Have your investment
goals changed significantly?"-it probably would have been obvious
357. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 95,885 (M.D.N.C.
1977). Note that while Rolf concerned both the NYSE and NASD rules, the plaintiffs
in Gleit based their suitability claim solely on NYSE rule 405, and the plaintiff in
Parsons solely on NASD article III, § 2.
358. For example, the broker's communication would clearly be a "recommendation" as that term is defined in subsections (b) and (c) of the proposed CFTC suitability rule.
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that the purchase of a stock which was still highly speculative despite
its recent price gains was now unsuitable for the plaintiff.
The court dismissed the idea of a suitability violation by noting
that there is "no affirmative duty on the broker to investigate or solicit
facts."359 Since Ward had no reason to question Smith's purchase,
it appeared to him that the purchase was a suitable one. In addition,
the court held that an express recommendation is necessary before a
rule violation may take place and that the evidence in the case revealed no such recommendation. Thus, the court decided that the
transaction was not within the terms of the NASD suitability rule,
and did not pursue the question of whether this very large, speculative purchase was suitable for plaintiff's portfolio. If anything, the
court suggested that speculative securities are suitable for anyone
who is "extremely wealthy with extensive securities and real estate
holdings."3oo
There are only two other federal cases that rule instructively on
the substance of a suitability violation. 361 Both rejected the allegations of a violation on the basis of a highly subjective view of suitability. In essence, these opinions adopted a presumption that sophisticated investors make their own assessment of suitability, thereby
immunizing the broker from any potential liability.
In Phillips v. Reynolds & Co.,3 6 2 three investors sued a broker
for their losses on transactions in the stock of Strategic Materials
Corporation. Their main claims were under rule 10b-5, but they
also included a suitability claim. Two of the plaintiffs were of considerable means and had extensive trading experience. Little information was provided with respect to the third investor, a trucking
359.

[1976-1977 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC.

L. REP. (CCH) f 95,885, at 91,250

(1977).
360. Id.
361. Several other decisions on the merits are of little value. The court in Marshak
v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 383-84 (N.D. Okla. 1975), totally
ignoring the language of the NASD suitability rule, read it as nothing more than a
narrow know-your-customer rule, a peculiar reversal of the general tendency to read
suitability content into NYSE rule 405 and other know-your-customer rules. See also
Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fr
96,331, at 93,105 (D. Mass. 1978); Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199,
208 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (E.D. Va. 1968);
note 369 infra.
362. 294 F. Supp. 1249, motion to amend decision or grant new trial denied, 297
F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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company vice president. The court rejected the suitability claims of
all three. Though the reasoning is obscure, the court apparently fa-

vored a purely subjective, disclosure and free choice oriented, notion
of suitability, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs alleged the
3
broker's actual knowledge of unsuitability. 63

The other decision that denied liability under the suitability rules,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. v. Bocock, Inc.8 64 was a diversity case in which the plaintiff brokerage firm sued for amounts

the defendant owed on his personal and trust accounts after the defendant failed to meet a margin call. The defendant advanced a
suitability counterclaim. The counterclaim was apparently based on

a state law theory of common law deceit, 36 5 although the court may
also have interpreted the NASD suitability rule as giving rise to a

direct federal claim.
The court, which apparently viewed the NASD rule as reaching

67
both fraudulent and negligent conduct, 366 rejected the counterclaim.3
363. It is possible, as the suitability claim was apparently not briefed in detail,
that the court only decided that a suitability obligation is not imposed by the fraud
sections of the securities laws.
364. 247 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Tex. 1965). See Comment, Corporations- Is It Now
"Caveat Broker" in the Securities Field?, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 493 (1966). One of the
issues in the case, the broker's liability for execution of transactions in a trust account
which are not authorized by state law, is not considered here.
365. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3722.
366. But see Rediker, supra note 47, at 42.
367. In Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the court
held: "Although there exists a serious question of whether there can be a private
action for violation of exchange [and NASD] rules, the court's determination that . . .
the plaintiffs' investments were suitable disposes of this claim .... ." One's best guess
is that the court has used similar reasoning to that in the Phillips and Bocock decisions; in fact, the court did not determine that the investments were suitable and
there is no discussion of the finances or needs of the many plaintiffs who lost money
on a speculative stock, but the court does determine, in line with Phillips and Bocock,
that plaintiffs were experienced speculators and were not deceived.
In Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court
denied that a cause of action lay under the NASD suitability rule, but held that in
any event, the broker defendant "Bartos followed an investment course suited to the
League's needs." Id. at 314 (footnote omitted). The League was a non-profit association of architects and other professionals; it had lost $87,000 of a $100,000 account in speculative trading by Bartos, who was given discretionary authority. The
court found that Bartos had been instructed to pursue an "aggressive" trading policy
and that the League knew of the speculative nature of his investments. Since the
League "faced a chronic shortage of operating funds" and "was very anxious to have
some profits," the investments were suited to its needs. Id. The court did not discuss
the sophistication of the League's financial officers or the general finances of the League.
See Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, at 452-55.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

Although the defendant had only a high school education, he had prospered in his own manufacturing business, had executed substantial
stock transactions, and had consulted an attorney who advised against
the short sales which were executed. The court concluded that
considering Bocock's age, education, intelligence, business experience and familiarity with stock transactions, particularly in
recent successful deals involving [the same] stock in similarly
large amounts, .

.

. Bocock . . .was a "suitable person

con-

sidering his other security holdings and his financial situation
and needs. See Section 2 of Article 3 of the Bylaws of the National Association of Security [sic] Dealers. 68
One commentator cites Bocock as one piece of evidence that fraud
principles may be expanding to encompass suitability violations. 3 69
A final federal case of importance to the analysis of suitability
principles is Anderson v. Knox, 370 a 1961 diversity action in which the
court allowed recovery in common law fraud for the recommendation
and sale, by an insurance agent of an "equity-funded" 37 ' insurance
package to a customer unable to benefit from its tax advantages and,
in fact, hardly able to afford it. The decision has been regarded
by the SEC and commentators as a key source of the evolving suita-

Contrast Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa
1975), in which the plaintiff broker also sought in a diversity action to recover margin
deficits - in that case, on accounts the defendant opened as trustee for his children's
funds. In deciding a common law negligence counterclaim for recommending the
margin purchase of low-rated bonds to the defendant, a "relatively unsophisticated"
investor, the court held that the NASD suitability rule and NYSE rule 405 were admissible evidence of the standard of care of brokers. The court found the broker
liable, but held the measure of damages to be not restitution, but only the cancellation of the accounts' deficits. The rule 405 violation was the result of the broker's
"failing to inquire as to the amount of assets in the trusts" and the NASD suitability
rule violation resulted from his failure "to advise the trustee of the risk of additional
financial responsibilities incumbent on a purchaser of BB bonds on a margin account
so that an informed decision could be made by the investor." Id. at 298-300.
368. 247 F. Supp. at 376-77. The words "suitable person" of course do not appear
in the NASD rule, nor is the rule part of the NASD By-laws.
369. 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3722.
370. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962). See Chittick, Responsibilities of Professionalism, 18 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 29 (1964); Note, The
Insurance Salesman - A New Duty to the Insured?, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 126 (1962).
See also New York Home Furniture Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 379 F.2d 879, 881
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961); Steadman v. McConnell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 334, 308 P.2d 361 (1957).
371. On "equity funding," see notes 89-90 & accompanying text supra.
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bility doctrine.Y32 The Ninth Circuit considered at length whether
the insurance program was objectively suitable, given the plaintiff's
income and future prospects, as well as whether the insurance agent's
representations of suitability were ones of fact or opinion made in
disregard of truth. The court sustained the trial court's award of
actual and exemplary damages. The court was particularly influenced by the fact that the salesman had encouraged reliance on his
judgment, and that the complex product involved defied analysis by
the layman. The insurance package involved was one quite clearly
tailored for the income and tax needs of someone in a position much
different from that of the plaintiff. The Anderson case therefore fits
well under the per se unsuitability rubric, where few of the difficult
37
problems of the suitability doctrine are raised. 3
Common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were held to
support recovery for a suitability violation in Twomey v. Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, Inc.3 7 4 The California court concluded that
violation of suitability principles, as expressed in the NASD suitability rule, should result in civil liability because "[i]t would be inconsistent to suggest that a person should be defrocked as a member of
his calling and yet not be liable for the injury which resulted from his
acts or omissions."3

75

The court determined that suitability prin-

ciples impose a duty on a broker when a customer who had previously
expressed a desire for stability of principle and modest income makes
372. See, e.g., Richard N. Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 17 n.12, 18 n.13 (1969); 6 Loss
(1969), supra note 18, at 3725; 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 100 n.35; E. WEISS,
supra note 115, at 184-85; Flint, supra note 97, at 1261 n.131; Jacobs, supra note 6,
at 899 n.133; Rediker, supra note 47, at 41; Fishman, supra note 54, at 246; Kroll,
supra note 329, at 37; Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 452
n.11, 454-55; Comment, supra note 5, at 518-19; Comment, supra note 317, at 1424
n.104.
373. But the case has also been viewed as a source of somewhat less per se rules.
For example, according to one commentator, Anderson "should be a warning to a salesman who sells a prospect a 'package' of both [mutual] fund shares and life insurance
where it is obvious that the investor's need is to invest all of his dollars in additional
life insurance." Tepperman, Legal Problems in the Combined Sales of Life Insurance
and Fund Shares, in CONFERENCE ON MrruAL FuNDs 7, 12 (P. Geerlings ed. 1967).
374. 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
375. Id. at 721-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 244. Pendent jurisdiction was assumed over
another suitability claim under California law in Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank,
326 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971). The claim alleged "liability under the National
Association of Securities Dealers Rules [sic] which requires that a broker's recommendations be suitable." Id. at 762. Evidently the rule was being invoked, as in
Twomey, which the court cited, as the standard of care in a state common law action
for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 765.
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a request for the recommendation of a rapid-growth security. In that
situation the broker must advise the customer of the risks and may
recommend specific speculative securities only if the customer persists
37 6

in the request.

The broker contended that his lack of information concerning
the plaintiff's financial position excused him from the need to warn
her of the risks inherent in the purchase of speculative securities. The
court held that the broker's obligation in this case extended further
than to execute the "stated objectives of the customer." A duty to
inquire into the plaintiff's "actual financial situation and needs" arose
because the broker was more than a mere agent. A fiduciary relationship existed in this case because the broker's "recommendations, as
invariably followed, were for all practical purposes the controlling
factor in the transactions."

3

7

The plaintiff's acquiescence in the high rate of trading in her account and in the speculative nature of the recommended securities
which were purchased was not enough to discharge the broker from
any liability. The court stated:
Plaintiff acknowledged that she understood that there was a risk,
that she knew securities could go down as well as up, and that she
understood that defendants were not going to make good her
losses, or guarantee her a profit. This, however, is not to say that
she was competent to evaluate the extent of the risk she was
taking or the propriety of one of her financial condition so doing.
The fact that she had inherited money, that she had prior transactions with other brokers, and that she had improvidently invested in one speculative security on her own initiative might justify a finding of knowledgeableness and lack of reliance, but they

do not compel that result when taken with her other testimony.
The receipt of confirmation slips and accounts, and her ability to
chart the cost and prices of her securities are facts of the same
tenor. They may permit, but they do not compel, findings that
plaintiff knew she was engaged in a course of trading and purchasing securities of a type ti-at were unsuitable for one of her
financial situation and needs. '
376. This approach was suggested in Mundheim, supra note 60, at 464-66.
377. 262 Cal. App. 2d at 719, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (citations omitted).
378. Id. at 722, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (emphasis added). An analogous narrowing
of the affirmative defense of customer ratification (or of proof of non-ratification as an
element of a plaintiff's case) has occurred in some churning cases. See, e.g., Fortenberry v. Weber, 18 Cal. App. 3d 213, 95 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1971) which holds the defense available under California law, but requires the broker to prove actual notice
to the customer of transactions, and charges the broker with notice of the customer's
capacity to understand confirmation slips.
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Here, the court clearly adopts an objective notion of suitability:

1155

even

if plaintiff had fully understood the risks of the transactions and their
potential impact on "her financial situation and needs" before choos-

ing to enter into them, the transactions would still be unsuitable.
A "finding of knowledgeableness and lack of reliance" would, however, be a good defense. In this view, suitability itself is not a function of customer choice at all, however well-informed the customer.

Investment objectives are thus not relevant to the calculation of suitability for the Twomey court, at least to the extent that the risk or
cost of the transaction exceeds some objective point of inappropri37
ateness given one's particular "financial situation and needs." 9

Possible Defenses
In some of the other reported federal cases in which suitability
allegations have been made, courts have avoided deciding whether

a cause of action is available under the rules and what elements constitute any such cause of action, by proceeding directly to find that
an applicable defense was satisfied. The defenses relied upon have
been (a) proximate cause, (b) estoppel or ratification, and (c) in
pari delicto.

(a)

In Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc.,3 10 the court

sustained the dismissal of a Rule 405 claim because the plaintiff had

"failed to establish a causal connection between the technical violations of the NYSE rules and the alleged losses sustained." Though
it may be construed either as a defense or as a necessary element
of liability, proximate cause is probably better conceived of as an
aspect of proving damages.3 8 1 Loss causation in law should be care379. Perhaps the Twomey court would have found investment objective relevant,
even though this "risk threshold" was not exceeded, in a case in which the broker
clearly sold a different type of security than the customer desired. Of course, such
an instance would generally be outright fraud. See text accompanying notes 295-97
supra.
380. 560 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting unreported district court decision). See also Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975); Bush v. Bruns, Nordeman & Co. [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 727 (1944).
Also note the
reference to stock market decline in the excerpt from the Pearl case in the text immediately below. Cf. Granbery, Marache & Co. v. E. L. Bruce Co., 62 Misc. 2d 406,
308 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (defense of failure of plaintiff to fulfill rule 405
held invalid because failure was not a separate proximate cause of harm to plaintiff).
381. See generally ALI FED. SEc. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 215A, Coin-
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fully distinguished from reliance.38 2 Though the two are indistinguishable in many securities actions, should suitability rules be construed so that no reliance on a broker's recommendation need occur
for a violation to take place, the law could deem any transaction
which follows upon an unsuitable recommendation by a broker as
legally caused by the recommendation.
(b)
In Pearl v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,383 where the plaintiff
had made a "conscious decision ... that business necessities required
dealing in speculative securities in order to maintain a business in
the selling of stock options," the court granted summary judgment
to defendant on an estoppel theory, "[e]ven assuming that violations
of [the NYSE and NASD] rules [would] give rise to liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 3s4 The court explained:
In this case, plaintiffs knew what their needs were and sought
out the speculative aspect of the option business even before they
brought their business to Shearson.

Shearson .

.

.

could only

believe that plaintiffs' needs would be served by trading in those
stocks actively traded on the option market, the speculative issues.
Defendants could have no knowledge beforehand that the stock
market would sink into a substantial decline during 1969. And
finally, defendants have relied upon the conduct of plaintiffs
throughout the 1969-70 period by continuing to endorse stock
options on the same type of stocks dealt with while plaintiffs' accounts were at Bache & Company. In short, this is the situation
where the investor has waited to see how his investments would
turn out before invoking the rules concerning the suitability of
those investments for his portfolio. Plaintiffs may not shift the
blame for investment decisions made in great part by themselves
on to the shoulders of the broker. 3 5
ment. On whether to treat a matter as an affirmative element of a violation or a defense, see 53 ALl PROCEEDINGS 553-68 (1976).
382. See, e.g., Gamatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1578 (1978). In Garnatz, the court held that where
defendants fraudulently represented that a speculative investment was safe, losses resulting from a general market decline were appropriately treated as proximately caused
by the misrepresentation. The opposite view was taken by the Second Circuit in the
Rolf decision, see text & accompanying note 351 supra. Cf. Moody v. Bache & Co..
570 F.2d 523, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing circumstances in which causation
may be inferred from reliance and materiality in 10b-5 actions).
383. Civil No. 9187 (W.D. Wash. May 1, 1972) (unpublished opinion; copy on
file with the author).
384. Id. at 8.
385. Id. at 8-9. Accord, Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970), modifying 283 F. Supp. 417, 428-31 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (S.D. Tex. 1965). But see
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The underlying assumption is that unsuitability is an objective property. Otherwise, there would be no need for the dealer to plead estoppel as a defense in the case of a sophisticated investor, because
such an investor would confer suitability on the transaction, just as
was found by the Phillips and Bocock courts. Nevertheless, such an
estoppel defense arrives at the same result, only possibly shifting the
burden of proof.
(c) Similar arguments have been sustained under the theory
of in pari delicto. In a suit based on the NYSE maintenance margin
rules, for example, one court held that "there is no right of action
that will allow a recovery to investors who know their accounts are
inadvertently undermargined, maintain their silence for a substantial
period of time, and take no corrective action." 38 6 Some decisions
suggest the in pari delicto defense might also be available against a
suitability charge,3 8 7 though none squarely so hold. Were the estoppel defense limited to situations where the customer consciously
sought to put himself in the pleasant position of either enjoying a
successful speculation or pursuing the broker for a suitability violation (and Pearl seems to be so limited), the in pari delicto defense
might be used to reach any situation where the customer knowingly
purchased unsuitable securities. 38 8 Again, the need for such a defense would turn on the prior question of the scope of the suitability
rules themselves. Only if the rules were intended to protect the customer from his own knowing choice of objectively unsuitable securities would such a defense make sense, because under the subjective
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). See also Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d
854 (10th Cir. 1974); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292,
300 (S.D. Iowa 1975); S. JAFFE, supra note 110, § 15.05.
386. Gordon v. duPont Glove Forgan, Inc., 487 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974). Accord, McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975); see also Evans v. Kerbs & Co.,
411 F. Supp. 616, 623 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Goodbody & Co. v. Penjaska, 8 Mich.
App. 64, 153 N.W.2d 665 (1967), app. dismissed & cert. denied, 393 U.S. 16 (1968).
As to in pari delicto defenses in securities actions generally, see Woolf v. S. D. Cohn
& Co., 515 F.2d 591, rehearing denied, 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426
U.S. 944 (1976); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 904-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
387. E.g., Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) If 94,760 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (rule 405).
See also Wolfson v.
Baker, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 96,407, at 93,458-59 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
388. But cf. ALI FEz. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1414, Comment (4),
and cases cited (reluctance of courts to permit in pari delicto defense in cases concerning Federal Reserve Board margin rules).
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theory, if the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly purchased the securities, they would not be unsuitable securities at all, and no affirmative defense would be necessary. If, however, that was their purpose, the defense should probably not be allowed, as it would nullify
an important part of the substantive liability.
C. Portfolio Theory
Recently, commentary has begun to focus on the potential of
"portfolio theory" for translating the suitability doctrine "into a detailed code of conduct for brokers." 3 19 Portfolio theory, which has
spawned an enormous literature in recent years, 390 seeks to solve,
through economic analysis, the investor's problem of selecting an optimal portfolio. Its implications for suitability doctrine are really
twofold. First, if one is willing to adopt all of its assumptions, the
389. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 118, at 1084. The leading article
treating the significance of portfolio theory for suitability doctrine is Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971). Other recent treatments are Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, and Note, Broker Investment
Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1977). A striking anticipation of many of the
issues later examined systematically by these commentators is the 1950 address by
Bickel, supra note 23. For other articles exploring the implications of portfolio theory
for laws which regulate investment, see Rizzi, Portfolio Theory, Capital Markets, and
the Marginal Effect of Federal Margin Regulations, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 499 (1977);
Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 Ams. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1 (pt. 1); 1977 id. 1 (pt. 2); Bines, Portfolio Theory, supra note 18:
Pozen, Money Managers and Security Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923 (1976); Kripke,
A Search For a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAw. 293 (1975);
Kassouf, Towards a Legal Framework for Efficiency and Equity in the Securities Markets, 25 HASTINcs L.J. 417 (1974); Note, Utilization of Investment Analysis Principles
in the Development of Disclosure Policy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 292 (1977); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977):
Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARv. L. REV. 960 (1975); Note, The Regulation of
Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1970).
390. Periodicals such as the Journal of Finance, the Financial Analysts Journal, and
the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis regularly offer articles on portfolio
theory, and many books have been published on the subject. See, e.g., K. SMNITH,
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
(1971); J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER, PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
(1971); W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970).
Among the
seminal works are H. MARKOWrrZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTIONS: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959), Hicks, Liquidity, 72 EcoN. J. 787 (1962), Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952), Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948), Tobin, Liquidity Preference as
Behavior Towards Risk, 26 REv. EcoN. STUD. 65 (1958).
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doctrine offers a completely developed method, in principle at least,
for arriving at the suitable investments for a given investor at any
point in time. Second, even if one denies some of the assumptions
of portfolio theory or questions its practicality, several of its principles
refute basic assumptions regardirg the suitability of particular transactions on which many of the authorities considered thus far have
relied. Traditional assumptions concerning the diversification of a
portfolio to minimize risk and the role of different types of securities
are exposed as inadequate overgeneralizations.
The Pure Theory
In highly simplified terms, portfolio theory can be thought of as
a formula for optimizing securities trading accounts which requires
five ingredients.
(a) The first ingredient is knowledge of the investor's subjective attitudes toward risk. More precisely, for each individual there
exists at any particular moment in time a function that translates
various possible changes in his wealth into units of relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction. These are called "units of utility" and the
function, a "utility function." Because almost everyone in almost
every circumstance would value his first dollar more than his millionth, this relationship is demonstrated by the following graph:
units of utility

U

dollars

Because a rational individual values the dollar gained less than the
dollar lost, increasingly so as the numbers increase, he will expect
a positive return for taking any risk. Greater and greater expected
returns are therefore required to induce him to take greater and
greater risks.391
391.

See, e.g., Note, Fiduciary Standards, supra note 389, at 970 n.57.

This state-
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return

risk
Thus, there is a hypothetical set of potential investments, 1, each one
of which will satisfy him equally. A similar set, I, will give him a
higher level of satisfaction. There exists an infinite number of these
sets, known as indifference curves, each conforming to the same basic
shape and each representing a particular level of satisfaction. In
theory, every investor fits this model, though each curve will reflect
his particular shape because it is a product of his particular utility
function.
This entire picture is taken at an instant in time. At the next
instant, when the individual's wealth, circumstances, and personality

have changed, his utility and indifference functions will have changed
3
as well. 12
This first ingredient of portfolio theory requires only knowledge

of attitudes toward wealth and risk; nothing need be known about
the factors that determine them. From this perspective, the familiar
suitability formula - "investment objectives, financial situation, and

ment depends on disputed notions of risk whose full exploration is beyond this synopsi,
See, e.g., J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcoNoMIc
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953); Marschak, Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and MeaNurable Utility, 18 ECONOMETRICA 111 (1950).
What is significant here is that we
speak not simply of risk of loss but rather of risk as a measure of the dispersion of
possible outcomes around the expected return; among these possible outcomes would
be total loss, partial loss, breaking even, a lower return than expected, and a greater
return than expected. See Cohen, supra note 389, at 1618 n.56 (discussing validity
of failing to focus exclusively on risk of loss).
392. Of course, an investor could simply hand a portfolio to a broker and instruct
him to obtain a specified return for a given period, whatever the risk required or to
maximize return within a specified risk ceiling. See Bines, Investment Objectives,
supra note 18, at 277-80. But portfolio theory suggests this behavior would be irrational.
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needs" - invokes extraneous elements. Everything relevant about
"investment objectives" is portrayed in the indifference curves (it
matters not that the goal is to send Johnny to college). 93 All that
is relevant about "financial situation" is how many dollars are available for investment. Everything relevant about "needs" has also
been accounted for by the curves. The investor's hopes, dreams,
fears, constraints, and responsibilities have all been combined by him
into his orientation toward risk and return.
(b) The second ingredient is knowledge about the risk and
return properties of all possible investments. Portfolio theory assumes that a security's prospects can be summarized in two statistics:
a percentage mean expected return and an index of variance which
expresses how widely possible outcomes are spread about the expected
return.394 Once all possible investments have been described according to their "risks" and "returns," certain investment possibilities
may be tentatively eliminated: all those that promise no greater return than some other investment with more risk and all those that
promise no less risk than some other investment with less return.
Those investment possibilities eliminated are said to be "dominated"
by the others. Like the individual's risk preferences, this second ingredient, the risk-return properties of securities, changes literally
from second to second.
(c) The third ingredient is knowledge about the covariance
among investments. Some investments will carry very similar prospects in the sense that one will tend to do well when the other does
well and poorly when the other does poorly. Their covariance will
rarely if ever be perfect, but it may be substantial. The risks of all
393. A complete analysis would have to take account of differing attitudes toward
wealth or consumption at various future times and toward various degrees of liquidity. See, e.g., Hirschleifer, Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World, 54
Am. ECON. REv. 77 (1964); Tobin, supra note 390.
394. See S. ARCHER & C. D'AmBROSIO, BUSINESS FINANCE: THEORY AND MANAGEMENT 61-92 (1966); Bines, Portfolio Theory, supra note 18, at 735-41.
There is considerable controversy over the basic question of whether risk can properly be defined
in the single statistic of variance, without taking account of other matters. See, e.g.,
Cohen, supra note 389, at 1607 n.19. There is also disagreement over the question
of how to arrive at better indices. See, e.g., Kraus & Litzenberger, Skewness Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets, 31 J. FIN. 1085 (1976); Bawa, Admissible
Portfolios for All Individuals, 31 J. FIN. 1169 (1976); Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, FIN. ANALYSTS J., March-April 1974, at 68 & May-June
1974, at 69; Bower & Wippern, Risk-Return Measurement in Portfolio Selection and
Performance Models: Progress Report, 4 J. FrN. & QUANT. ANAL. 417 (1969); Cohen,
supra note 389, at 1618-19 n.59.
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natural gas producers will covary to the extent that their prospects
are dictated by governmental price regulation, for example. Some
investments will tend to offset the risks of others (guns and butter),
but because general market conditions tend to have an indiscriminate impact, their movements will rarely if ever be completely unrelated. Covariances also change constantly but perhaps less pervasively than the first two factors.
(d) Fourth, we must have complete knowledge of the costs of
assembling possible portfolios. Commissions, volume discounts, liquidation costs, and other "transactions costs" make up this category.
These costs may be relatively constant over time, though less so
than when brokerage commissions were fixed.
(e) The final ingredient of portfolio theory is an assumption
that risk-free, or nearly risk-free, investments are available. This
assumption is not indispensable, but if it is true, it dictates a method
of considerably greater flexibility and precision for assembling an optimal portfolio than if it is not true, as explained below.
These five ingredients are assembled through a two-step formula.
First, an "efficiency frontier" of all the best portfolios for the particular investor is tailored by eliminating from further consideration those
portfolios that are dominated by others.
Second, this efficiency frontier is matched against the array of
the investor's indifference curves to ascertain the single portfolio that
puts him on the very highest curve, that is, where the frontier is
tangent to an indifference curve representing the highest level of
the investor's satisfaction.
return

I

I, /

I2

frontier

"X" marks the spot.
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Arriving at the frontier is a complicated task, involving at least
two and perhaps three distinct processes. First, all potential investments must be totally reassessed in terms of the particular investor's
immutable financial characteristics. His particular tax situation,395
other necessary transactions costs, and all of his effectively fixed assets must be included in every hypothetical portfolio. Second, portfolio diversification should be implemented with a view to reducing
covariance among the investments.8 96 Finally, to the extent that
the purchase of totally risk-free assets ("disinvestment") and unrestricted borrowing ("leveraging") are possible, final selection from
among the best portfolios should not be limited to selecting the one
portfolio that corresponds to the highest indifference curve but rather
should attempt to vary the mix between (a) the single portfolio on
and (b)
the frontier which has the highest overall return/risk ratio 97
leveraging.3
and
disinvestment
of
devices
risk-adjusting
the
Impracticalities of the Pure Theory

Of course, many objections to the workability of this strategy
are apparent. Although some have argued with perfect seriousness
that subjective risk preferences are ascertainable, 3 98 there are many

395. See, e.g., Feldstein, The Effects of Taxation on Risk Taking, 77 J. POL. EcoN.
755 (1969). The importance of tax considerations was early recognized in Bickel,
supra note 23, at 19-20.
396. Empirical research suggests that in most cases there is a relatively fixed point between roughly 15 and 50 securities - beyond which diversification no longer pays
for itself. The measurement of covariance and the rapidly diminishing effect of diversification are discussed in Markowitz, Markowitz Revisited, FiN. ANAL. J., Sept.-Oct.
1976. On the empirical research, see Cohen, supra note 389, at 1613-14 & n.42; V.
BRuDNEY & M. CH=RLs EiN, supra note 118, at 995-98; R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra
note 42, at 18 n.20. See also Nichols, supra note 60, at 437-38; Pozen, supra note 389,
at 940-53.
397. This approach is called "the separation theorem." See e.g., Tobin, supra note
390; Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 13 (1965). In technical
terms, disinvestment and leveraging allow the investor to move from a point on the
frontier to a point on an even higher indifference curve than the highest one tangent
to the frontier, by proceeding along a line whose slope is determined by the interest
rate the investor faces in his disinvestment or leveraging. See, id.; cf. C. KINDLEBERGER,
INTEnNATiONAL EcoNomncs 49, 51 (4th ed. 1968) (similar portrayals of gains from
international trade). Economists disagree over whether low-risk assets, such as Treasury bills, can be considered risk-free assets for purposes of the separation theorem.
See, e.g., Note, Fiduciary Standards, .supra note 89, at 971 n.65.
398. H. BIEmuAN, JR. & S. SmIDT, THE C.rrA.L BUncsErnG DECISION: EcoNoInc
ANALysxs AND FINANciNG OF I EsTm r PRojEcrs 248 (4th ed. 1975).
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obstacles to a broker's gaining any sort of picture of a customer, 399
much less a comprehensive notion of the customer's internal utility
calculus in coming to decisions about risk. 400 Indeed, the actual behavior of customers may well be inconsistent with the notion of any
continuous, rationally based, set of indifference curves.40 1 A broker
will be strongly tempted to ascertain a customer's objectives and
needs on the basis of shallow stereotypes. 40 2 In times of increasing
taxation and inflation, when individuals will differ in their willingness to accept greater risks in order the preserve their living stand40 3
ards, such stereotypes will be especially misleading.
Another obvious practical objection is that the theory requires
of the broker herculean tasks of security analysis. These tasks would
not be limited to the evaluation of the risk-return characteristics of
399. See Comment, supra note 60, at 742; Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note
18, at 420.
400. See, e.g., Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One Review of Rawis' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
In theory, it is
possible to derive indifference curves without any "direct" experience of the subjective
utilities of the customer, through an exhaustive process of exposing him to choices
and recording his ordinal rankings. See J. HICKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed. 1946);
Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243
(1948); Pareto, Mathematical Economics, 5 INTL ECON. PAPERS 58 (J. Griffin trans.
1955). In practice, however, constraints of time alone preclude such a course, and
the broker is thrown back on "direct" exploration of the customer's subjective preferences through the imperfect medium of language.
401. See, e.g., Geerlings, Suitability Requirements for Non-Member Broker-Dealers

Under Proposed Rule 15b10-3, in CONFERENCE

ON MUTUAL

FUNDS 13, 18 (P. Geer-

lings ed. 1967) (importance of investor's "psychological temperment"); Bickel, supra
note 23, at 21 (arguing that even informed individual investors have irrational prejudices, such as refusing to purchase any railroad or insurance stocks and that customers
have a natural urge to seek more than a reasonable rate of return - they want a stock
sure to go up in price, but with no risk). Investor bias against short sales is an excellent example of widespread irrationality. See generally Lease, Lewellen & Schlarbaum, Market Segmentation: Evidence on the Individual Investor, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 53.
402. Consider the following examples: "The contractual plan provides a method of
investment in equities which fits the needs and way of going of the average and small
investor .... ." Roach, supra note 38, at 145. "[T]o the extent the law permits a
manager to handle an account for a client who states his investment objectives in such
general terms as "income," "balance," "growth," and "aggressive growth," the manager's
responsibility for determining suitability is small. He needs to know little more than
the range of values along the fronter of best portfolios to which those terms ordinarily
apply. He has virtually no obligation to take into account the crucial suitability variables - the clients wealth and attitude toward changes in wealth - except perhaps those
quantities are implied by the stated objectives." Bines, Investment Objectives, supra
note 18, at 304-05.
403. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 23, at 19-21.
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nearly infinite numbers of securities. 40 4 They would also include
complex valuation of risky assets which are "securities" for purposes
of portfolio theory but are hardly listed in Moody's-land, partnership interests, insurance, and even future earnings. 40 5
Even if reliable performance data could be obtained, there is
no agreement among securities professionals or economists as to the
correct method of security analysis. 40 6 Because analysts will be
unable to reach a consensus on the ranking of all alternative portfolios, they will necessarily disagree widely about which portfolio is,
40 7
at a moment in time, optimal."

404. See, e.g., id. at 21 ("inconceivable" for "any security dealer, no matter how
large his statistical staff"); but see MSRB Notice of Filing of Fair Practice Rules, MSRB
MANuAL (CCH) ff 10,030 at 10,367 (1977), which rejects the suggestion of several
commentators that rule G-19 should "apply only to recommendations made to engage
in the purchase or sale of municipal securities generally," allowing a broker to "recommend specific securities to a customer who decided on his own to purchase muncipal
securities"; suggestion rejected in light of the "wide range of municipal securities with
varying characteristics."
405. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 389, at 1611 n.38; Comment, supra note 5, at
504-05, 508.
406. Consider, for example, the alarm sometimes expressed that suitability doctrine
threatens "to completely preclude the use of a pure technical (chartist) approach to
market interpretation." Investor Protection, supra note 30, pt. 2, at 821 (statement
of R. Burnside). See also Rice, supra note 117, at 576-77; Brudney, supra note 111,
at 254 (prepared statement of V. Brudney) ("To foresee a need for familarity with
primary sources immediately poses at least two challenges - what about the small
retail broker who relies on market letters or reports and conversations with persons
he considers reliable; and what about chartists, who predict their advice on market
configurations?"). Cf. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 488
n.7 (suitability doctrine does not "attempt to provide a standard for evaluating various
systems of analyzing securities or the decisions made as a result of such analysis").
In one response to a request for a no-action letter, the SEC did at least hint that a
"technical" or "chartist" investment approach would be looked upon unfavorably with
regard to suitability. See SEC Investment Company Act No-Action Letter, § 3(a),
John G. Kinnard & Co., Oct. 30, 1973, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP'.
(CCH) ff 79,662 (1973). A broker requested a no-action letter concerning a plan
to solicit customers' investments in margin accounts of $15,000 or more which would
be managed primarily according to various market indices, with an emphasis on short
selling. The broker represented that customers would "be selected on the basis of
present investment activities and will be immediately screened to determine the suitability of the service to their investment capabilities and objectives." Id. at 83,793.
The SEC responded that "the use of margin accounts and short selling would not be
suitable for clients who are not financially able to sustain the risks inherent in their
use," and that "very thorough screening" was required because many customers "willing and able" to invest $15,000 "may nevertheless be unsuitable prospects." Id. at
83,789.
407. Cohen, supra note 389, at 1621.
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A third difficulty is the radically time-bounded nature of every
complex calculation of optimality. At the next instant, the customer,
the securities, and the transaction costs will all have changed, and
in theory, the calculation will have to be undertaken anew.
Two final objections which may be raised are the great complexity of the calculations needed to derive the optimal portfolio,
and the uncertainty expressed in the relevant literature as to the
0
value of simplified methodologies.4 S
Useful Insights
If portfolio theory seems woefully impractical as an ideal, it nevertheless conveys important insights for suitability judgments. Its
counsel that specific transactions cannot be assessed outside the context of the investor's entire portfolio seems incontestable. Portfolio
theory serves to disprove the universal validity of statements that
"[s]peculative securities . .. are obviously unsuitable for some customers" or that mutual funds meet "a demand for an equity instrument suitable for the investment of small and medium savings
floWS."409

Anyone with money to invest, however little he has to invest
and however risk-averse he may be, may attain an optimal riskreturn posture via a portfolio containing a highly speculative stock.
Because of covariance, a single transaction exchanging a much lowerrisk security for a highly speculative stock can decrease overall riskper-unit-of-return. Conversely, such "safe," "well-diversified" holdings as mutual funds 4 10 may be worse for a portfolio than a mix
of speculative stocks and Treasury bills. These insights and the principles of optimal diversification undermine transaction-specific notions of suitability 41i and any rules of thumb applied to the "timid
408. See, e.g., Elton, Gruber & Padberg, Simple Criteria for Optimal Portfolio SeOn the great expense of calculating an optimal portlection, 31 J. FIN. 1341 (1976).
folio, see Pozen, supra note 389, at 941-42.
409. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 898; SPEC AL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 145. For
a suggestion that "suboptimization" - the application of portfolio theory without strict
adherence to all of its more costly or difficult steps - still offers a preferable means
of selecting investments, see Note, Fiduciary Standards, supra note 389, at 971 n.66.
410. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 179.
411. "To the extent that ambiguity exists regarding the meaning of risk suitability,
the suitability rule may have induced brokers to avoid the recommendation of efficient
investments." Cohen, supra note 389, at 1611. The possible incoherence of "talking
about the suitability of each individual purchase or sale" was adverted to in 1964 in
O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 95 (prepared statement of T. O'Boyle).
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widow" or the "aggressive young speculator. " 412 Similarly, they undermine the rationale of rules like proposed options rule 9b-2 that
rest partly on the assumption that all unusually risky investments

must be surrounded by government-imposed barriers to restrict them
to the few who are risk-prone and rich enough to absorb losses. 4 13
It does not seem unfair to apply the less mechanical, less simplistic, and less inaccurate tests of portfolio theory to the securities indus-

try. "Financial planning" services 41 4 offered by industry members are
guided by suitability rules containing references to "other security
holdings" 41 5 and imposing, in the view of some, an obligation to

match transactions to the investment profile of the customer. Of
course, it is no less fair to bar "the customer whose total portfolio
412. Cohen, supra note 389, at 1611.
413. See Bryant, Proposed SEC Option Rules, 6 REv. SEc. REG. 883, 886 (1973).
See, e.g., Maidenberg, Commodities: A Role for Futures in a Managed Portfolio, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1977, at 33, col. 1. Rules of thumb carry errors of exclusion as well
as inclusion. Although rule 9b-2 treats as highly risky transactions that in context
may be risk-minimizing, the fact that a situation is not singled out by a special rule
can also be misleading: "The fact that a client satisfies a presumptive standard may
be taken as tantamount to a determination that the risk involved in an investment program is appropriate for the client. Yet such a conclusion does not automatically follow." Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, at 282 n.16. Examples abound
of the poor formulation of suitability rules when tested against portfolio theory. Rule
15c2-5, putting in the broker's hands the responsibility to pass, according to some
notion of objective suitability, on the appropriateness of non-routine loan transactions,
singles out borrowing from the broker as especially risky notwithstanding the fact that
suitability theory suggests leveraging can be a vital step in attaining an optimal riskreturn posture. Another irrationality from the vantage point of portfolio theory is the
imposition of special suitability requirements on "speculative low-priced securities" in
the NASD policy statement. See text accompanying note 35 supra. As noted in
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities,supra note 60, at 461 n.47, price has no necessary relation to risk.
Of course, such rules can always be defended on the ground that "unskilled use"
of certain "tools of investment management" is especially hazardous. Bines, Investment Objectives, supra note 18, at 433. But the question is whether the various rules
that have evolved are so overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to portfolio suitability as to call for their replacement by more accurate standards.
414. See, e.g., SPECrAL STuDY, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 245-56; id., pt. 4, at 206;
Haight & Co., 44 S.E.C. 481, 484-85 (1971), aff'd mem., Nos. 23,244, 23,246 & 711136 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1971) (unreported opinion), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058
(1972).
415. Letter from SEC Division of Market Regulation to NASD, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. Rr-P. (CCH) ff 79,810, at 84,194 (1974). See also Kripke, supra
note 389, at 306 ("The suitability of a particular investment should be considered not
on its individual merits alone but on its contribution to the diversification and the
risk of the total portfolio. There is no reflection of that kind of thinking in the securities legislation to date.").
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is being managed [from] attack[ing] selectively only the loss transactions as unsuitable."416
Furthermore, the fact that a rigorous application of portfolio
theory to every transaction subject to suitability scrutiny would be
entirely unworkable does not weaken the possible relevance of portfolio theory as the source of a standard of care to which brokers
must adhere. Little commentary on the suitability doctrine has been
directed to the problem of standard of care. Of course, the "rules
by their terms establish a reasonable basis standard - a negligence
standard.."417 Those commentators who have remarked on the problem have tended to argue that a malpractice standard should be applied. 418 A malpractice standard, however, would provide little incentive for the industry to move closer to the portfolio theory ideal.
416. Lipton, supra note 1, at 279 (footnote omitted) (prepared statement of M.
Lipton) (discussing count in complaint in Trustees v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc., Civ. No. 71-C686 (S.D. Ind. 1971), later withdrawn, which made such an attack); see also Bines, Portfolio Theory, supra note 18, at 763-67 (also discussing
Trustees v. Donaldson); Nichols, supra note 60, at 438-39 n.24 (same); Belliveau,
Discretion or Indiscretion, Institutional Investor, Aug. 1972, at 65 (same).
417. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 901 n.139.
418. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 287 (remarks of M. Lipton); Leavell, supra
note 60, at 1584; Rice, supra note 117, at 554, 556-61; cf. Comment, supra note 5,
at 527 (liability should not be imposed if "every reasonable effort" made to insure
suitability, but as there are "many 'gray' areas in the suitability concept" it should
"be imposed cautiously, on a case-by-case basis"). Recall, also, the very deferential
malpractice standard applied in the Gleit case, see text accompanying notes 353-56
supra.
Other commentators have advocated "reasonableness" or "reasonable business
judgment" standards which suggest greater leniency than a malpractice standard. See,
e.g., Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MICH. L. REV. 680, 742
(1964) (standard would presumably be one of reasonableness and good faith); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 474-75 ("[A broker should]
only be found to have violated his responsibility if no reasoning brokers would have
recommended the particular security to the particular customer in light of information
about the customer which the broker-dealer knew or should have known."). Mundheim
has particularly stressed the vital importance of encouraging more meaningful communication between broker and customer. Id. at 479; see also 5A A. Jacobs, supra
note 6, § 211.01[b] at pp. 9-41 to 9-43, 9-45; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 905.
Another commentator has suggested that only recklessness along the lines of
tort-law gross negligence ought to result in sanctions against a broker. Investor
Protection, supra note 30, pt. 2, at 821 (statement of R. Burnside). Bickel takes a
similar position, noting "mistakes in judgment must be distinguished from mistakes
in motive." He adds that "a committee of persons active in the securities business"
is the appropriate disciplinary body because such persons "are best able to judge the
actions and motives of other dealers and the seriousness of any guilt." Bickel, supra
note 23, at 30. He also suggests an additional barrier to liability: "tt]be entire pattern of a dealer's recommendations and transactions must be judged and not an isolated
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As Professor Victor Brudney has observed: "The customs or practices of the trade might be sufficient to define standards of appropriate - or non-negligent - behavior in many professions or established
But the securities legislation contemplates alteration
trades . .
of those customs and practices in the securities industry in the interest of affording greater protection to investors." 41 9
Concededly, many of the underpinnings of portfolio theory are
still in dispute. On the other hand, assume a broker, after careful
inquiry into the customer's holdings and objectives, recommends and
sells a conservative security to an investor with conservative holdings
and conservative investment goals. Under present authority, the
transaction seems beyond reproach. But should the broker be subject to no duty of care to consider the portfolio impact of the transaction? It is submitted that the principles of portfolio theory would

serve the purposes of suitability doctrine by providing more accurate
guidance in measuring inappropriate risk levels than any of the existing rules of thumb for special situations or particular categories of
securities. In addition, portfolio theory principles would provide a
greater measure of certainty for the application of suitability rules
because, notwithstanding the admonition in 1963 that "what constitutes 'reasonable grounds' [for belief in suitability under the NASD

rule] would remain uncertain until expounded by the Commission
and courts in case-by-case adjudication," 420 little progress has since
421
been made.
account or transactions [sic] unless the evidence of guilt is beyond question of doubt."
Id. Cf. Note, Securities Law-Exchange Liability Under Section 6(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 - Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., 18 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 580 (1977) (discussing standards of care for stock exchanges in enforcing their rules).
Any development of a standard of care for brokers under suitability rules must
take account of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which held that
a private plaintiff must prove intentional, or perhaps reckless, conduct in order to
recover under rule 10b-5. See also Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d
38, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1978) (permitting recovery for reckless conduct). To the extent
that suitability obligations are imposed under the antifraud rubric, as in rule 15c2-5,
Hochfelder is a serious obstacle to the evolution of a negligence-based standard of
care. See Carlson, The Legal Standards by Which Money Managers are Measured Malpractice in the Management of Money, in COUNSELING THE INVESTmENT ADvisEu
359, 366-67 (D. Butowsky & R. Carlson eds. 1977).
419. Brudney, supra note 111, at 254-55 n.46. See also Kroll, supra note 329,
at 40 (lawyers "must see to it that the suitability standards actually followed provide
a 'margin for error' - one that will accommodate the gradual increase in standards").
420. Comment, supra note 317, at 1430.
421. "[A]s in other fields, we can expect the prevailing industry practices to con-
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The economic analysis on which portfolio theory is based posits
a fully subjective idea of suitability - the preferences to be served
by selecting the optimal portfolio are those of the customer. Portfolio theory can also, however, provide the means of achieving risk/
return levels dictated by an objective idea of suitability. For example, if there were a public anti-gambling policy prohibiting investors from bearing overall risk-per-unit-of-return above a certain level,
application of the theory would establish when a portfolio exceeded
the permitted level. Such an anti-gambling policy might be grounded
purely in paternalistic motives or might rest on more sophisticated
grounds. In either case, portfolio theory (with an adjustment to the
index for measuring risk) would indicate when overall portfolio risk
of loss exceeded the standard, even though the actual development
of the theory was based on a conception of rational behavior which
envisions all risks as potentially subject to compensation by sufficient
422
expected returns.
D. A Recapitulation of Themes
Rather in the fashion of a cindma-v&rit documentary, the Article
to this point essayed to depict as faithfully as possible the complex,
fragmented and inconsistent development of the suitability doctrine.
It sought to communicate the unfolding process of the doctrine's development, difficult to describe adequately in direct generalizations.
Whatever static suitability doctrine has existed at any particular time
is best described as an unintegrated kaleidoscope of authorities having in common only the central, ill-defined word "suitability."
tribute substantially to the standards below which the broker-dealer cannot safely fall.
A major difficulty in applying this principle is that the industry standards are elusive."
Rice, supra note 117, at 560. "The SEC decisions have never articulated any explicit criteria for determining whether a recommendation involves a risk that is unsuitable for the customer in question." Cohen, supra note 389, at 1628 n.77.
An attack on portfolio theory as a source of suitability doctrine should not be
made on the ground that its rigorous application requires drawing distinctions beyond
the competence of brokers and regulators. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 287
(remarks of A. Fleischer, Jr.). The issue is whether it provides some standards for
detecting inappropriate investments which are usable and enforceable and which are
more accurate than those of present doctrine.
422. An argument that the various provisions of law governing risky investments
should reflect this rationality axiom is advanced in Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, supra note 389. Two commentators have already advanced detailed suggestions for practical rules incorporating insights of portfolio theory into suitability
obligations. See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 448; Cohen,
supra note 389.
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Some major themes have emerged from the kaleidoscope of authorities. This section will demonstrate that they are the product of
a single issue: how the law should define and how it should treat
the customer's voluntary investment decision. Even if, however, a
certain coherence can thereby be imposed on these themes, a caveat
should be entered. There is a certain amount of risk in proposing
any structure designed to order these themes because any premature
structuring may misconceive and divert attention from a natural evolution of suitability, a doctrine which has already asserted itself in a
variety of contexts as "a major philosophical theme underlying the
federal securities laws." 423

The student of legal change may well

perform his or her most important service simply by placing evidences
424
of change in a clear order and allowing them to speak undistorted.
Some of the issues encountered above are recapitulated below.4 2Recommendation Only, or All Transactions?

A suitability requirement could be applied to only those broker
recommendations that are followed by the customer. In the alternative it might be applied to all recommendations, to all transactions,
or to both. It could even be applied to a broker's failure to recommend transactions or to execute them in discretionary accounts. 426
The language of the NASD rule by its terms applies only to recommendations, 427 and the NASD has suggested that it is applicable
whether or not the recommendation is followed. 428 Several other
suitability rules address only recommendations. 429 Although the

NASD has fought to restrict the application of its rule to recommen-

423. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
424. See M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TImE 49-63 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson
trans. 1962); E. HusSEaL, PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF PHILOSOPHY (Q. Lauer
trans. 1965). These philosophers propound the phenomenological method of investigation whereby "expansion is accomplished by an accumulation of discoveries, not
by an organic growth of scientific thinking as such." Id. at 38.
425. Illustrative instances of each theme's appearance will be given.
426. See Hed-Hofmann, supra note 20, at 202-03 & n.74. Contra, Comment, supra
note 5, at 540 n.140.
427. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
428. See note 51 & accompanying text supra.
429. E.g., The NASD rule on brokerage firm securities discussed at note 39 supra;
the basic options rule at notes 124-26 & accompanying text; the proposed limited price
options rules at notes 130-39 & accompanying text; and rule 15b10-3 at note 46 &
accompanying text. See notes 39, 45, 124-39, and 202-07 & accompanying text supra.
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dations, 430 the options rules for uncovered calls and offsetting puts4 3'
apply to all transactions, and rule 15c2-5, governing customer borrowing, 432 applies to recommendations and transactions. NYSE materials also suggest that exchange members' suitability obligations
extend beyond recommendations. 4 33 The SEC has twice suggested
that the law of suitability should eventually encompass nonrecom434
mended executions.
Theoretically, the wider coverage of rule 15c2-5 and the special
options rules for uncovered calls and offsetting puts can be justified
by factors not universal to the suitability doctrine. Rule 15c2-5 concerns those transactions in which, because the broker is a lender,
there is a special danger of overreaching. The options rules involve
transactions with exceptionally high risk for the endorsing broker as
well as the customer.4 35 As a general proposition, however, focusing
on recommendations is sensible only if one assumes that the protection of the suitability doctrine is unnecessary when the broker acts
as an order clerk. This assumption in turn must rest on the premise
that a customer capable of independently deciding to initiate a specific transaction should have his decision honored. Under a fully objective concept of suitability, however, customer free choice is irrelevant, and it makes little sense to distinguish between recommendations and unsolicited orders; either activity could leave the customer with an objectively unsuitable security. An empirical argument might be made that the distinction is rational because, for some
reason, customers initiating their own orders in fact tend to request
transactions that are objectively suitable. There is, however, no
reason to limit the protection of the objective version of the suitability doctrine to the customer who has had the benefit of a broker's
advice.
The SEC has intimated that order clerk transactions should be
subject to some, perhaps less stringent, suitability requirement than
that applied to recommendations. The objective view of suitability
is not the only theory consistent with this position, however. A sub430. See
431. See
432. See
433. See
434. See
576 n.209.
435. See

note 37 & accompanying text supra.
notes 135-36, 143 & accompanying text supra.
notes 84-87 & accompanying text supra.
notes 70-71 & accompanying text supra.
note 154 & accompanying text supra. But see Rice, supra note 117, at
note 137 & accompanying text supra.
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jective approach to suitability rules envisions their function as ensuring that the broker recommend a security suited to the customer's
own preferences. The goal is that the broker (a) understand the
customer's preferences and (b) recommend accordingly. The basic
cases in the "knowingly unsuitable" category of SEC decisions 3 6
were directed at the second point: the brokers had made recommendations contrary to the customers' expressed preferences. Cases
like Greenberg437 were arguably directed at the first point: without
some inquiry, the broker could not know the customer's desires. Beyond the question of whether there was any meaningful communication between customer and broker, the problem of understanding the
customer's preferences may contain another element, depending on
how one defines customer free choice. That element is whether the
customer has fully understood his own preferences, in light of the
alternatives offered by the market. Even with a subjective view of
suitability, if the idea of free customer decisionmaking requires that
the customer has understood reasonably well his own investment objectives and has appropriately matched those objectives to the "intricate merchandise" 438 available for investment, then logically an
order clerk broker should obtain assurances that the customer has
gone through this process. 4 30 Only empirical evidence which proves
that customers who seek no investment advice have already made
fully knowledgeable choices might refute the logic of imposing such

a duty of inquiry.
Even if it were clear that only recommendations were covered
by the suitability doctrine, the need to decide when a recommendation is legally present 4 0 would still remain. Dramatic illustration
436. See notes 260-83 & accompanying text supra.
437. See notes 314-19 & accompanying text supra.
438. H. R. RaPr. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
439. See Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D.
Iowa 1975), where the court held: "Without disclosure of the facts essential to a
margin purchase, a customer may express a preference for a risk which he does not
really understand and which he, if fully informed, might not be willing to undertake.
On the other hand, if an investor persisted in requesting an unsuitable margin investment, the broker could effectuate the sale provided he discloses the facts essential for
the purchaser to make an informed decision." See note 369 supra.
440. For a comprehensive study of this question in the context of the know-yoursecurity duty, see Rice, supra note 117, at 547-54. Note the SEC's statement that
under rule 15b10-3, "it is not intended that a general distribution of a market letter,
research report or other similar material would in itself constitute a recommendation." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967), [1966-1967
Transfer Binder] FED. SE . L. REP. (CCH) ff 77,459 (1967).
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of this issue is seen in the juxtaposition of the Rolf and Parsons decisions - the Rolf court declaring that the "broker must not allow
his silence to be taken as a recommendation " 44 1 and the Parsons court
strictly limiting the NASD rule to express recommendations.4 42 SEC
no-action letters suggest an ambiguous middle ground, as illustrated
by the Commission's rejection of the argument that suitability obligations do not apply to proposals to make securities conveniently
available on a payroll deduction plan but not to recommend them
in terms.

443

The definition of recommendation should be shaped by the policies underlying the suitability obligation. We have seen that even
under a subjective view, the recommendation/no recommendation
line could be valid only (a) because it is based on an independent
value accorded to free customer choice in the very narrow sense of
autonomous action, or (b) because there is a well-grounded empirical
sense that customer-initiated orders are suitable. Both of the above
criteria would suggest, if the subjective view is adopted, that the SEC
no-action letters correctly construed the payroll plans as recommendations, because the transactions under those plans would not
have been truly customer-initiated.
Is Reliance an Element?
Silence may be a recommendation when, as in Rolf, the customer relies on the broker's judgment as a check on his own, or his
agent's, investment choices. The uncertainty in the suitability doctrine as to whether reliance is an element is also related directly to
the question of free choice. As noted above, the only reason to require genuine reliance as a prerequisite to a suitability violation is
to vindicate the value of free choice as formal autonomy. Requiring
genuine reliance denies protection in all cases in which the customer
actually makes up his own mind. An objective notion of suitability,
and any subjective theory that goes at all beyond purely formal autonomy, require some degree of intervention by the broker, if only
to ensure that the customer is acting correctly to satisfy his own
preferences. Both theories thus implicitly abandon reliance as an

441.
442.
443.

See note 349 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 357-59 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 335-41 & accompanying text supra.
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element of a suitability violation or convert it into a partial or total

fiction.

444

The latter course is advocated by Mundheim and Fishman.
Fishman would erect a rebuttable presumption of reliance even in
order clerk situations. 445 This course may not go far enough, however, if the suitability rules are envisioned as assuring either objective
suitability or a full exploration with the customer of the mechanics
of his free choice.
Of course, there can be varying degrees of reliance. From a
standpoint that looks beyond the surface indicia of autonomy, a paradox as to the importance of reliance should be noted. Some customers may be totally unable to make intelligent investment decisions, even with help in the form of factual information and assistance
in analysis of that information. 446 Presumably, under the subjective
view of suitability a broker managing the discretionary account of
such a customer must work with whatever imperfect knowledge he
can obtain about the customer's preferences; but such a responsibility
vindicates a customer's free choice only in the most abstract sense.
On the other hand, when a customer is capable of selecting appro444. This statement is subject to a caveat similar to that entered in the discussion
of recommendations. It was noted there that delimiting the suitability obligation according to a recommendation - no recommendation line could be defended on empirical
grounds as tending to isolate the cases where unsuitability is most likely. This, it
was argued, could be true on either an objective or a subjective theory of suitability.
The reliance - no reliance line simply excludes one group given protection by
the recommendation line: those who receive a recommendation, but ultimately make
up their own mind. The argument seems strong that this group would be as or more
likely to end up with suitable transactions (on either the objective or the subjective
view) as those who receive no recommendation at all. Thus, the caveat applies with
equal or greater force here.
445. Both Mundheim and Fishman conclude that the suitability rules do not (and
in their view should not) apply to the pure "order clerk" relationship. See Mundheim,
supra note 60, at 450 (would apparently require broker to prove nonreliance, however,
even in "order clerk" situation); Fishman, supra note 54, at 240 ("[tlhe broker-dealer
can, of course, rebut the presumption [of reliance] by showing that he was merely an
order clerk"), 248 ("[b]eyond [Fishman's proposed] standards the broker-dealer would
be no more than an order clerk to whom the suitability rule would not apply"). See
also Lipton, supra note 1, at 280 n.24 (prepared statement of M. Lipton) (because
NASD and SECO rules address recommendations, "one may contend that the suitability
doctrine does not apply to the execution of unsolicited orders"); Brudney, supra note
111, at 271-72 ("[I]n the litigation surrounding the suitability rule the notion that
civil damages require reliance by the customer is clearly growing, notwithstanding the
fact that the broker may well have violated the suitability norm."). But see Rediker,
supra note 47, at 25 n.51; Cohen, supra note 389, at 1605.
446. See note 401 supra.
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priate investments and there is less reliance on the broker's own recommendations, it may be even more important, under a subjective
theory of suitability, to enforce the broker's duty. That is, when a
customer needs only technical assistance to realize his preferences
or is missing only one or two pieces to complete the puzzle leading
to fully informed choice, it is especially crucial, under the subjective
view, that the broker competently assist him. The broader the customer's sphere of reliance, the less crucial broker suitability obligations become in the maintenance of meaningful customer choice.
Can the Customer Ratify Suitability?
In Philips & Co.,44 7 the customers' expressed beliefs that their
purchases were suitable did not protect the broker against disciplinary action; yet, in Phillips448 and Bocock, 449 an inferred belief in suitability was enough to bar liability. An apparent explanation is the
differing in knowledge and sophistication of the customers involved.
A sophisticated investor is presumed to have competently calculated
suitability regardless of later protestations, while the novice can admit that he sincerely believed the investment was suitable at the time
and yet still recover. This maxim is undermined, however, by the
Rolf decision4 50 in which a sophisticated investor who closely followed his account became the first plaintiff ever to recover civil
damages in federal court for a suitability violation.
Mundheim would absolve the broker of culpability if he first advised against an unsuitable transaction and then made a specific recommendation only when the customer (a) persisted in requesting
a recommendation and perhaps also (b) signed a statement to that
effect. 4 51 Cohen essentially agrees with that position,4a 2 as do the
Twomey decision 453 and the proposed MSRB rule. 54 Many regulators and commentators require or advise that customers sign ratifications of suitability. 455 On the other hand, the commentators worry
447. 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
See notes 263-72 & accompanying text supra.
448. See notes 362-63 & accompanying text supra.
449. See notes 364-69 & accompanying text supra.
450. See notes 343-52 & accompanying text supra.
451. Mundheim, supra note 39, at 473 n.83.
452. Cohen, supra note 389, at 1622 n.64. See also Nichols, supra note 60, at
437 n.21.
453. See notes 374-79 & accompanying text supra.
454. See text accompanying notes 195-208 supra.
455. See, e.g., NASD News, March 1970, at 4: "If the customer refuses to accept
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that executing a transaction for a customer who refuses the broker's
advice and insists that his desired transaction is suitable4se or who
refuses to provide the suitability information the broker is required
to obtain 457 may expose the broker to liability.
Can order be brought to this chaos? Once again, a correct position depends on whether customer choice is relevant to suitability
at all and, if so, how it should be defined. A purely objective theory
gives no place to customer choice. Cohen attempts to explain his
simultaneous advocacy of an objective, prudent-person risk threshold
with which transactions must normally comply and investor freedom
to disregard brokers' warnings, by arguing that, as most investors
are prudent at heart, a warning will suffice and a prohibition is unnecessary. 458 Aside from the fact that he offers no evidence that investors' actual preferences satisfy his ideal of prudence, Cohen fails
to explain why even one investor should be allowed to act imprudently. "Consumer sovereignty" cannot, as he suggests, be the answer
unless it is somehow inconsistent with consumer sovereignty to force
investors to act against their preferences but consistent with it to
encourage them to do so.
From the standpoint of a subjective theory, it is necessary to distinguish a signed statement from a sincere customer belief in suitability. A signed statement in itself ought to prove nothing. A broker's obligation to determine whether a transaction is subjectively
suitable may be designed to cause the broker to make certain inquiries of his customers. Through these inquiries the broker would
determine whether each customer's superficially free choices are consistent with the particular customer's own purposes. In addition, a
subjective suitability obligation may be imposed to encourage customer communication with the broker that improves the customer's
understanding of his goals and of the market alternatives. A difficult
the broker's advice, we suggest that the broker compose a statement containing his
reasons for objecting to the investment and mentioning that his firm will not be responsible for the possible consequences of the customer's actions. He should then have
the investor carefully read the statement and sign it in the presence of a notary public.
This should be done prior to the transaction. The broker, of course, has the alternative of refusing the customer's business." See also notes 70 & 290 supra; Goodman,
New Issues - SEC "Hot Issues" Releases: Areas of Concern and Impact Upon Underwriters of New OTC Issues, in THE OVEa-THE-CouNTERa MARKEr PLACE: MYTHS,
MysE-ms_ AN MEcmAmcs 235, 242-43 (R. Kirschberg ed. 1974).
456. See for example note 455 supra.
457. See note 133 & accompanying text supra (limited price options proposal).
458. Cohen, supra note 389, at 1622 n.64.
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problem is posed when, after these inquiries, the customer persists
in a choice the broker views as inconsistent with the customer's own
investment objectives. On one hand, to allow brokers to execute
such an order will encourage them, whenever customers present orders, to perform only the most cursory investigation, if any, and then
say, "I advise against this transaction, but sign here, and I am permitted to execute your order anyway." On the other hand, once a
serious dialogue has occurred, to prohibit the transaction suggests that
the broker understands the customer's subjective preferences better
than the customer does. Of course, the problem may be that the
customer has an opinion about the market with which the broker disagrees; but perhaps the law should be even more reluctant to enshrine brokers' concepts of the best investment strategy than to make
controlling brokers' concepts of their customers' own preferences.
Unless the purpose of suitability doctrine is to protect mere formal autonomy, a customer who refuses to provide information about
himself is a less appealing candidate for the protection of the doctrine than a customer who declines advice that his choice is irrational.
If no constitutional barriers exist, the legislature or its regulatory delegates ought to be able to act in a citizen's own interests by compromising the value of strict confidentiality to the value of informed
investor choice. One might argue that, if the goal of the suitability
doctrine is to preserve free choice, an investor should be able to waive
his own protection. Free investor choice is itself a matter of public
policy, however. Many protective public policies may not be waived
by their beneficiaries, in part to prevent coercion from taking place,
and in part to avoid disputes as to the knowing and voluntary quality
of waivers.

4 59

Finally, it should be noted that the version of subjective suitability that would require the broker to have a reasonable conviction
that the customer is achieving his own goals in a particular transaction might or might not allow the judgments of a sophisticated or
knowledgeable customer to go unquestioned and to serve as a prima
facie ratification of suitability, as did the Phillips and Bocock courts.
Even these customers would surely sometimes benefit from discussing
their decisionmaking processes with brokers, but as their need for
459. Some commentators have voiced concern as to the possible legal consequences
to a broker who refused to deal with a customer demanding service despite suitability
warnings. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 455, at 342; Buxbaum, supra note 218, at
3, col. 1 & n.2.
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the protection of the suitability doctrine is less than that of other
customers, their exclusion could be justified as an accommodation to
the industry's interest in minimizing burdensome regulation.
Duty to Inquire
The single most bruited issue of suitability doctrine is whether
the broker has a duty to inquire into the customer's situation. In
the event of an affirmative answer, a corollary issue concerns what
information he must secure.
The NASD rule, with its reference to the broker's belief in suitability "upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by [the] customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs,"' 460 could be interpreted to mean that the broker must
inquire into these matters 4 1' but may form his judgment of suitability
on the basis of whatever information he has if the customer refuses
to answer any or all of his inquiries. The NASD policy statement,
however, recognizes a duty of inquiry only in the case of recommendations of "speculative low-priced securities"; 462 it is apparently a
response to the Special Study's recommendation of guidelines concerning "indiscriminate recommending or selling of specific securities
to other than known customers.."463 In explaining the policy statement to NASD members, the Board of Governors specifically denied
that the rule imposes a general duty of inquiry,4 64 though noting
cryptically that under the rule, "in certain circumstances more information might well be necessary." 46 5 The court in Parsons466 was
willing to take literally the NASD's disclaimer of any responsibility
to inquire.
Several of the other suitability rules explicitly impose a duty to
inquire but differ as to whether the broker must document his inquiries and what information is required. The NASD's rule governing the sale of securities in a broker's own firm4 67 does require documentation and refers to "information furnished" by the customer con460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., S.

See
See
See
See
See
See

JAFFE,

supra note 110, at 250.

text accompanying note 35 supra.
text accompanying note 28 supra.
note 37 & accompanying text supra.
note 52 & accompanying text supra.
notes 351-361 & accompanying text supra.
note 39 supra.
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cerning his "investment objectives, financial situation, and needs."
The NASD "hot issue" proposal 46s was identical. Rule 15b10-3 469 refers to the same information and speaks of "reasonable inquiry" but
does not require documentation. Rule 15c2-5 470 calls for documentation and requires flatly that the broker obtain information concerning
the customer's financial situation and needs" but says nothing about
"investment objectives." The NYSE apparently imposes a variable
duty depending on the degree of customer reliance.
Under any conception of suitability, other than the particular
subjective view that would uphold all formally autonomous customer
choices by placing them entirely outside the reach of the broker's
duty, some inquiry is necessary. Under the objective view, the broker must secure whatever information is necessary to apply the particular objective formula. Mundheim's and Cohen's risk threshold
formulas, which focus on ability to bear losses,4 7 2 would call for an
inquiry into the customer's financial obligations, assets, and perhaps
lifestyle. Unlike Cohen's proposed rules, which pursue subjective
suitability once the objective prudent person threshold has been satisfied, a purely objective rule would require no inquiry into the
customer's personal investment objectives.
Portfolio theory posits that transactions cannot be assessed in
vacuo. Thus any suitability construct which adopts the insights of
portfolio theory must require a complete inquiry into the customer's
assets and net worth. A doctrine seeking to encourage informed
customer decisions must also require an inquiry designed to ascertain
the customer's indifference curves. Once it is resolved whether a
duty of inquiry follows from any particular suitability theory and
what information a broker must obtain under that theory, all the
remaining issues concern the mechanics of the inquiry, which are a
function of the standard of care adopted, rather than basic doctrine.
"Per Se Unsuitability" and Contextual Unsuitability
Several of the practices singled out by the NASD policy statement and the SEC decisions, such as churning and mutual fund switching, are per se unsuitable. A variant on the idea of per se unsuit468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

See
See
See
See
See

note 163 & accompanying text supra.
text accompanying notes 45 & 49 supra.
text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
text accompanying note 67 supra.
notes 284-94 & accompanying text supra.
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ability is the presumptive suitability standard which requires that
customers entering into particular transactions satisfy standards of
income, net worth, or tax bracket. Such standards were proposed
by the NASD for tax-sheltered investments 4 73 and are applied by
some brokerage firms to options customers.4 74 A presumptive standard rests on the judgment that the investment in question could be
suitable only for those meeting it. 475 The underlying notion of all
per se unsuitability rules is that no rational person would choose to
enter one of these per se unsuitable transactions. Such rules need
not be concerned with a particular individual's investment preferences. Some presumptive standards may be rebuttable, but only
because the variety of possible situations means that their terms may
fail to draw universally valid lines around spheres of irrational behavior, not because a particular person might prove that losing money
is good for him.
In one sense such per se rules restrict customer free choice, but
only in the most inoffensive sense. They constitute objective suitability rules because they impose some concept of suitability other
than that of the individual customer. They are a very special case
of objective suitability, however, because this objective model is
based on rationality rather than wisdom or prudence. To be denied
the freedom to act in a way that could only entail an economic loss
is considerably less intrusive than to be denied the freedom to act
in a way that the state has decided merely is imprudent. Indeed,
although portfolio theory is often thought of as incorporating a purely
subjective notion of suitability, because its aim is to satisfy investor
preferences, the very assumptions behind the indifference curves do
not comprehend behavior which is actually economically irrational.
Yet the NASD, at least, has vacillated in its endorsement of even this
476
minimal modification of the definition of voluntary customer action.
Objective and Subjective Suitability
The concepts of objective and subjective suitability were introduced 477 as a helpful tentative dichotomy to use in tracing the chang473.
474.
475.
shelters
476.
477.

See notes 166-81 & accompanying text supra.
See note 147 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 287 (remarks of A. Fleischer, fr.) (tax
or equity funding "may only make economic sense" for certain investors).
See note 290 supra.
See text accompanying notes 96-100, 116-117, 262-264 & 269-271 supra.
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ing manifestations of suitability doctrine. These categories distinguish
whether the customer's (subjective) or someone else's (objective)
values are used to determine suitability. The "someone else" could
be the state whose judgment takes the form of statutes, a fictional
prudent person whose judgments are raised to a legal standard by
the state, or a specific person, such as the broker or a guardian, whose
opinion as to suitability is made binding on the customer.
A suitability doctrine need not be exclusively subjective or exclusively objective. Even the most ardent champions of investor
freedom would be unlikely to quarrel with a requirement that the
customer choose only securities for which he is able to pay and that
the determination of that capacity be made by someone else. In fact,
such requirements are prominently featured in the NASD policy statement4 7 8 and the mutual fund industry's so-called voluntary suitability
program.4 7 9 Another mixture of subjective and objective elements
is represented by the rules based on portfolio theory proposed by
Cohen, which would serve the customer's own preferences subject
to the limiting condition that his decision comport with an objective
risk threshold. The NASD's proposed rule on tax shelters would
480
have imposed a similar limiting condition.
Aside from Cohen's modified adoption of a subjective view, the
authorities and even the commentators are remarkably silent on this
fundamental issue of whose judgment should govern. Only a few
industry spokesmen representing the investment bankers,48 1 the mutual fund industry, 482 and the Amex,4 83 have explicitly advocated a
purely subjective theory. On the other hand, only the proposed
MSRB and CFTC rules, Rule 15c2-5, 4 84 and a few cases like Powell
& McGowan,48 5 seem to take a purely objective approach, and even
they are not without ambiguity on this point.
In the vast middle ground, implications, intimations, and occasionally outright contradictions remain. 48 6 The language of certain
478. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
479. See note 37 supra.
480. See text accompanying note 168 supra.
481. See note 31 supra.
482. See note 38 supra.
483. See note 80 supra.
484. See text accompanying notes 88 & 97 supra.
485. See text accompanying notes 273-80 supra.
486. For example the Special Study treatment of suitability in mutual fund sales
was inconsistent as between subjective and objective approaches. On the one hand,
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rules and statements, such as the NASD rule on brokers' recommendations of their own securities, 48 7 the SEC's warning as to certain unsecured short-term debt securities, 4 88 and the Future Structure statement 48 9 suggests an objective view, but is not conclusive. The Special Study's recommendation that the NASD develop guidelines for

"categories or amounts of securities deemed clearly unsuitable in
specified circumstances" 490 could be either a general endorsement of
the objective view or only an endorsement of the special application
of the objective stance in the case of per se unsuitability.
As the preceding sections of this recapitulation suggest, the ap-

parently neat dichotomy created by a classification of suitability rules
as subjective or objective conceals complicated problems of how to
define and protect customer free choice. Proposed options Rule
9b-2 491 and three SEC decisions which suggest an objective view of
suitability - Philips& Co.,4 92 Powell & McGowan4 93 and Fenocchio494
- illustrate these problems.
The peculiar feature of proposed options Rule 9b-2 is that it
would impose the general requirement expressed in Rule 15b10-3 to

all options recommendations and then would single out two higherrisk subsets of this domain for special requirements of subjective cus-

tomer awareness.

Rule 9b-2(b) (2) would require, in limited price

options recommendations, "that the customer understands the special

characteristics of such option," and Rule 9b-2(c) would require, in
uncovered call and offsetting put transactions, that he be "capable of
evaluating the additional risks in such transactions."

The rule's con-

cern with the customer's state of mind in especially risky options
trades supports the inference that the general provisions of Rule 9b2(b) (1) embody the subjective view of suitability. Because special
it was emphasized that no position was being taken "concerning the desirability or
undesirability of encouraging equity investments on the part of persons of modest
means, or of any means." SPEcIAL STUDY, supra note 18, pt. 4, at 180. On the other
hand, the study concluded that there was "no doubt that a substantial number of
[contractual] plans are sold to persons for whom, because they have insufficient income
or inadequate other financial resources, they are likely to be unsuitable investments."
Id. at 207; see also id. at 144, 146, 206.
487. See note 39 supra.
488. See text accompanying notes 149-150 supra.
489. See text accompanying notes 153-155 supra.
490. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
491. See notes 121-49 & accompanying text supra.
492. See notes 263-71 & accompanying text supra.
493. See notes 273-80 & accompanying text supra.
494. See notes 281-83 & accompanying text supra.
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requirements are imposed in high risk transactions, however, it is
fair to infer that the rule's regular suitability obligations could be satisfied even though the customer cannot "understand the characteristics" of the recommended transaction or "evaluate its risks." That
a broker believes an investment meets the customer's own preferences
is not enough to protect a customer in certain high risk situations.
The special rules thus recognize that subjective suitability rules can
be more vital to the presumably sophisticated investor who engages
in high risk transactions than to a less knowledgeable investor who
relies more heavily on the broker's investment advice. In the specified high risk situations it does not adequately protect the customer
to vest the broker with the final determination of whether a customer's preferences are satisfied by the transaction. When the potential harm of an incorrect determination is great enough, it is necessary that the customer carry out the details of the process of deciding
on a suitable investment himself.
To identify Rule 9b-2's application of a subjective view of suitability only begins the analysis. The crucial factor is the nature of the
free choice being protected - a concept of free choice whose protection requires that the customer be forced to choose for himself, as
well as required to understand and consider certain factors in so
doing. To say that such a choice is free is in one sense a fiction,
but in another it is not, because ultimately the customer still decides
4 95
for himself.
The Philips & Co., Powell & McGowan and Fenocchio cases suggest other concepts of free choice that require an even more subtle
analysis to be applied with respect to subjective suitability. In the
resultant explication the subjective and objective theories threaten
to merge. Philips & Co. makes it clear that at least in certain situations the customer cannot be allowed to decide for himself. Powell
& McGowan hold that those situations may include cases in which
there is full disclosure. Fenocchio indicates that "a sophisticated
investor who had been engaging in securities transactions for over
50 years" and whose investment transactions had been made with
his "full knowledge and approval" may not decide the suitability of
his own transactions when he is elderly, lives in a rest home, and
enters into transactions that appear unwise to the SEC.
495. See Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86
nn.63 & 64 (1976).

YALE

L. J. 1, 18-20
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These cases can be explained equally well under the objective
view of suitability or under a subjective view that curtails freedom
of choice by defining fully competent and informed choice so narrowly that the result is tantamount to requiring objective suitability
in most instances. Any subjective theory that is not sterile and
meaningless will embrace a concept of free choice which requires
the broker to look to some extent beyond the formal freedom of a
customer's decision; the doctrine of duress in contract law curtails
formal freedom in the same respect. Thus, a subjective suitability
doctrine will impose some duty on the broker to ask, 'What has the

customer been told about her investment choices?," "Did she understand what she was told?," and "Is she capable of evaluating the information?" Yet, because a customer could always be more knowledgeable and sophisticated, the subjective view potentially merges
into an objective view which measures suitability against the ideally
well-informed and intelligent customer, a standard far more exacting
than the "prudent person" ideal.
E. The Cause of Action Question
The question of whether exchange and NASD rules will give rise
to a federal cause of action against brokers 496 who violate suitability
rules has been the focus of significant litigation and discussion during

the last decade. 497

The availability of such an action would provide

496. It is generally recognized that no cause of action will lie under exchange
or NASD rules except against those expressly bound by them. For example, in Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F. Supp. 244, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court
denied a cause of action, under a "Special Instruction" pursuant to NYSE rule 418,
2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ff 2418 (1976), requiring annual "surprise audits" of members,
against an auditor which allegedly failed to report to the exchange its knowledge of
fraud and mismanagement in a member firm. See also Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins
& Sullivan, 413 F. Supp. 453, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir.
1977). However, an exchange may be liable to various possible plaintiffs for failure
to enforce its own rules. See generally Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,133 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 534
F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1976).
497. In addition to the articles cited at note 515 infra, see S. JAFFE, supra note
110, §§ 10.03, 11.10; 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 6, § 10.02; E. BRODSKY, supra note 60,
at 153-77; 5 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 2887-91; Nichols, supra note 52, at 438-45;
Shipman, Implied Civil Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations of
Stock Exchange and NASD Rules, in PLI FrosT ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION 356 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr. & D. Glazer eds. 1970); MacLean,
Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENVER L.J. 63
(1970); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customers for Violation of
a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAm L. REV. 253 (1970); Allen,

ir
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additional remedies, more convenient procedures, and perhaps more
plaintiff-responsive forums than the self-regulatory agencies to which
the SEC usually defers. 4 18 The cause of action question is important
because neither the SEC nor the courts to date have read the heart
of the suitability principle 4 19 into such fraud sections as 10(b) and
15(c). The question remains unresolved 5 0 because claims based on
suitability rules are generally combined with separate claims 50 1 of
fraud or other illegality and because courts often adjudicate these
50 2
claims and avoid the suitability cause of action question.
In 1964, the SEC General Counsel stated that the NASD suitability rule generally would not give rise to civil liability: "The
concept of suitability originated with the NASD as an ethical principle. That's where it basically belongs." 50 3 On the other hand, by
1973 one commentator had concluded that "it is obvious that the law
Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules,
25 Bus. LAw. 1493 (1970); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1120 (1970); Rediker,
supra note 47; Lowenfels, Liability Under Exchange Rules, 2 REV. SEC. REG. 841
(1969); Fishman, supra note 54, at 246-47; Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Overthe-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 633 (1966); Lowenfels, Implied Liability Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66
COLUMn. L. REV. 12 (1966); Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied
Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative
Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs.
L. REV. 925 (1966); O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 99 n.11, 101 (prepared statement of
T. O'Boyle); Note, Implied Civil Liability Arising From Violation of the Rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, 8 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 151 (1975); Note,
Cvil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v. First Securities Co., 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 388 (1972); Note, Securities - Civil Liability for Violation of Exchange Rule,
24 Sw. L.J. 384 (1970); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock
Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1970); Note, Stock Exchange Rules Implied
Civil Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Breach of the "Know
Your CustomeF' Rule, 44 TuL. L. REV. 633 (1970); Comment, supra note 5, at 533-46:
Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over Private Suits Alleging Violations of Stock Exchange
Rules, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443 (1975); Comment, Civil Remedies and Stock
Exchange Rules - An Emerging Concept of Implied Liability 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 551;
Case Comment, 3 IND. L.F. 555 (1970).
498. See, e.g., Rediker, supra note 47, at 39.
499. The core of suitability theory must be distinguished from certain per se suitability violations, such as churning. See note 292 supra.
500. For a recent statement to this effect, see R. JENN NCS & H. MARSH, supra note
42, at 693.
501. See text accompanying notes 328-332 supra.
502. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
503. O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 103 (remarks of P. Loomis, Jr.). But see E.
WEIsS, supra note 115, at 184-85.
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is moving in the direction of finding a suitabilty responsibility on the
part of brokers for which they will be held civilly liable to their
damaged customers." 50 4 A survey of the case law will demonstrate
that while there is some movement toward a middle position, the
courts remain sharply divided and this issue remains an open and
volatile one.
The Leading Cases
Two leading cases have addressed the issue of a private cause
of action under some exchange and NASD rules. In Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co.,50 5 suit was brought alleging that the defendant's imposition of an especially high margin requirement, even
though authorized in the parties' contract, violated the NYSE Constitution and Rules, the NASD By-Laws, and the NASD's general rule
requiring fair dealing. Judge Friendly noted that because the rules
arise from a self-regulatory scheme that mixes legal and ethical obligations and under which the SEC has power to supersede certain
rules it disapproves, the problem was a thorny one. He applied the
following analysis in dismissing the suit:
[T]he court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its
place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of the statute or an
SEC regulation. The case for implication would be strongest
when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common
law. The rules here at issue, however, are near the opposite pole.
Although they do impose a duty upon members not to engage in
conduct inconsistent with fair and equitable principles of trade
...they are something of a catch-all which, in addition to satisfying the letter of the statute, preserves power to discipline members for a wide variety of misconduct, including merely unethical
behavior which Congress could well not have intended to give
rise to a legal claim. We find little reason to believe that by requiring exchanges and dealers' associations to include such provisions in their rules Congress meant to impose a new legal
standard on members different from that long recognized by
state law.o6
504.

Lipton, supra note 1, at 285 (remarks of M. Lipton).

The decision whether

an exchange or NASD rule will support a cause of action generally is made as an
interpretation of § 27, the jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1970). The intricacies of whether the Exchange Act or other theories sustain
jurisdiction over a claim under NASD or exchange rules, already fully explored by the
commentators, see sources cited note 497, supra, will not be reexamined in this Article.
505. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
506. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
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A different principle was laid down in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.507 A trustee in bankruptcy for a securities firm alleged the defendant had violated NYSE Rule 405 by
allowing the firm's sole shareholder to open a cash account and enter
into transactions with converted property of the firm's customers.
On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held that
allegations of complete failure to investigate a customer made out
a federal cause of action. The court did not, however, decide that
an alleged violation of Rule 405 is actionable per se. The court noted
instead that "[a]lthough mere errors of judgment by defendant might
not support a federal cause of action, the facts alleged here are tantamount to fraud on the bankrupt's customers, thus giving rise to a
private civil damage action."' 50
The court implied that a defendant's knowledge of irregularities in a customer's dealings might also
be required for liability. Buttrey is generally cited for the principle
that a rule is actionable if it is designed to protect investors 5 9 and
if the conduct in question is "tantamount to fraud."; 10
Decisions Allowing Private Actions
The Seventh Circuit in particular, applying Buttrey, has unequivocally found in favor of a "suitability"5 1 cause of action for private
507. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
508. Id. at 142-43 (emphasis added).
509. In Neill v. David A. Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill.
1976), the
public-benefit rationale was used to reach the opposite result from Colonial Realty,
a private cause of action under the general NASD rule of fair dealing.
510. See text accompanying notes 533-540 infra. In Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 554 F.2d 790, 797 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit suggested that when
these standards are met, it might still be necessary to apply the Colonial Realty analysis
before implying a cause of action. See also SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
511. The courts have generally not distinguished between NASD and exchange
rules in considering the question, viewing Colonial Realty (in which plaintiff alleged
both NYSE and NASD violations) and Buttrey (NYSE rule) as the important precedents as to both. It has been argued, however, that a remedy "should exist with even
greater certainty and fervor . . . with reference to NASD and over-the-counter brokers,
both of whom are subject to more direct SEC regulation than are the NYSE brokers."
Comment, supra note 62, at 491 n.4. On the other hand, one court recently observed
that "the existence of a private right of action under Rule 405 does not lead to the
conclusion that there is a corresponding right under the NASD suitability rule."
Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) , 95,885, at 91,250 n.22 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (dictum); see also
Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Presumably, although the question seems never to have been tested, there would
be little doubt as to an implied cause of action under rule 15c2-5, and probably rule
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Several other courts, in deciding that various non-suitpersons.
ability self-regulatory rules will support civil damages suits, have
expressed views that would point toward a private action under suitability and know-your-customer rules. For example, in Starkman v.
Seroussi,51 3 the conclusion was reached in the Southern District of
New York that a civil suit will lie for violations of the duties to ascertain the real party in interest in a transaction and to supervise securities salespersons which NYSE Rule 405 imposes on member firms.
Suit was brought for recovery of losses sustained when a salesman
guaranteed against losses in violation of another NYSE rule. The
court allowed the cause of action and offered the following comment,
which would seem to apply equally to the suitability element of Rule
405:
is
So, too, Rule 405, here alleged to have been violated ....
precise and has among its purposes protection of the customer
qua customer. The rules here allegedly violated may be considered "an integral part in SEC regulation" in furtherance of
15blO-3. See Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities
Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORN. L.Q. 633, 637-38
(1966); cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding there is no
implied private cause of action for violation of § 14(e); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (1947) (leading cases concerning implied rights of action).
At least Exchange Act rule 15c2-5, the "equity funding" rule, as a "fraud" rule
clearly designed to protect investors and closely analogous to rule lOb-5, would likely
satisfy the Piper-Cort-Borak test. Professor Loss, writing in 1969, assumed that violation of the SECO suitability rule, would "furnish just as good a ground for implication of a private action to be decided under federal law, as violation of fraud or
proxy or margin rules." 5 Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3448; see also 6 id. at 371920; accord, 53 ALI PRocEEDiNGs 632 (1976) (remarks of Prof. Loss); Kroll, supra note
328, at 39; Fishman, supra note 54, at 247; Rediker, supra note 47, at 36. Contra,
Mundheim, supra note 60, at 468-69. On the other hand, the legislative history, see
note 40 supra, might suggest that each 15b-10 rule was to stand on a similar footing,
on the ethical-legal continuum, its analogous NASD rule. With the new restrictiveness of the Piper Court, and, indeed, the lumping of SECO rules with NASD rules
as to a private cause of action by the Code, see text accompanying notes 614-24
infra, the question of a private action under rule 15bl0-3 may well be wide open.
See also Rediker, supra note 47, at 46-47 n.146.
512. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 963 (1970); Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Ill.
1976)
1973). See also Neill v. David A. Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ill.
(permitting action under NYSE rule 405); Faturik v. Woodmere Sec., Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 943, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (semble); Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., [19721973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) II 93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (semble).
513. 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the purpose declared
in section 6(d) to "insure fair dealing and
1 14
to protect investors."

In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,5 15 the Second Circuit, which has
6
withheld judgment on the question of a suitability cause of action,l
did suggest that an action might be brought that was premised on
the defendant's NYSE Listing Agreement and the NYSE Company
Manual. Stressing the public's reliance on the exchange's reputation for stability, fair dealing, and disclosure, the court stated:
Cases involving generally broad standards of conduct and
having nothing to do with disclosure require the presence of fraud
to create a right of action under federal law, but this is because
the only action or conduct proscribed by the rule is fraudulent
conduct. Here, however, is involved a notice or notification
rule."'

To the extent that suitability rules are aimed at facilitating informed
investor choice, this reasoning indicates that a cause of action may
be derived from the rules.
Several federal courts have also expressed a willingness to hear
evidence of violations of the NASD suitability rule or NYSE Rule
405 under common law negligence claims over which pendent jurisdiction has been established.518 In a number of other cases, courts
514. Id. at 524 (footnote omitted).
515. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
See
Comment, Implication of Civil Liability under the New York Stock Exchange Rules
and Listing Agreement, 22 VILL. L. REv. 130 (1976); Comment, Implied Remedies
for Violations of Exchange Listing Agreements, 64 CEo. L.J. 925 (1976); Comment,
Securities Regulation - Expanding the Scope of the 1934 Act - The Issuer's Liability
for Failure to Comply with the NYSE Company Manual, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1251
(1976); Recent Case, Securities - Private Actions - Issuer Violation of Stock Exchange
Requirement Held "Colorable" Federal Claim; Issuers Have State Law Duty to Give
"Reasonable Notice" of Call to Holders of Convertible Debentures, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1016 (1976).
516. See text accompanying note 350 supra.
517. 520 F.2d at 1382 n.16. Note, however, the emphasis in Heine v. Signal Cos.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
on the fact than Van Gemert only decided that a sufficient colorable claim under federal law existed to support pendent jurisdiction over the issues that ultimately disposed of the case.
518. See, e.g., Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ( 96,251, at 92,679 (D. Ore. 1977);
Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Mahony v.
Reynolds Sec., Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,354
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (also Amex rule); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202.
1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A. C. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160,
1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969; text accompanying notes 364-69 supra. See Mundheim, supra
note 60, at 469 n.77.
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have applied the NYSE Rule 405 know-your-customer requirement
as a standard of due care in suits against brokers for negligence in

dealing in stolen or forged securities. 519
Decisions Denying Private Actions
Some decisions have more or less flatly denied a right to sue
under the suitability and know your customer rules.520 The most
52
extreme position is that announced in Lange v. H. Hentz & Co. 1

In Lange, plaintiff alleged violations of several NASD rules, including
the suitability rule. The court first held that no jurisdiction existed
over the claims because NASD rules are not part of the statutory

scheme over which Congress intended to establish federal court jurisdiction. Assuming arguendo there was jurisdiction, the court held
that NASD rules fail the tests outlined by the Supreme Court 522 for
519. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Royal Natl Bank, 413 F.
Supp. 43, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
348 F. Supp. 969, 976-77 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 192, 197 (8th Cir. 1974);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 234 N.E.2d
230, 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 66 (1967), aff'd on rearg., 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d
754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (1970), aff'd mem., 39 App.
Div. 2d 1019, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1972); cf. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Third Nat'!
Bank, 400 F. Supp. 383, 390-91 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d
1141 (1st Cir. 1976) (Boston Exchange rule); Dorsey & Co. v. Banque National de la
Republic d7Haiti, 393 F. Supp. 893, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d
1241 (2d Cir. 1976) (rule 15b10-3); see generally Comment, supra note 62; Guttman,
Developments in Stockbrokers" Liabilities - Wilson v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 14
HowwvA
L.J. 330 (1968). But in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 92,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970), the court held that rule 405 does not impose any positive duty to ascertain
the title of securities, and that even if it did an allegation of mere negligence in its
violation would not satisfy the Buttrey standard. To the same effect, see South Side
Bank & Trust Co. v. Walston & Co., 425 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1970).
520. Thompson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 111
(W.D. Okla. 1975); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292; 29697 (S.D. Iowa 1975). See also Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,
56 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Other decisions have denied a cause
of action exists under any exchange or NASD rule. See, e.g., McMaster Hutchinson
& Co. v. Rothschild & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 93,541, at 92,584-86 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (seemingly misreading Colonial Realty as
barring private association rules); Wheeler v. Boettcher & Co.,
- Colo. App.
539 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1975) (same); the same mistaken reading of Colonial Realty
appears in Fishman, supra note 54, at 246 n. 80, and Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 60, at 465 n.61. Cf. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1964) (no cause of action against a listed company for violation of an exchange rule).
521. 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
522. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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implying private actions: (1) the "class of security dealers," not the
public investor, is the primary beneficiary of self-regulation, (2) the
intent of the rules was to create ethical and not legal standards, (3)
liability would deter self-regulation, and (4) liability would invade
523
the state provinces of negligence and fiduciary duty.
In Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 524 the plaintiff alleged
violations of the NASD suitability rules and NYSE Rule 405. While
noting that the SEC's promulgation of Rule 15b10-3 was evidence
that the suitability requirement is an integral part of SEC regulation,
the court held:
[N]either the suitability nor the supervision rules at issue here
should be the basis for federal court damage actions. If § 20 does
not constitute the exclusive source of employer broker-dealer liability under the federal securities laws, common law principles
of agency and negligence would provide additional bases of liability under § 10(b), either via respondent superior . . . or in
any event, for breach of a duty to supervise. Even under the
latter theory, broad liability would exist under the federal securities law, and it would be superfluous to imply a cause of
action under the suitability and supervision rules since the duties
imposed under those rules are identical to what is at least imposed
at common law.525
Two other decisions have registered additional objections to a
private cause of action. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 526 the
court observed that "the practical consequences of allowing private
federal damage suits based on [suitability] rules . . . and involving
judicial review of market judgments, would be considerable" - "a
broker might honestly think that his 'ground' for believing his recommendation 'suitable' is 'reasonable,' only to find himself overruled
in a law suit and found guilty of fraud notwithstanding his good
faith." 527 In Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,528 the court
opined that NYSE rule 405 did not meet the Colonial Realty regulatory-scheme test and listed several considerations indicating that a
private cause of action should not be allowed:
523. 418 F. Supp. at 1382-83. See also Musser v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ri 96,183 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Piper, Jaffray &
Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 295-97 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
524. 414 F. Supp. 885 (D. Conn. 1976).
525. Id. at 890 (footnote omitted).
526. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
527. Id. at 431.
528. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).

May 19781

SUITABILITY OBLIGATIONS OF BROKERS

1193

[F]irst, accurate evaluation of the degree to which any particular
rule represents SEC policy is often difficult, if not impossible
; second, imposition of liability might chill the process of
*
self-regulation by creating fear of damaging liability; and, finally
exchange rules are not promulgated by a government body
.
after careful deliberation and weighing of the variegated competing public interests. We believe Congress intended to encourage
self-regulation to invoke higher standards than could feasibly be
implemented by Congress or the SEC, and we should tread carefully before interfering with that scheme.529
*

Also, in DeRenzis v. Levy, 530 the court stated that problems would
arise as to notice and opportunity to be heard in rulemaking should
an exchange rule be allowed as the source of a federal cause of
action. 5 31

529. Id. at 166 n.23. See also Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411 (D.Minn. 1977);
Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 95,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying a cause of action under the supervision and knowyour-customer rules). In Zagari, for example, the court adopted the Colonial Realty
tests, rejecting the Buttrey criteria because (a) the protection-of-investors criterion was
viewed as too broad, as it is applicable to all exchange rules, and (b) the tantamountto-fraud criterion was viewed as lacking in logical foundation, as requiring wasteful
fact finding, and as rendering actions under the rules superfluous. It then held that
Amex rule 411 failed the Colonial Realty tests for several reasons. First, the rule was
not sufficiently central to the regulatory scheme; its adoption did not cause the SEC
to terminate a rulemaking procedure of its own, nor was it adopted at SEC behest or
pursuant to SEC rule. Second, the adoption of a parallel SECO rule (which the court
simply assumed would give rise to liability), while troubling, was apparently viewed
as an effort to force nonmember firms to join the NASD, where their duty there would
be only an ethical one. Third, the rule was viewed as articulating a common law
standard of care applicable in negligence actions, thus diminishing the need for a
federal remedy. Finally, the court listed policy arguments against implied liability:
a flood of litigation, the nullification of limits to Exchange Act rule 10b-5, and the
chilling of self-regulation. It is unclear whether the court meant its reasoning to apply
to suitability aftions, though much of it of course would. Its observation that rule
411 and NYSE rule 405 "embody standards similar to" the NASD suitability rule, id.
95,777 at 90,180, and its citation of cases discussing a suitability cause of action,
suggest it meant its reasoning to apply to suitability action; however, the facts of the
case make clear that the complaint was for failure to supervise employees who violated
margin rules. Zagari was followed in Mosser v. Bache & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer
96,183 (N.D. Cal. 1977), where the court denied
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
a cause of action under the NASD suitability rule.
530. 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
531. Id. at 1001-02 n.5. See also Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376,
1380 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (recognition of criminal liability for violations of NASD rules
- which would arguably follow from the equivalence of the language in § 27 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), the jurisdictional section, with the language
in § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970), the criminal liability section - is "rife with the
constitutional problems of delegation and vagueness").

r
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The Majority Position: "Tantamount to Fraud"

Although several of the most recent decisions have, as noted,
refused to entertain suits under the suitability rules, the majority
position remains that the rules are actionable, 532 but only when their
violation is "tantamount to fraud," a phrase of studied ambiguity
which leaves courts a certain amount of leeway to go beyond a rigid
fraud requirement.5 33 For example, in Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jack532. See 6 L. Loss (1969), supra note 18, at 3715-16; note 60 supra. But see
Lipton, supra note 1, at 276-77 (prepared statement of M. Lipton) (rule 405 has
three mutually reinforcing purposes: protection of the market against customers acting unlawfully, of the broker against such customer, and of the customer qua customer). The argument that express suitability rules exist primarily to protect brokers
from irresponsible customers, though weaker than the argument as to know-yourcustomer rules, has been made at least implicitly. Recall the concern expressed in
the NASD policy statement that the customer have "the financial ability" to enter a
transaction, see text accompanying note 36 supra, which seemed to be the exclusive
thrust of the "voluntary" suitability efforts of the Association of Mutual Plan Sponsors,
see note 38 supra. See also note 533 infra. But see Rediker, supra note 47, at 30
n.74 (listing ways in which suitability rules are clearly for the protection of investors).
533. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Minn. 1977); Lange
v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Cf. Hayden v. Walston
& Co., 528 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1975) (action under NASD rule requiring registration of securities salespeople denied because although "registration inures to the
benefit of the public generally by assuring professional competence, the requirement
does not set a duty with respect to a particular securities transaction the breach of
which tortuously interferes with the customer's rights"); Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D.D.C. 1977) (action under NYSE rule requiring prompt transfer of accounts between brokerage firms denied because although the rule "does express some concern for the individual investor, the rule cannot be said to have been
designed primarily for the purpose of protection of investors since the emphasis is on
methods and procedures to be used in furtherance of orderly and expeditious account
transferring").
In another decision, Halperin v. Edwards & Hanley, 430 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), a court held that no claim for a violation of the NASD suitability rule or NYSE
rule 405 may be asserted against a brokerage firm which arises out of an investment
in the firm itself. Cf. note 39 supra (NASD suitability rule specifically governing such
The court felt the issue was governed by the holdings of the Second
investments).
Circuit in Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977), and Lank v. New York
Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977), which limited suits against stock exchanges for the non-enforcement of their own rules to public investors, and barred
exchange members and partners or investors in member firms from bringing such suits.
The Halperin decision is poorly reasoned. First, Arneil and Lank were clearly limited
to the issue of standing to sue exchanges under section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78f (Supp. V 1975). Second, even if the reasoning of these decisions were
applicable, the central feature of that reasoning was the importance of the protection
of public investors; the plaintiff in Halperin was a public investor, and the fact that
he was induced to invest in a brokerage firm should not deprive him of protection.
Third, the Halperin court offered no explanation for barring suits under the NASD
suitability rule; Arneil and Lank could have no bearing on this question.
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son & Curtis, Inc.,534 the court noted that the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, "although designed to protect the investor, are essen-

tially directed at fraud."535 While holding that the NYSE rule and
the NASD suitability rule are actionable, "the Court [did] not mean
to imply that mere negligence or errors of judgment will suffice to sustain an action under such rules.... Only further evidence can deter-

6
mine whether fraud or something tantamount to fraud is involved."53

In nearly a dozen other cases, 53 7 courts either have limited the cause

of action under suitability rules to allegations that would also constitute fraud or conduct "tantamount to fraud" or have dismissed
5 8
suits merely alleging negligent violations of the suitability rules. 3
534. 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975).
535. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
536. Id.
537. Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1281 (1978) (NASD suitability rule and NYSE rule 405); Shorrock v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 96,251, at 92,677-79 (D. Ore. 1977) (same); Rolf v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d
38 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); Carroll v. Bear, Stems & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 999, 1002
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (reinforcing its conclusion by referring to the Supreme Court's imposition of a scienter requirement for rule 10b-5 actions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the court holds "it is well settled that a federal private
right of action based on an alleged violation of [the NASD suitability rule or NYSE
rule 405] will be implied only when there are well-pleaded allegations of fraudulent
conduct on the part of the defendant and not where the action is nothing more than
a 'garden-variety customer-broker suit' [Colonial Realty]"; Architectural League v.
Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (NASD suitability rule); McMillan
v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (NASD suitability
rule and NYSE rule 405) (semble); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1195,021, at 97,581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(NASD suitability rule and NYSE rule 405); Utah v. duPont Walson, Inc., [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) If 94,812 (D. Utah 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168-69 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 264 (1977) (NASD suitability rule and NYSE and Amex
know-your-customer rules); Hsue Tung v. Broussard, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 94,471, at 95,654 (D.D.C. 1974) (NYSE rule 405);
Wells v. Blythe & Co., 351 F. Supp. 999, 1000-02 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (NASD suitability
rule).
538. In one recent decision a court read this line of cases, inaccurately, as requiring a separate showing of a violation of an antifraud provision before a cause of
action could be alleged under NASD rules, and specifically the suitability rule. Parsons
v. Homblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) if 95,885, at 91,249-50 (M.D.N.C. 1977). The court then announced,
after setting forth the familiar language from Colonial Realty quoted supra, see text accompanying note 506 supra: "Following the guidance of Judge Friendly in Colonial
Realty this Court holds that no private action exists for violations of the National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice." Id. at 91,250. How the court's con-
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In Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,53 9 the district court held
that suitability rules give rise to civil liability if the violations "operated as a fraud" upon the plaintiff and if the defendant acted with
54
scienter, in the form of either intent or reckless disregard. 0

The Proposed Federal Securities Code
The American Law Institute, at its annual meeting held May 1619, 1978, approved the Proposed Official Draft of the ALI Federal
Securities Code. 5 4" Two major innovations in suitability doctrine are
contained in the Code. These innovations are the creation of a new
SEC rulemaking authority with respect to suitability4 ' and the establishment of a framework for the SEC and the courts to settle the
private cause of action question.5 1 3 In addition, the Code would
preserve, largely intact, all of the present underpinnings of suitability
law treated in the preceding discussions of sources and enforcement
5 44
mechanisms.
A. The Continuation of Present Law
Sources of Suitability Rules
Four sources of current suitability law would be preserved by
the Code. First, the present statutory authority for the NASD suitability rule and the exchanges' know-your-customer rules would be

clusion follows Judge Friendly is a mystery. Though it said not a word in explanation of its reasoning, the court apparently felt that a cause of action under the rules
would be surplusage in light of the (erroneous) fact that the weight of authority required in any event an "independently cognizable" fraud claim as a prerequisite to the
action. Id. at 91,249. See also Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442,
445 (2d Cir. 1971).
539. 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); accord,
Wolfson v. Baker, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 96,407, at 93,455-57 (M.D.
Fla. 1978).
540. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978). The circuit court did not reach the cause of
action question. See note 350 supra.
541. See note 15 supra. It should be noted that the section numbers of the Code,
which were essentially uniform through the six tentative drafts, were redone in the
Proposed Official Draft. For a cross-reference table, see ALl FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) app. I.
542. See text accompanying notes 607-13 infra.
543. See text accompanying notes 614-24 infra.
544. See text accompanying notes 18-237, 239-57 supra.
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preserved in the new law largely verbatim. 545 The current statutory
pattern is simplified by combining the basic authorizations in section 803(i) (1) (A), which requires both "registered securities associa-

tions" 540 and "national securities exchanges" 547 to have rules designed
"to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices and to
promote just and equitable principles of trade." 548 Precisely the same

language is now found in sections 15A(b)(6) and 6(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act.549 The Code preserves two restrictions on NASD and
exchange rulemaking powers which may place some limits on the
scope of the suitability doctrine, although as yet these restrictions have
not been invoked by any challenger. The restrictions prohibit NASD

and exchange rules from "impos[ing] any burden on competition that
is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes that
the organization is intended to further as a self-regulatory organization
under this Code" 550 and from "regulat[ing], by virtue of any authority
545. The requirements discussed in the remainder of this paragraph are imposed
as prerequisites to the registrationof an association or exchange. ALI FED. SEC. CODE
(Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 803(d). To the same effect are §§ 15A(b) and
6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b) and 78f(b) (Supp. V 1975).
546. As defined in ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 299.39.
547. As defined in id. § 299.6.
548. Id. § 803(i)(1) (A).
549. See text accompanying notes 21 & 56 supra.
550. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 803 (1). See also id.
§ 1804(c) (effect of SEC rules on competition). The analogous provision in present
law (worded identically in two sections, one governing associations, and one exchanges)
requires that the rules "not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes" of the Exchange Act. Sections 15A(b) (9) and
6(b)(8) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(9) and 78f(b)(8) (Supp. V 1975).
Itmight be argued that the Code, whose "necessary or appropriate" formula focuses on the particular purposes of the rulemaker as a statutory self-regulator, rather
than the purposes of securities regulation generally, meaningfully reinforces the statutory expression of concern as to the possible impact of self-regulatory rules on competition. Cf. note 31 supra (potential impact of broad suitability rules on venture
capital markets); O'Boyle, supra note 23, at 102 (prepared statement of T. O'Boyle)
("if suitability is ever recognized as a legal concept on a broad basis, the cost of defending (and settling) claims becomes an ever-increasing factor in the over-all cost
of doing business"); Kroll, supra note 328, at 38 (rules like rule 15c2-5, if applied
generally, "would be unsuitable for and would unduly interfere with the normal
merchandising of securities") (emphasis in original); Rediker, supra note 47, at 16
(legalization of ethical rules threatens "potentially prohibitive effects on the cost of
doing business"). But cf. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 904 n.154 (such arguments are unlikely to "be found any more acceptable in the future than they have been in the
past"). But note that the language in both the Code and present law, which calls for
minimizing the impact of self-regulatory rules on "competition," could be seen as
directed only at broker-broker and exchange-exchange competition, rather than competition in capital markets.
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conferred by this Code, matters not related to the purposes of this
Code or to the administration of the organization." 55 1 The authority
of the SEC to override (add to, modify, or subtract from) NASD and
55 2
exchange rules is also continued by the Code.
Second, the Code imposes essentially the same standards on the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). The SEC is not,
553
however, given power to override MSRB rules.
Third, the Commission's existing authority to promulgate SECO
rules designed "to promote just and equitable principles of trade"
55 4
would remain unchanged by the Code.
Fourth, the rulemaking authority in section 15(c) (2) of the Exchange Act, 55 5 the present basis for "equity funding" rule 15c2-5, and
the likely source of any future fraud-grounded development of suitability doctrine, 556 is carried forward in section 1614 of the Code.
That section empowers the SEC to "define in a manner not inconsistent with the conditions and restrictions of part XVI [which prohibits
the full panoply of fraudulent and manipulative acts], and [to] prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, any conduct made un551. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 803(i)(2)(D). The
analogous provision in present law (again, worded identically in separate sections governing associations and exchanges) requires that the rules not "regulate by virtue
of any authority conferred by [the Act] matters not related to the purposes of
[the Act] or the administration of the association [or exchange]." Sections 15A(b)(6)
and 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6) and 78f(b)(5) (Supp.
V 1975). A comment to the Code suggests that this provision should not be read so
as unduly to restrict self-regulatory organizations' rulemaking authority. See ALI
FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 803, Comment (6).
552. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 805(e). Note that
"rule change," as used in § 805(e), is a new term of art, defined in id. § 299.45(c).
Section 805(e) is derived from § 19(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (Supp.
V 1975).
553. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1103(a)(7). See
also id. § 801(e)(2) (§ 803(i) does not apply with respect to a municipal security).
554. See id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 905(c)(1). See text accompanying
notes 32-36 & note 41 supra. The authorization in the present SECO rulemaking
provision, § 15(b)(9) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(9) (Supp. V 1975),
to prescribe rules designed "in general, to protect investors and the public interest"
is absent from § 905(c) of the Code because the investor-protection and publicinterest standards for SEC rulemaking, now peppered throughout the securities acts,
are stated only once in the Code, in a section applicable to all SEC rules. See ALI
FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1804(b).
555. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).

556. See 53 ALl

PaOCEEDNcs

534-35 (1976).
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lawful by that part."557 The reference to definition and prevention
of fraudulent acts mirrors the language found in present law, but the
breadth of the rulemaking grant is new insofar as it covers the entire
range of the Code's substantive prohibitions of fraud or manipulation.
The Code commentary indicates that this broad rulemaking grant
"should encourage, when practicable, the greater use of rules rather
than quasi-judicial techniques like the various manifestations of the
'shingle theory' . . . in the development of new 'fraud' doctrine." 55a
As to the scope of the antifraud language itself, section 15(c)
(2)'s prohibition of securities transactions by brokers and dealers "in
connection with which such broker or dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" is stated in simplified
form in section 1602(a), the basic fraud section of the Code: "It is
unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to make a
misrepresentation in connection with . . . a sale or purchase of a
security, an offer to sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to
buy or sell a security .... ,59 The Code thus replaces "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" with "fraudulent act or
. . . misrepresentation." The omission of "deceptive" is recovered
in some degree by the inclusion of "misrepresentation," which is defined as "(1) an untrue statement of a material fact, or (2) an omission
to state a material fact necessary to prevent the statements made from
being misleading in light of the circumstances under which they are
made."oo An initial decision by the ALI, however, to include "deception" within the definition of fraud was abandoned in the final draft
of the Code. The definition of "fraudulent act" now reads: "'Fraudulent act' includes an act, device, scheme, practice, or course of conduct that (1) is fraudulent or (2) operates or would operate as a
fraud." 61 An earlier draft contained a third subsection covering
acts, devices, etc., "likely to deceive regardless of whether deception
562
is intended."
557. ALI FED. SEc. CoDE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1614. The MSRB
may have concurrent power under id. § 1103. See id. § 909, Note; id. § 1614, Note;
id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 1311(b).
558. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1311(a), Comment (2).
559. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1602(a).
560.

Id. § 297.

561. Id.§ 262(a).
562. Id. (Rev. Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) § 234D(a). While the earlier version
of the "fraudulent act" definition was in effect, a comment explained that "deceptive"
was deleted from the basic fraud section because it "add[ed] nothing to 'fraudulent'
and 'fraud."' Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 225, Comment (1)(b). For a dis-
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The intent behind the omission of "manipulative," which might
serve in present law as a broader foundation for the development of
suitability doctrine than the words "fraudulent" or "deceptive," is not
suggested by the comments to the Code. A second subsection of the
definition of "fraudulent act" states: "Inaction or silence when there
is a duty to act or speak may be a fraudulent act."5 63 This subsection
might be interpreted to allow the Commission freedom to promulgate
rules under the fraud rubric establishing "a duty to act" so that a
broker may only recommend or sell suitable securities. The language,
however, seems intended to elaborate upon, rather than expand, the
basic definition of "fraud.."564 On the other hand, the use of the
word "includes" to introduce the basic definition, rather than the word
"means," as generally used in the definitions of the Code, was clearly
intended to leave the definition of "fraudulent act" open-ended. 65 A
comment to an earlier draft declared that "[tlhis definition .
taken together with the definition of 'misrepresentation' in § 259, the
provisions on manipulation in § 1308, and the rulemaking authority
given the Commission by § 1311(a) . . . is meant to be as broad
as the various locutions in all the source provisions. "566 The effect that
omitting the word "manipulative" has upon the possible substantive
grounds for broker selling-practice liability is indicated by the collection in Code section 1609,56- captioned "Manipulation," of various
prohibitions of the Exchange Act and rules thereunder concerning
market manipulation.56 8 Although the term "manipulation" appears
only in the section and subsection headings of section 1308, which
"have no legal significance,"569 a comment suggests that the section

cussion of the earlier versions of these sections, see 50 ALI PROCEEDINGS 421-22, 43233 (1973).
563. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 262(b).
564. The language is apparently designed to allow the development of a noninsider's duty to disclose. See, e.g., id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 205(b), Comment; id. § 1303, Comment (3); id. § 1301(a), Comment (2)(e).
565. See 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 475, 478 (1974) (remarks of Professor Loss); ALI
FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 276, Comment (1)
(an instance of the
draftsmen's shifting from "means" to "includes").
566. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 225(a), Comment (1)(a),
at 9. The comment was written at a time when the term "deceptive act" instead of
"fraudulent act" was being used. The comment apparently remains in effect.
567. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1609.
568. E.g., § 9(a)(1)-(3), (5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)-(3),
(5) (1970); rules 10b-2, 10b-6, 15cl-8, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-2, 240.10b-6, 240.15cl-8
(1977).
569. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 2010(c).
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fully compensates for anything lost through the deletion of "manipulative" from the definition of "fraudulent act." 570 In any event,
whether or not the Code ultimately narrows the ground for the de-

velopment of 15c2 suitability rules, it compensates for any narrowing
by the separate authorization of SEC suitability rules governing all
brokers.
Violation of fraud-based suitability rules like rule 15c2-5 571 would
be a direct violation of section 1602(a) (1),572 exposing the broker to

civil liability 573 if he bought or sold as principal. He would also be
liable if, as an agent or other fiduciary, he effected the transaction
"for the account or benefit of himself or a person or estate to whom
he stands in a fiduciary capacity." 574 Whether a broker purports to
act as principal or agent will not always be determinative of whether
575
he is a fiduciary.

76

Enforcement Mechanims5

The complicated system through which suitability rules can be

administratively enforced under present law is retained in the Code.
The source provisions are simplified and modified in some respects,
but proceedings by self-regulatory organizations, proceedings by the
SEC, appeals to the SEC, and appeals to the courts are all largely

preserved in their current form. Provision is made for appeals to the
SEC from NASD and exchange proceedings in section 810,5,7 for
570. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1308(c), Comment (2) (written before "deceptive act" was supplanted by "fraudulent act"). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976), the Court held that "manipulative" is "virtually a term
of art" which connotes intentional or willful conduct to deceive investors by artificially
influencing securities prices.
571. No attempt is made in this brief survey to specify every change the Code
makes in the present law governing administrative enforcement and court review. One
example of such a change in the Code's elimination of the confusion as to exchange
enforcement of MSRB rules, and SEC enforcement of MSRB rules against exchange
members. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 806(a)(2)(A)
and Note; id. § 1810(c); id.(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 806(a)(2)(A) and Comment (3); id. § 1507A(c) and Comment (2); see also, e.g., 53 ALI PROCEEDINGS
599-600 (1976).
572.

ALl FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 810.

573. Id. § 1810.

574. Id.§ 1809(a)(4)(B).
575. Id.§ 1818(a)(1); see also 53 ALl PROCEEDINGS 549-51, 571-72 (1976).
576. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 808.
577. Id. § 803(j)(1). The requirements that association and exchange rules, respectively, provide for discipline are contained in sections 15A(bJ (7) and 6(b)(6),

1.202
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direct Commission proceedings against NASD and exchange members
and their associates in section 1810(c), 5 8 for direct Commission proceedings against registered brokers and their associates primarily in
section 1809(a) (4) (B), 5 7 9 and for appeals to the circuit courts from
SEC orders in section 1818(a) (1). 5180 Exchanges and associations
are empowered, 5 1 and in some cases are required,5 8 2 to enforce the
statute, SEC rules, their own rules, and in the case of associ ations,
MSRB rules. The SEC's direct enforcement power is more limited:
it does not extend to the self-regulatory organizations' own rules. " '
B. Innovation
Under the present federal securities laws, the body of law that
controls brokers' relationships with their customers is divided between
antifraud law and self-regulation. We have noted problems with
both of these sources of potential liability for suitability violations.
Antifraud regulation, through the shingle theory,58 4 has suffered from
the need to rely on a fiction which threatens to lose contact with the
mainstream of antifraud law. The effectiveness of self-regulation has
suffered from the unwillingness of the SEC to guide the development
of standards and from the courts' doubts as to the appropriateness
of inferring a private civil cause of action to enforce the self-regulators'
rules.
The Code seeks to ameliorate these problems by two major innovations. First, it frees the law of broker regulation from the fetters of
the shingle theory by directly codifying some of the best-established
shingle theory violations and by giving the SEC a broad direct grant
of power to promulgate rules governing all brokers in the area of
suitability and in other areas without the necessity of relying on the
respectively, of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(7) and 78f(b) (6)

(Supp.

V 1975).
578. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) §§ 1809(a)(4)(B),
1810(c).
579. See text accompanying notes 100-08 supra.
580. See text accompanying notes 557-71 supra.
581. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1602(a)(1). Liability
under § 1602(a) (1) for an antifraud suitability rule follows from id. § 1614, which
makes a violation of an SEC antifraud rule "a violation of the section to which it is
directed." Section 1602(a)(1) prohibits fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
582. Id. § 1703(a).

583.

Id.§ 1709(a)(1).

584. See 3 Loss (1961), supra note 18, at 1500-08; 6 Loss (1969), supra note 18,
at 3702-08.
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antifraud sections. Second, it provides a structure for a final resolution of the cause of action perplexity by giving the SEC the power to
decide conclusively whether any particular self-regulatory rule shall
give rise to a cause of action, and by giving the courts clearer guidelines to follow should the SEC fail to exercise this power.
Codification of Liability for Churningand CertainShingle Theory Violations
Before considering the Code's grant of suitability rulemaking
power it is important first to examine its direct codification of certain
standards of practice for brokers. Although retaining the general
prohibition against fraud and the corresponding SEC rulemaking
power, the Code directly proscribes churning in section 1606 55 and
certain specific shingle theory violations in section 913.586
The prohibition against churning is directed toward discretionary
accounts and accounts as to which the broker may "determine the
volume and frequency of transactions by reason of the customer's
willingness to follow his or his agent's suggestions." The legal-con58 7
trol criterion applied by the SEC and the courts in churning cases
is followed by the Code. The unanimity of the decisions which apply
this test is given as one reason for codification. 58 Civil liability for
churning violations is provided for in section 1717.589
Section 1606 provides four nonexclusive factors to guide courts
in determining when transactions "are excessive in volume or frequency." Three factors are "the size and character of the account,
the needs and objectives of the customer as ascertained on reasonable
inquiry, [and] the pattern of trading in the account." 590 A fourth
factor, "the amount of profits or commissions of the broker . . . in
relation to the size of the account,"591 was elevated to primary importance in the final draft of the Code.592 Although section 1606 does
585. ALI FED. SEc. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1606; see also 50 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 461-62 (1973).
586. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 913; see also 51 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 524-25 (1974); 53 ALI PROCEEDINGs 527-28, 538, 644-48 (1976).
587. See note 292 supra.
588. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1306, Comment [1].
589. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1717.
590. Id. § 1606. These factors are said to be drawn from the case law. Id. (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1306, Comment 2. No cases are cited in the comment to illustrate any of the particular factors.
591. Id.
592. See id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1606, Note (b).
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not provide that all these factors must be weighed by a court or that
they are the exclusive considerations, these factors suggest two implications for suitability doctrine. First, the reference to "the needs
and objectives of the customer as ascertained on reasonable inquiry"
strongly suggests that a broker must look behind his customer's initial
statement of his own preferences and inquire about his "needs and
objectives," at least for purposes of determining the appropriate "volume" and "frequency" of trading. Like most of the suitability rules,
however, this language is open to either an objective or a subjective
interpretation. A reading of all the factors in combination suggests
a definition of churning that goes beyond the special case of the nowin transaction into which no rational customer would enter. If the
intent of the section is to hold brokers liable for excessive trading
levels determined with reference to some objective standard, a second
implication for suitability doctrine may be drawn: that section 1606's
concept of suitability goes further than the relatively inoffensive intrusion on free choice involved in per se rules against irrationality. 593
Section 913 codifies "the most common instances of application
of the 'shingle theory. "594 It does away with the fiction of an implied representation and makes it directly unlawful for a broker to
fail to execute an order promptly,5 95 to fail to disclose his control relationship with an issuer, 596 to effect an unauthorized transaction, 59
and to charge prices not reasonably related to the market.598 Civil
liability is provided for in section 1715. 599
An early draft of section 913 made suitability violations unlawful as well, but this prohibition was deleted on the theory that codification of suitability doctrine is premature.6 0 0 Section 913 does not
codify rule 15c2-5.
Express SEC Power to Adopt Suitability Rules Governing All Brokers
Section 915(a) of the Code provides:
593. See text accompanying notes 472-76 supra.
594. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 913, Comment.
595. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 913(a). See note 106 supra.
596. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 913(b). See Exchange
Act rule 15c-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-5 (1977).
597. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 913(c). See note 105
supra.
598. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 913(d). See note 103
supra.
599. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1715.
600. See note 653 infra.
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It is unlawful for a broker .
Commission's rules,

1205

in contravention of the

(3) to recommend a transaction in a security unless he
reasonably believes that it is not unsuitable for the customer on
the basis of (A) information furnished by the customer on reasonable inquiry with respect to his investment objectives, financial situation, and needs, and (B) any other information known
by the broker .... 601
The SEC is thereby empowered, but expressly not directed, 60 2 to
establish a regime of suitability regulation over all brokers, within
the parameters of the present language of rule 15b10-3. This grant
of rulemaking power is supplemented by section 915(b):
The Commission, by rule, may define in a manner not inconsistent with the condifions and restrictions of [section] ...
915(a), and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, any
conduct by a broker ...

that is made unlawful by [that section]

or any similar conduct that constitutes unfair dealing with a
customer .... 603
Section 915(a) also empowers the SEC to issue rules respecting
three practices which had come to be included under the shingle
theory: failure to disclose marketmaker status or interest in a distribution;60 4 failure to disclose a substantial long or short position in
a security; 60 5 and recommending an unregistered security as to which
60 6
reasonable information is unavailable.
The draftsmen's intent in granting the SEC power to promulgate
suitability rules, and rules in these other areas, was "to carve out a
degree of misconduct that is more than 'unethical,' so that it is within
the proper sphere of direct regulation rather than self-regulation, but
less than 'fraudulent."'"60 7 The Code commentary explains that the
purpose is to escape the limitations of the shingle theory:
601. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 915(a).
602. Section 1804(g) of the Code, id. § 1804(g), reads: "A provision of this Code
that makes it unlawful to engage in specified conduct in violation of a rule or order
does not require the promulgation of rules or orders, and does not apply in the absence
of a rule or order."
603. Id. § 915(b).
604. Id. § 915(a)(1)(A).
605. Id. § 915(a)(1)(B). See note 109 supra.
606. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 915(b).
607. Id. § 915, Note (1) (quoting id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 914, Comment
(1)). See also id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 914, Comment (2) (extent to which
suitability doctrine is "law as distinct from ethics . . . is left to further evolution").
Quaere whether the spirit of the following comment to the earlier version of section
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There is no intention to enlarge the Commission's rulemaking
authority with respect to brokers and dealers beyond the "fraud"
rubric of the "shingle" theory. The design, rather, is to avoid
the artificiality of that theory - however nobly it may have
served its purpose in an earlier day - and to relieve both the
Commission and the securities industry of the "fraud" opprobrium that is necessarily attached to every practice that is today
proscribed by the "shingle" concept. 08
The express grant of suitability rulemaking power was introduced
into the Code between the approval of the final tentative draft in 1977
and the approval of the proposed official draft in 1978. Earlier versions of section 915 contained only a general grant to the SEC of rulemaking power over broker practices. At first, power was granted
over conduct that "involves a conflict of interest or abuse of a fiduciary
' 60
relationship or otherwise takes unfair advantage of a customer," .1
and later, power was granted over conduct that "involves an abuse of
a fiduciary relationship with a customer."' 6 1 The deletion between
drafts of the "conflict of interest" and "unfair advantage" language
was explained on the ground that they "addled] nothing" to the
phrase "abuse of a fiduciary relationship," which "alone is broad
enough to support, for example, a 'suitability' or 'know your customer'
rule." 6 1 1

The Code does not provide for civil liability for violations of the
suitability rules which the Commission might adopt under section
915(a) (3). Rather, the decision on availability of a private cause
of action under such rules would be left entirely to the courts,"1'2
guided by the standards set forth in section 1722(a) 1 3 discussed
immediately below.
Resolving the Cause of Action Question

Rather than definitively resolving the thoroughly debated question as to whether NASD, exchange, and SECO rules, as well as the
915 raises any question as to the Commission's power to adopt a rule proscribing in
general terms any unsuitable transaction by a broker, without providing any additional
standards: "It is not contemplated that this section will result in blanket rules like
Inv. Co. Act Rule 17d-1 (as distinct from specified acts) to a requirement of an application for Commission approval." Id. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 914, Comment
(3).
608. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 915, Note (1).
609. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1976) § 914(a)(2).
610. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 914(a)(2).
611. Id. § 914, Comment (1)(c).
612. Telephone conversation between the author and Prof. Louis Loss, Reporter for
the Code, in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 1978).
613. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1722(a).
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new section 915 SEC rules, should give rise to civil liability, the Code
attempts in sections 1721614 and 1722(a)615 to structure a process by
which the question can be answered on a rule by rule basis.
The first step in that process is to give the Commission the option
to decide by SEC rule, subject to four statutory guidelines, whether
any particular NASD, exchange, or SECO rule supports a private suit
for damages. As to any particular rule, the Commission could decide
to provide for civil liability, or to exclude civil liability. That decision would be binding on the courts, subject only to judicial review
for arbitrariness under section 1818(b).616 This SEC power does not
extend, however, to section 915 rules.
The four nonexclusive "criteria" which "the Commission shall
consider" in adopting any such inclusionary or exclusionary rules are
as follows:
(1) whether the particular self-regulatory organization rule was
required by the Commission to be adopted, amended, or supplemented, (2) whether the particular rule is substantially a substitute for or parallel to a rule of the Commission (other than a
section 905(c) [SECO] rule), (3) whether the particular rule
is designed for the special benefit of a class of persons to which
a potential plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged,
and (4) the risk, in the case of a self-regulatory organization rule,
that the imposition of liability under section 1721 will discourage the organization from full performance of its intended role.617
The second step requires a court to decide whether a cause of
action shall be inferred when a claim is based on a rule as to which
the Commission has not exercised its power. This decision is to be
made "in accordance with the principles of common law and equity,
applied as a matter of Federal jurisprudence, and the standards of
section 1722(a). ' 6 18 Section 1722(a) establishes four more criteria,
but unlike those guiding the SEC under section 1721, these criteria are
not merely considerations but are mandatory prerequisites to the
maintenance of a private action under a section 915 suitability rule.619
614. Id. § 1721.
615. Id. § 1722(a).

616. Id. § 1818(b).
617. Id. § 1721(c). Criteria (1), (2), and (4), of course, have no applicability
to SECO rules. The Code commentary describes these criteria as "an amalgam of
most of the approaches" taken in the cases and publications canvassed at text accompanying notes 496-540 supra. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1416, Comment (5).
618. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1721(a) (2).
619. Quaere why the SEC criteria should not also be mandatory.
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A court is to recognize an action
only if (1) it is not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions
in any of the actions expressly created or with the scheme of the
Code, (2) the provision, rule, or order is designed for the special
benefit of a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs against
the kind of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the court that
under the circumstances the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to the violation, and (4), in cases comparable to
those dealt with in [certain Code sections imposing limitations
on damages], a comparable maximum is imposed.21
This statutory pattern clearly moves toward some resolution of
the presently open question of a private cause of action under the
suitability rules. Although it does not foreclose the SEC or the courts
from considering whether a violation of the rule would be "tantamount to fraud," its silence on this point would undermine the present
view of the majority of courts that such a finding is the dispositive
factor. 6 2 1 Of course, the SEC can resolve the question with respect
to any particular rule, except a new section 915 suitability rule, by
acting under section 1721.
On the other hand, this process does not clearly suggest the out2
come of the private cause of action question as to suitability rules.6 2
Under section 1721, the SEC may decide on the basis of any arguments and need only consider the listed criteria. As to the suitability
rules, only the third and fourth factors, the class intended to be benefited 6 23 and the potential impact on self-regulation, are relevant because the NASD rule and NYSE rule 405 were neither dictated by
the Commission nor designed to substitute for or parallel a non-SECO
SEC rule. These factors have already been considered by the courts
and commentators and have not led them to any consensus.6 24 The
section 1722(a) standards for courts, although mandatory, are similarly unhelpful. The limitation of damages requirement is a secondary concern, and the benefited-class standard is repeated from the
SEC criteria. Whether recognition of a private cause of action is
consistent with the scheme of the Code and whether such recognition
has a remedial effect appropriate to the particular violation are there-

620.

ALL FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1722(a).
See text accompanying note 534-40 supra.
622. See 50 ALl PROCEEDINGS 528 (1973) (suitability is "right in the middle" of
the spectrum from inclusion to exclusion).
623. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
624. See text accompanying notes 496-540; note 60 supra.
621.
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fore the pivotal questions. These criteria essentially restate the question whether the suitability rules are better left as ethical standards.
In deciding the private action question as to a suitability rule, the
courts are likely to find these standards add little to the admonition
to observe "the principles of common law and equity."
C. Measures of Damages for Suitability Violations
The Code provides for an assortment of damage measures which
parallels the variety of routes it leaves open for civil liability under
suitability principles. There has been very little discussion of the
proper measure of damages for a suitability violation.625 The Rolf
case is the only federal decision that has reached the point of awarding
damages for a suitability violation. The appropriate measure, according to the trial court, was commissions and interest paid, based
on an analogy to churning cases. 26 The Second Circuit reversed and
instructed the trial court to add a measure of non-market-induced
portfolio loss.6 27 One commentator has assumed that rescission would
be the proper award, 28 while another has advocated that recovery

should reflect the position of the plaintiff if a suitable security had
been purchased. That amount would be determined by taking "the
average return of a fair sample of securities that would have been
suitable, and compar[ing] this to the return actually produced by the
unsuitable recommendation." 6 29 A persuasive argument can be made
that the damages caused by an unsuitable transaction should be measured with reference to the position of the plaintiff if he had not dealt
625. On damages in rule 10b-5 actions, see Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FoRais L. REv.
277 (1977); Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 Gn-o. L.J. 1093
(1977); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN . L. REv. 371 (1974).
626. Geerlings, supra note 97, at 19-20, suggested this might be the correct remedy.
Cf. note 367 supra (decision awarding cancellation of account deficit).
627. See text accompanying notes 350-52 supra.
628. Comment, supra note 5, at 541-42. Cf. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1578 (1978) (risk of
market decline is "rightly . . . borne by defendants" where speculative investment is
fraudulently represented to be safe); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 878-79
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3709, 3710 (May 15, 1978) (measure of
damages in implied private action under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6 (1970), for fraudulent representation that portfolio was in "most conservative
posture" is that proportion of net losses on unregistered securities equal to the proportion of unregistered securities which would not have been in such a portfolio).
629. Cohen, supra note 389, at 1605 n.5.
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with the broker. There is no reason why he should receive the difference between a suitable investment and his actual investment if he
would not have made a suitable investment even in the absence of
6 30
the violation.
The variety of measures of damages provided by the Code that
could apply to suitability violations under different theories may be
summarized as follows:
Category of Violation
1. fraud by principal
2. fraud by agent or other
fiduciary
3. churning

4. codified shingle theory
violations
5. violations of SEC section 915
suitability rule
6. violations of NASD, exchange,
or SECO rules which the SEC
holds actionable
7. violations of NASD, exchange,
or SECO rules which a court
holds actionable

Measure of Damages
1. change in value of purchased
or sold securities, as defined in
detail63l
632
2. loss caused
3. "commissions and profits," plus
interest paid, plus "whatever
additional items of damages the
court allows in its discretion on
consideration of the factors
enumerated 634in" section 1606633
4. loss caused
5. not specified
- probably loss
3
caused

6
6. loss caused

36

7. loss caused,3 subject to certain
limitations1 7

630. Cf. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1716(a)(2)(B)
(court may award plaintiff, in its discretion, "the difference between the borrower's
trading losses and any trading losses that he would have suffered in the absence of"
a violation of a Federal Reserve Board credit rule under § 918); id. (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1973) § 1414, Comment (7) (discussing need to satisfy requirement of causation
before such damages may be awarded); id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 215A, Comment (3)(a) (same).
631. See id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1708(a). This measure of damages
is also subject to variation "on a showing that a different . . . measure of damages
would be plainly more appropriate on consideration of such factors as the plaintiff's
loss, the defendant's profit, and the deterrent effect of the particular type of liability."
Id. § 1723(e).
632. See id. § 1709(a).
633. See id. § 1717. The § 1606 factors appear at text accompanying note 590
supra.
634. See id. § 1715. Previous drafts provided for recovery of the greater of loss
caused or "profit, commission, or fee." See id. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 1413A.
635. The closest provision appears to be id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1715.
636. See id. § 1721(a).
637. See id. §§ 1721(a), 1722(a)(4).
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On all theories of recovery, incidental or consequential damages are
also available. 6 38
D. Defenses Against Liability for Suitability Violations
Some of the Code provisions considered above also provide specific defenses. A broker sued for a violation of a rule promulgated
pursuant to section 1614(a) may defend on the grounds that "the
plaintiff bought or sold with knowledge of the relevant facts . . .
as they should have been disclosed,"6 39 but only if he was not acting
as a fiduciary.(4 0 A broker who commits one of the codified shingle
theory violations is liable only if he acts "without reasonable justification or excuse."' 4 1 The sections on liability for churning and violations of self-regulatory rules offer the broker neither escape.
The courts' tentative applications of defenses of proximate cause,
estoppel, and in pari delicto would be variously affected by the Code.
As seen above, only some of the suitability damage measures are concerned with losses "caused" by the violation; such losses would be
subject to manipulation by the courts through their construction of
that "question-begging but useful term, 'legal cause,' which § [220]
defines in the reasonable expectancy language of Restatement of Torts
Second." 42 "The treatment of estoppel and ratification is left to
the general law."643 The defenses of unclean hands and in pari
delicto "are valid only to the extent (which may be complete) that
it is so determined on consideration of (1) the deterrent effect of the
particular type of liability, (2) the financial and legal sophistication
of the parties, and (3) their relative responsibility for the loss
644
incurred."

The Code Criticized
Any criticism of an effort as massive as the Federal Securities
Code is likely to be regarded as both presumptuous and futile. How638. See id. § 1723(a).
639. Id. § 1703(e)(1).
640. See id. § 1709.
641. Id. § 1715.
642. Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 215A, Comment (5) (b).
643. Id. § 1420(d), Comment (4).
644. Id. (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) § 1727(d). The commentary also recalls "an elementary bit of Latin translation sometimes overlooked - that in pari delicto
means equal fault." Id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1419(d), Comment (2).
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ever, as the present commentary will be predominantly favorable, it
perhaps tends more to the first vice than the second.
In its central initiative in the area of suitability, the Code properly gives the SEC an express authorization to enact suitability rules,
but the Code should also provide that the rules so adopted will give
rise to civil liability. Three premises underpin the conclusion that
the Code is to be praised for its grant to the SEC of suitability rulemaking power. First, surer and better defined suitability protection
for customers and less uncertainty for brokers about their suitability
responsibilities are desirable ends. Second, the plethora of suitability
law suits and of specialized suitability rules, proposals, and statements,
reflects a serious problem. The self-regulators are succeeding neither
in discouraging suitability abuses6 4 5 nor in defining the suitability doctrine. Third, if the future brings a continued bull market, 6 4 the
abuses will become even more severe. The time to act is now.
For several reasons, the general fraud provisions are inadequate
to provide a solution. As argued above, suitability obligations imposed under the shingle theory unduly strain its rationale. 4 7 It is
in any event desirable to avoid fictions, as the Code could by outlawing directly certain shingle theory violations.64s Drawing suitability
doctrine into the statutory definition of fraud threatens to distort the
growth and integration of the doctrine and, should the Supreme
Court34 9 ultimately find the suitability-fraud connection too tenuous,
such action could actually halt further doctrinal development. Also,
despite intermittent paeans to the superiority of adjudication over
rulemaking, '5 ° and however well adjudication may have served in
645. See, e.g., Rustin, Simison & Freed, A University's Finances Are Left in a
Shambles By a Securities Scheme, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
646. See, e.g., Vartan, The Mauling of the Market: A Capital Question, N.Y. Times.
Oct. 9, 1977, § 3, at G, col. 4 (analyst's prediction of "'a major bull market' lasting
from late 1978 into 1981." Cf. SPECIAL STUDy, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 268, 324.
647. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
648. But cf. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (critical evaluation of the role
of fictions in legal analysis).
649. The recent Supreme Court disposition of securities cases reflects a trend of
narrowing construction of the securities laws. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
650. See, e.g., Cohen, Book Review, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 399, 406 (1968) (in proposed boiler room rule, SEC "found it impossible to define a species of fraud in a
manner which would specify the full range of improper conduct without encompassing
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other areas, it has not been true of suitability that "Commission decisions and judicial affirmation thereof [have] suggest[ed even] partial
eluciguidelines." 651 Indeed, the Commission has actively avoided 652
dating the relationship between fraud and suitability doctrine.
On the other hand, direct codification of a broker suitability
obligation653 also seems undesirable. The direct codification of a
broad suitability rule, or adoption by the SEC of an inclusionary rule
making the general suitability rules subject to civil liability, would
do nothing to resolve the many ambiguities of the doctrine. Pressure
on the courts to do so would redouble. The evidence that is available suggests that, even when they do reach the merits, the courts
are unable to arrive at consistent positions on the basic themes of the
doctrine by interpreting rules like the NASD suitability rule and
NYSE rule 405. In addition, the courts have failed to address such
issues as the proper conception of investor choice to be embodied
in the rules, the place of portfolio theory in the application of the
rules, and the appropriate standard of care to apply to brokers.
The present administrative and appellate mechanisms surrounding the NASD and SECO rules do not seem to promise a solution.
Over a decade ago, Mundheim appealed to the NASD to resolve the
central questions of suitability doctrine. 54 Notwithstanding the fact
that something of a consensus has emerged in the courts which limits
other activities not intended to be reached"); Cohen & Rabin, supra note 75, at 71419, 725-27.
651. Comment, supra note 60, at 740.
652. See text accompanying notes 295-312, 330-33 supra.
653. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) § 1423(a), Comment (2);
50 ALI PROCEEDINGS 524-25 (1973) (remarks of Professor Loss) ("[Wie are probably
going to make some law on suitability. We are not going to rely anyway on the association and the exchanges on suitability.").
At least initially, the Reporter envisioned a suitability provision aimed chiefly at
fraud in oral sales practices. 49 ALI PROCEEDINGS 417-18 (1972) (colloquy between
Prof. R. Knauss and Prof. Loss). See also id. at 376-77 (remarks of Prof. Loss) (initial
consideration of suitability test for limited offerings).
For a time, section 913, the shingle-theory codification, contained a provision on
suitability. This provision was deleted in the belief that the doctrine is "still to amorphous for codification." 53 ALI PROCEEDINGS 538 (1976) (remarks of Prof. Loss).
Instead, the present intent seems to be to "leave the whole doctrine of suitability
to further administrative development by rule." Id. at 542 (remarks of Prof. Loss).
'"e went through various drafts and decided that we would neither foreclose the development nor encourage the development but just maintain a neutral position." Id.
at 542-43 (remarks of Prof. Loss).
654. See Mundheim, supra note 60, at 451, 466-67.
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private actions to violations "tantamount to fraud," a situation which
some had argued would free the NASD to elaborate the rule without
the fear of legal liability, 655 the NASD has failed to so limit private
actions. It persists in identifying the rule with its special per se applications. The apparently infrequent NASD enforcement has led
to only a handful of appeals to the SEC. Thus, Commission adjudication has contributed no more to the construction of the NASD rule
than it has to that of the fraud-suitability relationship. The SECO
rule has not even led to a single reported case. Finally, the SEC's
power to force a clearer rule on the exchanges and the NASD, though
cited by the Code commentary as an available recourse, 65 0 will almost
certainly go unexercised because of its potential to upset the entire
self-regulatory equilibrium657 It seems likely that the stalemate will
persist.
If such a stalemate in fact continues-the NASD refusing to attack the basic problems of the suitability doctrine, the courts without
the skills to do so, the SEC unable or unwilling to do so-then the
Code's new model of liability offers the most promise. Section 915
would empower the Commission to shape the suitability doctrine
through rulemaking.
The draftsmen were also wise to confer specific power on the
SEC to issue suitability rules, rather than a general broker-practice
rulemaking power limited by the "fiduciary relationship" standard.
One very practical reason is that, if the Code refers directly to suitability by name, it is far more likely that the Commission will be motivated, and perhaps even pressed, to proceed in that area. In addition, the absence of any clear indication in the law as to what interactions between broker and customer are enough to establish a fiduciary relationship6 5 s would lend further uncertainty to a rulemaking
power based thereon. "The fiduciary theory will probably be of little
value in the many suitability cases where the reason for the brokerdealer's dereliction was partly attributable to minimal prior contacts
with the customer." 5" There is some authority that a broker is neces655. See, e.g., Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v.
First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388, 394-96 (1972).
656. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977) § 914, Comment (1)(c).
657. See Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation
of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 811 (1971).
658. Leavell, supra note 60, at 1595-99.
659. Rediker, supra note 47, at 40 n.116. See also Mundheim, supra note 60, at
470-71, 473-75. But see Hed-Hofmann, supra note 20, at 200 ("If the broker-dealer
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sarily a fiduciary to his customers. 660 On the other hand, the Special
Study was unwilling to conclude that a general suitability doctrine
as to recommendations could be derived from fiduciary obligations, 6 61
and in 1969 the Commission expressly held that "it is not necessary to
show a fiduciary relationship with their customers to hold [brokers]
accountable for the recommendations" they make. 66 2 Thus, it was
wise of the ALI not to court unnecessary controversy over the scope
of the Commission's power when the power of Congress to enact a
provision conferring specific power on the SEC to adopt suitability
rules could not realistically be contested.
Even assuming that the "fiduciary relationship" language would
cover any situation where reliance or even a recommendation was
present, the definition and significance of investor free choice govern the rationality of restricting the doctrine to the context of recommendations or of reliance. Because the analysis of the wisdom
of such restrictions in the context of a particular concept of investor
free choice is likely to turn upon empirical assessments, 63 those restrictions should not be frozen into legislation.
Limits upon the Commission's power to respond to breakthroughs
in portfolio theory on an ad hoc basis are also undesirable. If, for
example, it became incontestably clear that a certain form of portfolio diversification yielded dramatic advantages, the Commission
now would probably have the authority, through the supplementary
"unfair dealing" rulemaking power of section 915(b), to require
brokers to advise their customers against transactions that fail to
exploit such diversification, even in order clerk situations.
It might, however, have been preferable to list certain standards
as a guide for the Commission, in the manner that standards are pro664
vided to the Commission for its adoption of rules on civil liability.
Among the broad values that might be specified are (a) the preservation of investor free choice, (b) the avoidance of securities regulation masquerading as suitability regulation, (c) the application of
advises the customer - even though he is acting as a dealer - he becomes a fiduciary.").
660. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1978);
text accompanying note 160 supra (SEC commentary accompanying rule hlAel-1).
661. SPECIA STDuny, supra note 18, pt. 1, at 237-38, 252-53.
662. Richard N. Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 17 (1969).
663. See text accompanying notes 426-46 supra.
664. As to the pro's and con's of providing the SEC with standards to channel its
discretion, see 49 ALI PROCEEDiNGs 382-85 (1972).
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portfolio theory in developing operational suitability rules, and (d)
the adoption of a standard of care which does not remain static.
Providing the SEC by statute with specific rulemaking power
in the area of suitability offers several additional advantages. First,
by allowing the Commission to promulgate a general rule applicable
to all brokers, the confusion caused by the differences between the
NASD suitability rule and rule 15b10-3 is eliminated. Second, such
power leaves the Commission with the vital flexibility to choose
whether to defer to the NASD in initiating cases under the rule
(subject to Commission review) or to bring actions directly. This
power would provide a strong incentive to the NASD to clarify the
doctrine and, so long as the NASD responded to that incentive, would
allow the Commission to benefit from the special knowledge and experience of the self-regulators. Such a course would also give the
SEC the ability it now lacks to generate cases directly that will further refine the doctrine. Thus, the proposal would not abandon a
beneficial mix of rulemaking and adjudication but rather would
strengthen both of these vital ingredients of lawmaking. Third, the
rulemaking power may be broad enough to permit the SEC to clarify
the confusion as to measure of damages. SEC rules could grant an
award measured as accurately as possible in terms of the departure
from the portfolio the customer would have had if the broker had
acted lawfully, or could, at least, allow greater flexibility in arriving
at damages. Finally, the SEC could use its rulemaking power to
determine whether any defenses in addition to the general statutory
defenses of estoppel and in pari delicto should be permitted.
The only shortcoming of the Code approach, which may well
be merely an oversight caused by haste, is the failure to provide for
civil liability for violations of section 915 suitability rules. The intent behind section 915 seems to have been to empower the Commission to add to the list of shingle theory violations directly codified
in section 913, which unambiguously provides for civil liability. It
is certainly anomalous that the SEC is empowered under section
1721(a)(1) to designate any self-regulatory rule as giving rise to
civil liability, but is not so empowered with respect to its own section 915 suitability rules. Especially in light of the uncertain guidance afforded the courts by the section 1722(a) criteria it is unfortunate that the Code fails to provide for private suits to enforce section 915 suitability rules.

